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Abstract
This work initiates a general study of learning and generalization without the i.i.d. assump-
tion, starting from first principles. While the standard approach to statistical learning the-
ory is based on assumptions chosen largely for their convenience (e.g., i.i.d. or stationary
ergodic), in this work we are interested in developing a theory of learning based only on
the most fundamental and natural assumptions implicit in the requirements of the learning
problem itself. We specifically study universally consistent function learning, where the
objective is to obtain low long-run average loss for any target function, when the data
follow a given stochastic process. We are then interested in the question of whether there
exist learning rules guaranteed to be universally consistent given only the assumption that
universally consistent learning is possible for the given data process. The reasoning that
motivates this criterion emanates from a kind of optimist’s decision theory, and so we refer
to such learning rules as being optimistically universal. We study this question in three
natural learning settings: inductive, self-adaptive, and online. Remarkably, as our strongest
positive result, we find that optimistically universal learning rules do indeed exist in the
self-adaptive learning setting. Establishing this fact requires us to develop new approaches
to the design of learning algorithms. Along the way, we also identify concise characteriza-
tions of the family of processes under which universally consistent learning is possible in
the inductive and self-adaptive settings. We additionally pose a number of enticing open
problems, particularly for the online learning setting.
Keywords: statistical learning theory, universal consistency, nonparametric estimation,
stochastic processes, non-stationary processes, generalization, domain adaptation, online
learning
1. Introduction
At least since the time of the ancient Pyrrhonists, it has been observed that learning in
general is sometimes not possible. Rather than turning to radical skepticism, modern learn-
ing theorists have preferred to introduce constraining assumptions, under which learning
becomes possible, and have established positive guarantees for various learning strategies
under these assumptions. However, one problem is that the assumptions we have focused
on in the literature tend to be assumptions of convenience, simplifying the analysis, rather
than assumptions rooted in a principled approach. This is typified by the overwhelming re-
liance on the assumption that training samples are independent and identically distributed,
or resembling this (e.g., stationary ergodic). In the present work, we revisit the issue of the
assumptions at the foundations of statistical learning theory, starting from first principles,
without relying on assumptions of convenience about the data, such as independence or
stationarity.
We approach this via a kind of optimist’s decision theory, reasoning that if we are
tasked with achieving a given objective O in some scenario, then already we have implicitly
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committed to the assumption that achieving objective O is at least possible in that scenario.
We may therefore rely on this assumption in our strategy for achieving the objective. We
are then most interested in strategies guaranteed to achieve objective O in all scenarios
where it is possible to do so: that is, strategies that rely only on the assumption that
objective O is achievable. Such strategies have the satisfying property that, if ever they fail
to achieve the objective, we may rest assured that no other strategy could have succeeded,
so that nothing was lost.
Thus, in approaching the problem of learning (suitably formalized), we may restrict
focus to those scenarios in which learning is possible. This assumption — that learning
is possible — essentially represents a most “natural” assumption, since it is necessary for
a theory of learning. Concretely, in this work, we initiate this line of exploration by fo-
cusing on (arguably) the most basic type of learning problem: universal consistency in
learning a function. Following the optimist’s reasoning above, we are interested in deter-
mining whether there exist learning strategies that are optimistically universal learners, in
the sense that they are guaranteed to be universally consistent given only the assumption
that universally consistent learning is possible under the given data process: that is, they
are universally consistent under all data processes that admit the existence of universally
consistent learners. We find that, in certain learning protocols, such optimistically universal
learners do indeed exist, and we provide a construction of such a learning rule. Interest-
ingly, it turns out that not all learning rules consistent under the i.i.d. assumption satisfy
this type of universality, so that this criterion can serve as an informative desideratum in
the design of learning methods. Along the way, we are also interested in expressing concise
necessary and sufficient conditions for universally consistent learning to be possible for a
given data process.
We specifically consider three natural learning settings — inductive, self-adaptive, and
online — distinguished by the level of access to the data available to the learner. In all
three settings, we suppose there is an unknown target function f⋆ and a sequence of data
(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . with Yt = f
⋆(Xt), of which the learner is permitted to observe the first
n samples (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn): the training data. Based on these observations, the learner
is tasked with producing a predictor fn. The performance of the learner is determined by
how well fn(Xt) approximates the (unobservable) Yt value for data (Xt, Yt) encountered
in the future (i.e., t > n).1 To quantify this, we suppose there is a loss function ℓ, and
we are interested in obtaining a small long-run average value of ℓ(fn(Xt), Yt). A learning
rule is said to be universally consistent under the process {Xt} if it achieves this (almost
surely, as n→∞) for all target functions f⋆.2 The three different settings are then formed
as natural variants of this high-level description. The first is the basic inductive learning
setting, in which fn is fixed after observing the initial n samples, and we are interested in
obtaining a small value of 1m
∑n+m
t=n+1 ℓ(fn(Xt), Yt) for all large m. This inductive setting is
perhaps the most commonly-studied in the prior literature on statistical learning theory (see
1. Of course, in certain real learning scenarios, these future Yt values might never actually be observable,
and therefore should be considered merely as hypothetical values for the purpose of theoretical analysis
of performance.
2. Technically, to be consistent with the terminology used in the literature on universal consistency, we
should qualify this as “universally consistent for function learning,” to indicate that Yt is a fixed function
of Xt. However, since we do not consider noisy Yt values or drifting target functions in this work, we
omit this qualification and simply write “universally consistent” for brevity.
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e.g., Devroye, Gyo¨rfi, and Lugosi, 1996). The second setting is a more-advanced variant,
which we call self-adaptive learning, in which fn may be updated after each subsequent
prediction fn(Xt), based on the additional unlabeled observations Xn+1, . . . ,Xt: that is, it
continues to learn from its test data. In this case, denoting by fn,t the predictor chosen
after observing (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn),Xn+1, . . . ,Xt, we are interested in obtaining a small
value of 1m
∑n+m
t=n+1 ℓ(fn,t−1(Xt), Yt) for all large m. This setting is related to several others
studied in the literature, including semi-supervised learning (Chapelle, Scho¨lkopf, and Zien,
2010), transductive learning (Vapnik, 1982, 1998), and (perhaps most-importantly) the
problems of domain adaptation and covariate shift (Huang, Smola, Gretton, Borgwardt,
and Scho¨lkopf, 2007; Cortes, Mohri, Riley, and Rostamizadeh, 2008; Ben-David, Blitzer,
Crammer, Kulesza, Pereira, and Vaughan, 2010). Finally, the strongest setting considered
in this work is the online learning setting, in which, after each prediction fn(Xt), the learner
is permitted to observe Yt and update its predictor fn. We are then interested in obtaining
a small value of 1m
∑m−1
n=0 ℓ(fn(Xn+1), Yn+1) for all large m. This is a particularly strong
setting, since it requires that the supervisor providing the Yt responses remains present in
perpetuity. Nevertheless, this is sometimes the case to a certain extent (e.g., in forecasting
problems), and consequently the online setting has received considerable attention (e.g.,
Littlestone, 1988; Haussler, Littlestone, and Warmuth, 1994; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006;
Ben-David, Pa´l, and Shalev-Shwartz, 2009; Rakhlin, Sridharan, and Tewari, 2015).
Our strongest result is for the self-adaptive setting, where we propose a new learning rule
and prove that it is universally consistent under every data process {Xt} for which there
exist universally consistent self-adaptive learning rules. As mentioned above, we refer to
this property as being optimistically universal. Interestingly, we also prove that there is no
optimistically universal inductive learning rule, so that the additional ability to learn from
the (unlabeled) test data is crucial. For both inductive and self-adaptive learning, we also
prove that the family of processes {Xt} that admit the existence of universally consistent
learning rules is completely characterized by a simple condition on the tail behavior of
empirical frequencies. In particular, this also means that these two families of processes
are equal. In contrast, we find that the family of processes admitting the existence of
universally consistent online learning rules forms a strict superset of these other two families.
However, beyond this, the treatment of the online learning setting in this work remains
incomplete, and leaves a number of enticing open problems regarding whether or not there
exist optimistically universal online learning rules, and concisely characterizing the family
of processes admitting the existence of universally consistent online learners. In addition
to results about learning rules, we also argue that there is no consistent hypothesis test
for whether a given process admits the existence of universally consistent learners (in any
of these settings), indicating that the possibility of learning must indeed be considered an
assumption, rather than merely a verifiable hypothesis. The above results are all established
for general bounded losses. We also discuss the case of unbounded losses, a much more
demanding setting for universal learners. In that setting, the theory becomes significantly
simpler, and we are able to resolve the essential questions of interest for all three learning
settings, with the exception of one particular question on the types of processes that admit
the existence of universally consistent learning rules.
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1.1 Formal Definitions
We begin our formal discussion with a few basic definitions. Let (X ,B) be a measurable
space, with B a Borel σ-algebra generated by a separable metrizable topological space
(X ,T ), where X is called the instance space and is assumed to be nonempty. Fix a space
Y, called the value space, and a function ℓ : Y2 → [0,∞), called the loss function. We
also denote ℓ¯ = sup
y,y′∈Y
ℓ(y, y′). Unless otherwise indicated explicitly, we will suppose ℓ¯ <∞
(i.e., ℓ is bounded); the sole exception to this is Section 8, which is devoted to exploring the
setting of unbounded ℓ. Furthermore, to focus on nontrivial scenarios, we will suppose X
and Y are nonempty and ℓ¯ > 0 throughout.
For simplicity, we suppose that ℓ is a metric, and that (Y, ℓ) is a separable metric space.
For instance, this is the case for discrete classification under the 0-1 loss, or real-valued
regression under the absolute loss. However, we note that most of the theory developed
here easily extends (with only superficial modifications) to any ℓ that is merely dominated
by a separable metric ℓo, in the sense that ∀y, y′ ∈ Y, ℓ(y, y′) ≤ φ(ℓo(y, y′)) for some con-
tinuous nondecreasing function φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) with φ(0) = 0, and which satisfies a
non-triviality condition supy0,y1 infymax{ℓ(y, y0), ℓ(y, y1)} > 0. This then admits regres-
sion under the squared loss, discrete classification with asymmetric misclassification costs,
and many other interesting cases. We include a brief discussion of this generalization in
Section 9.1.
Below, any reference to a measurable set A ⊆ X should be taken to mean A ∈ B,
unless otherwise specified. Additionally, let Ty be the topology on Y induced by ℓ, and let
By = σ(Ty) denote the Borel σ-algebra on Y generated by Ty; references to measurability
of subsets B ⊆ Y below should be taken to indicate B ∈ By. We will be interested in the
problem of learning from data described by a discrete-time stochastic process X = {Xt}∞t=1
on X . We do not make any assumptions about the nature of this process. For any s ∈ N
and t ∈ N ∪ {∞}, and any sequence {xi}∞i=1, define xs:t = {xi}ti=s, or xs:t = {} if t < s,
where {} or ∅ denotes the empty sequence (overloading notation, as these may also denote
the empty set); for convenience, also define xs:0 = {}. For any function f and sequence
x = {xi}∞i=1 in the domain of f , we denote f(x) = {f(xi)}∞i=1 and f(xs:t) = {f(xi)}ti=s.
Also, for any set A ⊆ X , we denote by xs:t ∩A or A ∩ xs:t the subsequence of all entries of
xs:t contained in A, and |xs:t ∩A| denotes the number of indices i ∈ N ∩ [s, t] with xi ∈ A.
For any function g : X → R, and any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 in X , define
µˆx(g) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt).
For any set A ⊆ X we overload this notation, defining µˆx(A) = µˆx(1A), where 1A is the
binary indicator function for the set A. We also use the notation 1[p], for any logical
proposition p, to denote a value that is 1 if p holds (evaluates to “True”), and 0 otherwise.
We also make use of the standard notation for limits of sequences {Ai}∞i=1 of sets (see e.g.,
Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000): lim sup
i→∞
Ai =
∞⋂
k=1
∞⋃
i=k
Ai, lim inf
i→∞
Ai =
∞⋃
k=1
∞⋂
i=k
Ai, and lim
i→∞
Ai
exists and equals lim sup
i→∞
Ai if and only if lim sup
i→∞
Ai = lim inf
i→∞
Ai. Additionally, for a set A,
a function T : A → R bounded from below, and a value ε > 0, define argminε
a∈A
T (a) as an
4
Learning Whenever Learning is Possible
arbitrary element a∗ ∈ A with T (a∗) ≤ inf
a∈A
T (a) + ε; we also allow ε = 0 in this definition
in the case inf
a∈A
T (a) is realized by some T (a), a ∈ A; to be clear, we suppose argminε
a∈A
T (a)
evaluates to the same a∗ every time it appears (for a given function T and set A).
As discussed above, we are interested in three learning settings, defined as follows. An
inductive learning rule is any sequence of measurable functions fn : X n × Yn × X → Y,
n ∈ N ∪ {0}. A self-adaptive learning rule is any array of measurable functions fn,m :
Xm × Yn × X → Y, n,m ∈ N ∪ {0}, m ≥ n. An online learning rule is any sequence of
measurable functions fn : X n × Yn × X → Y, n ∈ N ∪ {0}. In each case, these functions
can potentially be stochastic (that is, we allow fn itself to be a random variable), though
independent from X. For any measurable f⋆ : X → Y, any inductive learning rule fn, any
self-adaptive learning rule gn,m, and any online learning rule hn, we define
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) = lim sup
t→∞
1
t
n+t∑
m=n+1
ℓ (fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xm), f
⋆(Xm)) ,
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆;n) = lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ(gn,m(X1:m, f
⋆(X1:n),Xm+1), f
⋆(Xm+1)) ,
LˆX(h·, f⋆;n) = 1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ(ht(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1)) .
In each case, LˆX(·, f⋆;n) measures a kind of limiting loss of the learning rule, relative
to the source of the target values: f⋆. In this context, we refer to f⋆ as the target function.
Note that, in the cases of inductive and self-adaptive learning rules, we are interested in
the average future losses after some initial number n of “training” observations, for which
target values are provided, and after which no further target values are observable. Thus,
a small value of the loss LˆX in these settings represents a kind of generalization to fu-
ture (possibly previously-unseen) data points. In particular, in the special case of i.i.d.
X with marginal distribution PX , the strong law of large numbers implies that the loss
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) of an inductive learning rule fn is equal (almost surely) to the usual notion
of the risk of fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n), ·) — namely,
∫
ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n), x), f
⋆(x))PX(dx) —
commonly studied in the statistical learning theory literature, so that LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) repre-
sents a generalization of the notion of risk (for deterministic responses). Note that, in the
general case, the average loss 1t
n+t∑
m=n+1
ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xm), f
⋆(Xm)) might not have a
well-defined limit as t → ∞, particularly for non-stationary processes X, and it is for this
reason that we use the limit superior in the definition (and similarly for LˆX(gn,·, f⋆;n)).
We also note that, since the loss function is always finite, we could have included the losses
on the training samples in the summation in the inductive LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) definition without
affecting its value. This observation yields a convenient simplification of the definition, as
it implies the following equality.
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) = µˆX(ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), ·), f⋆(·))) .
The distinction between the inductive and self-adaptive settings is merely the fact that
the self-adaptive learning rule is able to update the function used for prediction after ob-
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serving each “test” point Xt, t > n. Note that the target values are not available for these
test points: only the “unlabeled” Xt values. In the special case of an i.i.d. process, the
self-adaptive setting is closely related to the semi-supervised learning setting studied in the
statistical learning theory literature (Chapelle, Scho¨lkopf, and Zien, 2010). In the case of
non-stationary processes, it has relations to problems of domain adaptation and covariate
shift (Huang, Smola, Gretton, Borgwardt, and Scho¨lkopf, 2007; Cortes, Mohri, Riley, and
Rostamizadeh, 2008; Ben-David, Blitzer, Crammer, Kulesza, Pereira, and Vaughan, 2010).
In the case of online learning, the prediction function is again allowed to update after
every test point, but in this case the target value for the test point is accessible (after
the prediction is made). This online setting, with precisely this same LˆX(h·, f⋆;n) objective
function, has been studied in the learning theory literature, both in the case of i.i.d. processes
and relaxations thereof (e.g., Haussler, Littlestone, and Warmuth, 1994; Gyo¨rfi, Kohler,
Krzyz˙ak, and Walk, 2002) and in the very-general setting of X an arbitrary process (e.g.,
Littlestone, 1988; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006; Rakhlin, Sridharan, and Tewari, 2015).
Our interest in the present work is the basic problem of universal consistency, wherein
the objective is to design a learning rule with the guarantee that the long-run average loss
LˆX approaches zero (almost surely) as the training sample size n grows large, and that this
fact holds true for any target function f⋆. Specifically, we have the following definitions.
Definition 1 We say an inductive learning rule fn is strongly universally consistent under
X if, for every measurable f⋆ : X → Y, lim
n→∞ LˆX(fn, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.).
We say a process X admits strong universal inductive learning if there exists an inductive
learning rule fn that is strongly universally consistent under X.
We denote by SUIL the set of all processes X that admit strong universal inductive learning.
Definition 2 We say a self-adaptive learning rule fn,m is strongly universally consistent
under X if, for every measurable f⋆ : X → Y, lim
n→∞ LˆX(fn,·, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.).
We say a process X admits strong universal self-adaptive learning if there exists a self-
adaptive learning rule fn,m that is strongly universally consistent under X.
We denote by SUAL the set of all processes X that admit strong universal self-adaptive
learning.
Definition 3 We say an online learning rule fn is strongly universally consistent under X
if, for every measurable f⋆ : X → Y, lim
n→∞ LˆX(f·, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.).
We say a process X admits strong universal online learning if there exists an online learning
rule fn that is strongly universally consistent under X.
We denote by SUOL the set of all processes X that admit strong universal online learning.
Technically, the above definitions of universal consistency are defined relative to the loss
function ℓ. However, we will establish below that SUIL and SUAL are in fact invariant to
the choice of (Y, ℓ), subject to the basic assumptions stated above (separable, 0 < ℓ¯ <∞).
We will also find that this is true of SUOL, subject to the additional constraint that (Y, ℓ)
is totally bounded. Furthermore, for unbounded losses we find that all three families are
invariant to (Y, ℓ), subject to separability and ℓ¯ > 0.
As noted above, much of the prior literature on universal consistency without the i.i.d.
assumption has focused on relaxations of the i.i.d. assumption to more-general families of
6
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processes, such as stationary mixing, stationary ergodic, or certain limited forms of non-
stationarity (see e.g., Steinwart, Hush, and Scovel, 2009, Chapter 27 of Gyo¨rfi, Kohler,
Krzyz˙ak, and Walk, 2002, and references therein). In each case, these relaxations were
chosen largely for their convenience, as they preserve the essential features of the i.i.d.
setting used in the traditional approaches to proving consistency of certain learning rules
(particularly, features related to concentration of measure). In contrast, our primary interest
in the present work is to study the natural assumption intrinsic to the universal consistency
problem itself : the assumption that universal consistency is possible. In other words, we
are interested in the following abstract question:
Do there exist learning rules that are strongly universally consistent under
every process X that admits strong universal learning?
Each of the three learning settings yields a concrete instantiation of this question. For the
reason discussed in the introductory remarks, we refer to any such learning rule as being
optimistically universal. Thus, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 An (inductive/self-adaptive/online) learning rule is optimistically universal
if it is strongly universally consistent under every process X that admits strong universal
(inductive/self-adaptive/online) learning.
1.2 Summary of the Main Results
Here we briefly summarize the main results of this work. Their proofs, along with several
other results, will be developed throughout the rest of this article.
The main positive result in this work is the following theorem, which establishes that
optimistically universal self-adaptive learning is indeed possible. In fact, in proving this
result, we develop a specific construction of one such self-adaptive learning rule.
Theorem 5 There exists an optimistically universal self-adaptive learning rule.
Interestingly, it turns out that the additional capabilities of self-adaptive learning, com-
pared to inductive learning, are actually necessary for optimistically universal learning.
This is reflected in the following result.
Theorem 6 There does not exist an optimistically universal inductive learning rule, if
(X ,T ) is an uncountable Polish space.
Taken together, these two results are interesting indeed, as they indicate there can be
strong advantages to designing learning methods to be self-adaptive. This seems particu-
larly interesting when we note that very few learning methods in common use are designed
to exploit this capability: that is, to adjust their trained predictor based on the (unlabeled)
test samples they encounter. In light of these results, it therefore seems worthwhile to re-
visit the definitions of these methods with a view toward designing self-adaptive variants.
As for the online learning setting, the present work makes only partial progress toward
resolving the question of the existence of optimistically universal online learning rules (in
Section 6). In particular, the following question remains open at this time.
7
Steve Hanneke
Open Problem 1 Does there exist an optimistically universal online learning rule?
To be clear, as we discuss in Section 6, one can convert the optimistically universal
self-adaptive learning rule from Theorem 5 into an online learning rule that is strongly
universally consistent for any process X that admits strong universal self-adaptive learning.
However, as we prove below, the set of processes X that admit strong universal online
learning is a strict superset of these, and so optimistically universal online learning represents
a much stronger requirement for the learner.
In the process of studying the above, we also investigate the problem of concisely char-
acterizing the family of processes that admit strong universal learning, of each of the three
types: that is, SUIL, SUAL, and SUOL. In particular, consider the following simple condi-
tion on the tail behavior of a given process X.
Condition 1 For every monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B with Ak ↓ ∅,
lim
k→∞
E[µˆX(Ak)] = 0.
Denote by C1 the set of all processes X satisfying Condition 1. In Section 2 below, we
discuss this condition in detail, and also provide several equivalent forms of the condition.
One interesting instance of this is Theorem 12, which notes that Condition 1 is equivalent to
the condition that the set function E[µˆX(·)] is a continuous submeasure (Definition 10 below).
For our present interest, the most important fact about Condition 1 is that it precisely
identifies which processes X admit strong universal inductive or self-adaptive learning, as
the following theorem states.
Theorem 7 The following statements are equivalent for any process X.
• X satisfies Condition 1.
• X admits strong universal inductive learning.
• X admits strong universal self-adaptive learning.
Equivalently, SUIL = SUAL = C1.
Certainly any i.i.d. process satisfies Condition 1 (by the strong law of large numbers).
Indeed, we argue in Section 3.1 that any process satisfying the law of large numbers — or
more generally, having pointwise convergent relative frequencies — satisfies Condition 1,
and hence by Theorem 7 admits strong universal learning (in both settings). For instance,
this implies that all stationary processes admit strong universal inductive and self-adaptive
learning. However, as we also demonstrate in Section 3.1, there are many other types of pro-
cesses, which do not have convergent relative frequencies, but which do satisfy Condition 1,
and hence admit universal learning, so that Condition 1 represents a strictly more-general
condition.
Other than the fact that Condition 1 precisely characterizes the families of processes
that admit strong universal inductive or self-adaptive learning, another interesting fact
established by Theorem 7 is that these two families are actually equivalent : that is, SUIL =
8
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SUAL. Interestingly, as alluded to above, we find that this equivalence does not extend to
online learning. Specifically, in Section 6 we find that SUAL ⊆ SUOL, with strict inclusion
iff X is infinite.
As for the problem of concisely characterizing the family of processes that admit strong
universal online learning, again the present work only makes partial progress. Specifically,
in Section 6, we formulate a concise necessary condition for a process X to admit strong
universal online learning (Condition 2 below), but we leave open the important question of
whether this condition is also sufficient, or more-broadly of identifying a concise condition
on X equivalent to the condition that X admits strong universal online learning.
In addition to the questions of optimistically universal learning and concisely charac-
terizing the family of processes admitting universal learning, another interesting question
is whether it is possible to empirically test whether a given process admits universal learn-
ing (of any of the three types). However, in Section 7 we find that in all three settings
this is not the case. Specifically, in Theorem 43 we prove that (when X is infinite) there
does not exist a consistent hypothesis test for whether a given X admits strong universal
(inductive/self-adaptive/online) learning. Hence, the assumption that learning is possible
truly is an assumption, rather than a testable hypothesis.
While all of the above results are established for bounded losses, Section 8 is devoted
to the study of these same issues in the case of unbounded losses. In that case, the theory
becomes significantly simplified, as universal consistency is much more difficult to achieve,
and hence the family of processes that admit universal learning is severely restricted. We
specifically find that, when the loss is unbounded, there exists an optimistically universal
learning rule of all three types. We also identify a concise condition (Condition 3 below)
that is necessary and sufficient for a process to admit strong universal learning in any/all
of the three settings.
We discuss extensions of this theory in Section 9, discussing more-general loss functions,
as well as relaxation of the requirement of strong consistency to mere weak consistency.
Finally, we conclude the article in Section 10 by summarizing several interesting open ques-
tions that arise from the theory developed below.
2. Equivalent Expressions of Condition 1
Before getting into the analysis of learning, we first discuss basic properties of the µˆx
functional. In particular, we find that there are several equivalent ways to state Condition 1,
which will be useful in various parts of the proofs below, and which may themselves be of
independent interest in some cases.
2.1 Basic Lemmas
We begin by stating some basic properties of the µˆx functional that will be indispensable
in the proofs below.
Lemma 8 For any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 in X , and any functions f : X → R and g :
X → R, if µˆx(f) and µˆx(g) are not both infinite and of opposite signs, then the following
9
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properties hold.
1. (monotonicity) if f ≤ g, then µˆx(f) ≤ µˆx(g),
2. (homogeneity) ∀c ∈ (0,∞), µˆx(cf) = cµˆx(f),
3. (subadditivity) µˆx(f + g) ≤ µˆx(f) + µˆx(g).
Proof Properties 1 and 2 follow directly from the definition of µˆx, and monotonicity and
homogeneity (for positive constants) of lim sup. Property 3 is established by noting
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
(f(xt) + g(xt)) ≤ lim
k→∞
(
sup
n≥k
1
n
n∑
t=1
f(xt)
)
+
(
sup
n≥k
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt)
)
=
(
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
f(xt)
)
+
(
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt)
)
.
These properties immediately imply related properties for the set function µˆx.
Lemma 9 For any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 in X , and any sets A,B ⊆ X ,
1. (nonnegativity) 0 ≤ µˆx(A),
2. (monotonicity) µˆx(A ∩B) ≤ µˆx(A),
3. (subadditivity) µˆx(A ∪B) ≤ µˆx(A) + µˆx(B).
Proof These follow directly from the properties listed in Lemma 8, since 0 ≤ 1A, 1A∩B ≤
1A, and 1A∪B ≤ 1A + 1B.
2.2 An Equivalent Expression in Terms of Continuous Submeasures
Next, we note a connection to a much-studied definition from the measure theory literature:
namely, the notion of a continuous submeasure. This notion appears in the measure theory
literature, most commonly under the name Maharam submeasure (see e.g., Maharam, 1947;
Talagrand, 2008; Bogachev, 2007), but is also referred to as a subadditive Dobrakov submea-
sure (see e.g., Dobrakov, 1974, 1984), and related notions arise in discussions of Choquet
capacities (see e.g., Choquet, 1954; O’Brien and Vervaat, 1994).
Definition 10 A submeasure on B is a function ν : B → [0,∞] satisfying the following
properties.
1. ν(∅) = 0.
2. ∀A,B ∈ B, A ⊆ B ⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B).
3. ∀A,B ∈ B, ν(A ∪B) ≤ ν(A) + ν(B).
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A submeasure is called continuous if it additionally satisfies the condition
4. For every monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B with Ak ↓ ∅, limk→∞ ν(Ak) = 0.
The relevance of this definition to our present discussion is via the set function E[µˆX(·)],
which is always a submeasure, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 11 For any process X, E[µˆX(·)] is a submeasure.
Proof Since µˆX(∅) = 0 follows directly from the definition of µˆX, we have E[µˆX(∅)] =
E[0] = 0 as well (property 1 of Definition 10). Furthermore, monotonicity of µˆX (Lemma 8)
and monotonicity of the expectation imply monotonicity of E[µˆX(·)] (property 2 of Def-
inition 10). Likewise, finite subadditivity of µˆX (Lemma 9) implies that for A,B ∈ B,
µˆX(A ∪ B) ≤ µˆX(A) + µˆX(B), so that monotonicity and linearity of the expectation imply
E[µˆX(A ∪B)] ≤ E[µˆX(A) + µˆX(B)] = E[µˆX(A)] + E[µˆX(B)] (property 3 of Definition 10).
Together with the definition of Condition 1, this immediately implies the following theo-
rem, which states that Condition 1 is equivalent to E[µˆX(·)] being a continuous submeasure.
Theorem 12 A process X satisfies Condition 1 if and only if E[µˆX(·)] is a continuous
submeasure.
2.3 Other Equivalent Expressions of Condition 1
We next state several other results expressing equivalent formulations of Condition 1, and
other related properties. These equivalent forms will be useful in later proofs below.
Lemma 13 The following conditions are all equivalent to Condition 1.
• For every monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B with Ak ↓ ∅,
lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) = 0 (a.s.).
• For every sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B,
lim
i→∞
µˆX

⋃
k≥i
Ak

 = µˆX
(
lim sup
k→∞
Ak
)
(a.s.).
• For every disjoint sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B,
lim
i→∞
µˆX

⋃
k≥i
Ak

 = 0 (a.s.).
11
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Proof First, suppose X satisfies Condition 1, and let {Ak}∞k=1 be any monotone se-
quence in B with Ak ↓ ∅. By monotonicity and nonnegativity of the set function µˆX
(Lemma 9), lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) always exists and is nonnegative. Therefore, since the set func-
tion µˆX is bounded in [0, 1], the dominated convergence theorem implies E
[
lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak)
]
=
lim
k→∞
E [µˆX(Ak)] = 0, where the last equality is due to Condition 1. Combined with the fact
that lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) ≥ 0, it follows that lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) = 0 (a.s.) (e.g., Ash and Dole´ans-Dade,
2000, Theorem 1.6.6). Thus, Condition 1 implies the first condition in the lemma.
Next, let X be any process satisfying the first condition in the lemma, and let {Ak}∞k=1
be any sequence in B. For each k ∈ N, let Bk = Ak \
⋃
j>k
Aj . Note that {Bk}∞k=1 is a
sequence of disjoint measurable sets. In particular, this implies
⋃
k≥i
Bk ↓ ∅, so that (since
X satisfies the first condition) lim
i→∞
µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Bk
)
= 0 (a.s.). Furthermore, for any i ∈ N, we
have
⋃
k≥i
Ak =
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
∪ ⋃
k≥i
Bk. Therefore, by finite subadditivity of µˆX (Lemma 9),
lim
i→∞
µˆX

⋃
k≥i
Ak

 = lim
i→∞
µˆX

(lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
∪
⋃
k≥i
Bk


≤ µˆX
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
+ lim
i→∞
µˆX

⋃
k≥i
Bk

 = µˆX
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
(a.s.).
Furthermore, since lim sup
j→∞
Aj ⊆
⋃
k≥i
Ak for every i ∈ N, monotonicity of µˆX (Lemma 8) im-
plies µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Ak
)
≥ µˆX
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
, which implies lim
i→∞
µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Ak
)
≥ µˆX
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
.
Together, we have that the first condition implies the second condition in this lemma. Fur-
thermore, the second condition in this lemma trivially implies the third condition, since any
disjoint sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B has lim sup
k→∞
Ak = ∅, and µˆX(∅) = 0 is immediate from the
definition of µˆX.
Finally, suppose the third condition in this lemma holds, and let {Ak}∞k=1 be a monotone
sequence in B with Ak ↓ ∅. For each k ∈ N, let Bk = Ak \
⋃
j>k
Aj . Note that {Bk}∞k=1
is a sequence of disjoint sets in B, and that monotonicity of {Ak}∞k=1 implies ∀k ∈ N,
Ak =
(
lim sup
j→∞
Aj
)
∪⋃
i≥k
Bi; furthermore, Ak ↓ ∅ implies lim sup
j→∞
Aj = ∅, so that Ak =
⋃
i≥k
Bi.
Therefore, the third condition in the lemma implies
lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) = lim
k→∞
µˆX

⋃
i≥k
Bi

 = 0 (a.s.).
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Since the set function µˆX is bounded in [0, 1], combining this with the dominated convergence
theorem implies lim
k→∞
E[µˆX(Ak)] = E
[
lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak)
]
= 0. Since this applies to any such se-
quence {Ak}∞k=1, we have that Condition 1 holds. This completes the proof of the lemma.
In combination with Lemma 13, the following lemma allows us to extend Condition 1
to other useful equivalent forms. In particular, the form expressed in (2) will be a key
component in the proof below (in Lemma 19) that Condition 1 is a necessary condition for
a process X to admit strong universal self-adaptive learning.
Lemma 14 For any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 of elements of X , and any sequence {Ai}∞i=1 of
disjoint subsets of X , the following conditions are all equivalent.
lim
k→∞
µˆx

⋃
i≥k
Ai

 = 0. (1)
lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= 0. (2)
lim
m→∞ limn→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
= 0. (3)
Proof Fix x and {Ai}∞i=1 as described. For each x ∈
∞⋃
i=1
Ai, let i(x) denote the index i ∈ N
with x ∈ Ai; for each x ∈ X \
∞⋃
i=1
Ai, let i(x) = 0.
First, suppose (2) is satisfied. For any k ∈ N, let
nk = max

n ∈ N ∪ {0,∞} : x1:n ∩
⋃
i≥k
Ai = ∅

 .
By definition of nk, we have
⋃
i≥k
Ai ⊆
⋃{Ai : x1:nk ∩ Ai = ∅}, so that monotonicity of µˆx
(Lemma 9) implies
lim
k→∞
µˆx

⋃
i≥k
Ai

 ≤ lim
k→∞
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:nk ∩Ai = ∅}
)
. (4)
Next note that monotonicity of
⋃
i≥k
Ai implies nk is nondecreasing in k. In particular, this
implies that if any k ∈ N has nk =∞, then
lim
k→∞
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:nk ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= 0
by definition of µˆx, which establishes (1) when combined with (4). Otherwise, suppose
nk < ∞ for all k ∈ N. In this case, note that ∀k ∈ N, by maximality of nk, we have
xnk+1 ∈
⋃
i≥k
Ai, so that i(xnk+1) ≥ k. Together with the definition of nk this also implies
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x1:nk∩
⋃
i≥i(xnk+1)+1
Ai = ∅, and by the definition of i(xnk+1) we know xnk+1 /∈
⋃
i≥i(xnk+1)+1
Ai,
so that in fact x1:(nk+1)∩
⋃
i≥i(xnk+1)+1
Ai = ∅. This implies ni(xnk+1)+1 ≥ nk+1. Thus, ∃k′ > k
s.t. nk′ ≥ nk + 1. Together with monotonicity of nk, this implies nk ↑ ∞. Combined with
(2), this implies that
lim
k→∞
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:nk ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= 0,
which establishes (1) when combined with (4) and nonnegativity of µˆx (Lemma 9).
Next, suppose (1) is satisfied, and fix any m ∈ N. By inductively applying the finite
subadditivity property of µˆx (Lemma 9), for any n, k ∈ N,
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
≤ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m, i ≥ k}
)
+
∑
i∈{1,...,k−1}:
|x1:n∩Ai|<m
µˆx(Ai).
(5)
Note that, for any i ∈ N with µˆx(Ai) > 0, there must be an infinite subsequence of x
contained in Ai; in particular, this implies ∃n′i ∈ N with |x1:n′i ∩Ai| = m. Also define n′i = 0
for every i ∈ N with µˆx(Ai) = 0. Therefore, defining
kn = min
({
i ∈ N : n′i > n
} ∪ {∞})
for every n ∈ N, we have that every i < kn has either |x1:n ∩ Ai| ≥ m or µˆx(Ai) = 0.
Therefore, ∑
i∈{1,...,kn−1}:
|x1:n∩Ai|<m
µˆx(Ai) = 0. (6)
Furthermore, by definition, kn is nondecreasing, and if kn < ∞, then any n′ ≥ n′kn has
n′ > n (since n′kn > n by the definition of kn), and hence n
′
i ≤ n′ for every i ≤ kn (since
minimality of kn implies n
′
i ≤ n < n′ for every i < kn, and by assumption n′kn ≤ n′), which
implies kn′ ≥ kn + 1. Therefore, we have kn → ∞. Thus, combined with (5) and (6), and
monotonicity of µˆx (Lemma 9), we have
lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
≤ lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m, i ≥ kn}
)
+
∑
i∈{1,...,kn−1}:
|x1:n∩Ai|<m
µˆx(Ai)
= lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m, i ≥ kn}
)
≤ lim
k→∞
µˆx

⋃
i≥k
Ai

 .
If (1) is satisfied, this last expression is 0. Thus,
lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
= 0
for all m ∈ N. Taking the limit of both sides as m→∞ establishes (3).
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Finally, note that for any n ∈ N,
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : x1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < 1}
)
,
and monotonicity of µˆx (Lemma 9) implies that for any m ∈ N,
µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < 1}
)
≤ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
.
Taking limits of both sides, we have
lim
n→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < 1}
)
≤ lim
m→∞ limn→∞ µˆx
(⋃
{Ai : |x1:n ∩Ai| < m}
)
.
Thus, if (3) is satisfied, then (2) must also hold.
One interesting property of processes X satisfying Condition 1 is that µˆX is countably
subadditive (almost surely), as implied by the following two lemmas. Note that this is not
necessarily true of processes X failing to satisfy Condition 1 (e.g., the process Xi = i on
N does not have countably subadditive µˆX). However, we note that this kind of countable
subadditivity is not actually equivalent to Condition 1, as not every process satisfying this
countable subadditivity condition also satisfies Condition 1 (e.g., any process X on N with
∀i ∈ N, µˆX({i}) = 1).
Lemma 15 For any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 of elements of X , and any sequence {Ai}∞i=1 of
disjoint subsets of X , if (1) is satisfied, then
µˆx
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
µˆx(Ai).
Proof By finite subadditivity of µˆx (Lemma 9 and induction), we have that for any k ∈ N,
µˆx
(∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤ µˆx

⋃
i≥k
Ai

+ k−1∑
i=1
µˆx(Ai). (7)
If (1) is satisfied, then lim
k→∞
µˆx
(⋃
i≥k
Ai
)
= 0, so that taking the limit as k →∞ in (7) yields
the claimed inequality, completing the proof.
Lemma 16 If X satisfies Condition 1, then for any sequence {Ai}∞i=1 in B,
µˆX
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
µˆX(Ai) (a.s.).
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Proof Let B1 = A1, and for each i ∈ N\{1}, let Bi = Ai\
i−1⋃
j=1
Aj. Then {Bi}∞i=1 is a disjoint
sequence in B. If X satisfies Condition 1, then Lemma 13 implies lim
k→∞
µˆX
( ⋃
j≥k
Bj
)
= 0
(a.s.). Combined with Lemma 15, this implies that µˆX
( ∞⋃
i=1
Bi
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
µˆX(Bi) (a.s.). Noting
that
∞⋃
i=1
Bi =
∞⋃
i=1
Ai, we have µˆX
(∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
µˆX(Bi) (a.s.). Finally, since Bi ⊆ Ai for
every i ∈ N, monotonicity of µˆX (Lemma 9) implies µˆX(Bi) ≤ µˆX(Ai), so that µˆX
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
µˆX(Ai) (a.s.).
3. Relation to the Condition of Convergent Relative Frequencies
Before proceeding with the general analysis, we first discuss the relation between Condition 1
and the commonly-studied condition of convergent relative frequencies. In particular, we
show that Condition 1 is a strictly more-general condition. This is interesting in the context
of learning, as the vast majority of the prior literature on statistical learning theory without
the i.i.d. assumption studies learning rules designed for and analyzed under assumptions
that imply convergent relative frequencies. These results therefore indicate that we should
not expect such learning rules to be optimistically universal, and hence that we will need
to seek more general strategies in designing optimistically universal learning rules.
Formally, define CRF as the set of processes X such that, ∀A ∈ B,
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1A(Xt) exists (a.s.). (8)
These processes are said to have convergent relative frequencies. Equivalently, this is
the family of processes with ergodic properties with respect to the class of measurements
{1A×X∞ : A ∈ B} (Gray, 2009). Certainly CRF contains every i.i.d. process, by the strong
law of large numbers. More generally, it is known that any stationary process X is con-
tained in CRF (by Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem), and in fact, it suffices for the process to be
asymptotically mean stationary (see Gray, 2009, Theorem 8.1).
3.1 Processes with Convergent Relative Frequencies Satisfy Condition 1
The following theorem establishes that every X with convergent relative frequencies satisfies
Condition 1, and that the inclusion is strict in all nontrivial cases.
Theorem 17 CRF ⊆ C1, and the inclusion is strict iff |X | ≥ 2.
Proof Fix any X ∈ CRF. For each A ∈ B, define πm(A) = 1m
∑m
t=1 P(Xt ∈ A). One
can easily verify that πm is a probability measure. The definition of CRF implies that,
∀A ∈ B, there exists an event EA of probability one, on which lim
m→∞
1
m
∑m
t=1 1A(Xt) exists;
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in particular, this implies µˆX(A) = lim
m→∞
1
m
∑m
t=1 1A(Xt)1EA almost surely. Together with
the dominated convergence theorem and linearity of expectations, this implies
E[µˆX(A)] = E
[
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1A(Xt)1EA
]
= lim
m→∞E
[
1
m
m∑
t=1
1A(Xt)1EA
]
= lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
P(Xt ∈ A) = lim
m→∞πm(A).
In particular, this establishes that the limit in the rightmost expression exists. The Vitali-
Hahn-Saks theorem then implies that lim
m→∞πm(·) is also a probability measure (see Gray,
2009, Lemma 7.4). Thus, we have established that A 7→ E[µˆX(A)] is a probability measure,
and hence is a continuous submeasure (see e.g., Schervish, 1995, Theorem A.19). That
CRF ⊆ C1 now follows from Theorem 12.
For the claim about strict inclusion, first note that if |X | = 1 then there is effectively
only one possible process (infinitely repeating the sole element of X ), and it is trivially
in CRF, so that CRF = C1. On the other hand, suppose |X | ≥ 2, let x0, x1 be distinct
elements of X , and define a deterministic process X such that, for every i ∈ N and every
t ∈ {3i−1, . . . , 3i − 1}, Xt = xi−2⌊i/2⌋: that is, Xt = x0 if i is even and Xt = x1 if i is odd.
Since any monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B with Ak ↓ ∅ necessarily has some k0 ∈ N with
{x0, x1} ∩ Ak = ∅ for all k ≥ k0, we have E[µˆX(Ak)] = 0 for all k ≥ k0, so that X ∈ C1.
However, for any odd i, 1
3i−1
3i−1∑
t=1
1{x1}(Xt) ≥ 23 , so that lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1{x1}(Xt) ≥ 23 , while
for any even i, 1
3i−1
3i−1∑
t=1
1{x1}(Xt) ≤ 13 , so that lim infm→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1{x1}(Xt) ≤ 13 . Therefore
1
m
m∑
t=1
1{x1}(Xt) does not have a limit as m→∞, and hence X /∈ CRF.
3.2 Inconsistency of the Nearest Neighbor Rule
The separation C1 \ CRF 6= ∅ established above indicates that, in approaching the design
of consistent inductive or self-adaptive learning rules under processes in C1, we should
not rely on the property of having convergent relative frequencies, as it is not generally
guaranteed to hold. Since most learning rules in the prior literature rely heavily on this
property for their performance guarantees, we should not generally expect them to be
consistent under processes in C1. To give a concrete example illustrating this, consider
X = [0, 1] (with the standard topology), and let fn be the well-known nearest neighbor
learning rule: an inductive learning rule defined by the property that fn(x1:n, y1:n, x) = yin ,
where in = argmin
i∈{1,...,n}
|x − xi| (breaking ties arbitrarily). This learning rule is known to be
strongly universally consistent (in the sense of Definition 1) under every i.i.d. process (e.g.,
Devroye, Gyo¨rfi, and Lugosi, 1996).
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We exhibit a process X ∈ C1, under which the nearest neighbor inductive learning rule
is not universally consistent.3 This also provides a second proof that C1 \CRF 6= ∅ for this
space, as this process will not have convergent relative frequencies. Specifically, let {Wi}∞i=1
be independent Uniform(0, 1/2) random variables. Let n1 = 1, and for each k ∈ N with
k ≥ 2, inductively define nk = nk−1 + k · n2k−1. Now for each k ∈ N, let ak = k − 2⌊k/2⌋
(i.e., ak = 1 if k is odd, and otherwise ak = 0), and let bk = 1 − ak. Define X1 = 0, and
for each k ∈ N with k ≥ 2, and each i ∈ {1, . . . , n2k−1}, define Xnk−1+(i−1)k+1 = bk2 + i−12n2
k−1
,
and for each j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, define Xnk−1+(i−1)k+j = ak2 +Wnk−1+(i−1)k+j.
The intention in constructing this process is that there are segments of the sequence in
which [0, 1/2) is relatively sparse compared to [1/2, 1], and other segments of the sequence in
which [1/2, 1] is relatively sparse compared to [0, 1/2). Furthermore, at certain time points
(namely, the nk times), the vast majority of the points on the sparse side are determined
a priori, in contrast to the points on the dense side, which are uniform random. This is
designed to frustrate most learning rules designed under the CRF assumption, many of
which would base their predictions on the sparse side on these deterministic points, rather
than the relatively very-sparse random points in the same region left over from the previous
epoch (i.e., when that region was relatively dense, and the majority of points in that region
were uniform random). It is easy to verify that, because of this switching of which side is
dense and which side sparse, which occurs infinitely many times, this process X does not
have convergent relative frequencies.
We first argue that X satisfies Condition 1. Let I = {1} ∪ {nk−1 + (i − 1)k + 1 : k ∈
N \ {1}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n2k−1}}. Note that every t ∈ N \ I has Xt ∈
{
Wt,
1
2 +Wt
}
. Now note
that, for any k ∈ N \ {1, 2} and any m ∈ {nk−1 + 1, . . . , nk},
|{t ∈ I : t ≤ m}| ≤ nk−2 + nk−1 − nk−2
k − 1 +
⌈
m− nk−1
k
⌉
≤ 1 + nk−2 + nk−1
k − 1 +
m− nk−1
k − 1
= 1 + nk−2 +
m
k − 1 ≤ 1 +
√
nk−1
k − 1 +
m
k − 1 ≤ 1 +
√
m
k − 1 +
m
k − 1 .
Thus, letting km = min{k ∈ N : m ≤ nk} for each m ∈ N, and noting that km →∞ (since
each nk is finite), we have that
lim
m→∞
|{t ∈ I : t ≤ m}|
m
≤ lim
m→∞
1
m
+
√
1
m(km − 1) +
1
km − 1 = 0.
We therefore have that, for any set A ∈ B,
µˆX(A) ≤ lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1N\I(t)1A(Xt)+ lim
m→∞
|{t∈I :t≤m}|
m
= lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1N\I(t)1A(Xt).
Furthermore, the rightmost expression above is at most
lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
(
1A(Wt)+1A
(
1
2
+Wt
))
≤ lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1A(Wt)+lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
1A
(
1
2
+Wt
)
3. Of course, Theorem 6 indicates that any inductive learning rule has processes in C1 for which it is not
universally consistent. However, the construction here is more direct, and illustrates a common failing
of many learning rules designed for i.i.d. data, so it is worth presenting this specialized argument as well.
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and the strong law of large numbers and the union bound imply that, with probability one,
the expression on the right hand side equals 2λ(A ∩ (0, 1/2)) + 2λ(A ∩ (1/2, 1)) = 2λ(A),
where λ is the Lebesgue measure. In particular, this implies E[µˆX(A)] ≤ 2λ(A) for every
A ∈ B. Therefore, for any monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B with Ak ↓ ∅, lim
k→∞
E[µˆX(Ak)] ≤
lim
k→∞
2λ(Ak) = 0 since 2λ(·) is a finite measure (because X is bounded) and therefore is
continuous (see e.g., Schervish, 1995, Theorem A.19). Thus, X satisfies Condition 1.
Now to see that the nearest neighbor rule is not universally consistent under this process
X, let y0, y1 ∈ Y be such that ℓ(y0, y1) > 0. Define
V =
{
bk
2
+
i− 1
2n2k−1
: k ∈ N \ {1}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n2k−1}
}
,
and take f⋆(x) = y1 for x ∈ [0, 1] \ V , and f⋆(x) = y0 for x ∈ V , and note that this is
a measurable function since V is measurable. Note that we have defined f⋆ so that, with
probability one, every t ∈ I has f⋆(Xt) = y0, and every t ∈ N \ I has f⋆(Xt) = y1. Then
note that, for any k ∈ N \ {1, 2} with ak = 1, the points {Xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ nk, f⋆(Xi) = y0}
form a 1
2n2
k−1
cover of [0, 1/2). Furthermore, the set {Xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ nk, f⋆(Xi) = y1} ∩
(0, 1/2) contains at most nk−1 points. Together, these facts imply that the set Nk = {x ∈
[0, 1] : fnk(X1:nk , f
⋆(X1:nk), x) = y0} has λ(Nk ∩ (0, 1/2)) ≥ 12 −
nk−1
2n2
k−1
= 12
(
1− 1nk−1
)
. In
particular, this implies that a Uniform(0, 1/2) random sample (independent from fnk and
X1:nk) has probability at least 1− 1nk−1 of being in Nk. However, for every k′ ∈ N\{1} with
2k′ > k, we have a2k′ = 0, so that the set {Xi : n2k′−1 < i ≤ n2k′}∩(0, 1/2) consists of (2k′−
1)n22k′−1 =
2k′−1
2k′ (n2k′−n2k′−1) independent Uniform(0, 1/2) samples (also independent from
fnk and X1:nk). Since V is countable, with probability one every one of these samples has
f⋆(Xi) = y1. Furthermore, a Chernoff bound (under the conditional distribution given
fnk and X1:nk) and the law of total probability imply that, with probability at least 1 −
exp
{
− 1
2(2k′−1)2
(
1− 1nk−1
)
(2k′ − 1)n22k′−1
}
≥ 1− exp{−(2k′ − 1)/4},
|Nk ∩ {Xi : n2k′−1 < i ≤ n2k′} ∩ (0, 1/2)| ≥
(
1− 1
2k′−1
)(
1− 1
nk−1
)
2k′−1
2k′
(n2k′ − n2k′−1).
Since
∞∑
k′=1
exp{−(2k′ − 1)/4} < ∞, the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that with probability
one this occurs for all sufficiently large k′. Thus, by the union bound, we have that with
probability one,
µˆX(ℓ(fnk(X1:nk , f
⋆(X1:nk), ·), f⋆(·)))
≥ lim sup
k′→∞
1
n2k′
n2k′∑
t=1
ℓ(fnk (X1:nk , f
⋆(X1:nk),Xt) , f
⋆(Xt))
≥ lim sup
k′→∞
|Nk ∩ {Xi : n2k′−1 < i ≤ n2k′} ∩ (0, 1/2)|
n2k′
ℓ(y0, y1)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1) lim sup
k′→∞
(
1− 1
2k′−1
)(
1− 1
nk−1
)
2k′−1
2k′
(
1−n2k′−1
n2k′
)
= ℓ(y0, y1)
(
1− 1
nk−1
)
.
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By the union bound, with probability one, this holds for every odd value of k ∈ N \ {1, 2}.
Thus, with probability one,
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) ≥ lim sup
k→∞
µˆX
(
ℓ
(
fn2k+1(X1:n2k+1 , f
⋆(X1:n2k+1), ·), f⋆(·)
))
≥ lim sup
k→∞
ℓ(y0, y1)
(
1− 1
n2k
)
= ℓ(y0, y1).
In particular, this implies fn is not strongly universally consistent under X. Similar argu-
ments can be constructed for most learning methods in common use (e.g., kernel rules, the
k-nearest neighbors rule, support vector machines with radial basis kernel).
It is clear from this example that obtaining consistency under general X satisfying
Condition 1 will require a new approach to the design of learning rules. We develop such
an approach in the sections below. The essential innovation is to base the predictions not
only on performance on points that seem typical relative to the present data set X1:n, but
also on the prefixes X1:n′ of the data set (for a well-chosen range of values n
′ ≤ n).
4. Condition 1 is Necessary and Sufficient for Universal Inductive and
Self-Adaptive Learning
This section presents the proof of Theorem 7 from Section 1.2, establishing equivalence
of the set of processes admitting strong universal inductive learning, the set of processes
admitting strong universal self-adaptive learning, and the set of processes satisfying Condi-
tion 1. For convenience, we restate that result here (in simplified form) as follows.
Theorem 7 (restated) SUIL = SUAL = C1.
The proof is by way of three lemmas: Lemma 19, representing necessity of Condition 1
for strong universal self-adaptive learning, Lemma 25, representing sufficiency of Condi-
tion 1 for strong universal inductive learning, and Lemma 18, which indicates that any
process admitting strong universal inductive learning necessarily admits strong universal
self-adaptive learning. We begin with the last (and simplest) of these.
Lemma 18 SUIL ⊆ SUAL.
Proof Let X ∈ SUIL, and let fn be an inductive learning rule such that, for every mea-
surable f⋆ : X → Y, lim
n→∞ LˆX(fn, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.). Then define a self-adaptive learning rule
gn,m as follows. For every n,m ∈ N, and every {xi}mi=1 ∈ Xm, {yi}ni=1 ∈ Yn, and z ∈ X , if
n ≤ m, define gn,m(x1:m, y1:n, z) = fn(x1:n, y1:n, z). With this definition, we have that for
every measurable f⋆ : X → Y, for every n ∈ N,
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆;n) = lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ(gn,m(X1:m, f
⋆(X1:n),Xm+1), f
⋆(Xm+1))
= lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xm+1), f
⋆(Xm+1)) = LˆX(fn, f⋆;n),
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so that lim
n→∞ LˆX(gn,·, f
⋆;n) = lim
n→∞ LˆX(fn, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.).
Next, we prove necessity of Condition 1 for strong universal self-adaptive learning.
Lemma 19 SUAL ⊆ C1.
Proof We prove this result in the contrapositive. Suppose X /∈ C1. By Lemma 13,
there exists a disjoint sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B such that limi→∞ µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Ak
)
> 0 with prob-
ability greater than 0. Furthermore, since this property involves only the limit as i →
∞, we may take this sequence {Ak}∞k=1 to have A1 = X \
∞⋃
i=2
Ai, so that
∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X .
Lemma 14 then implies that, for this sequence {Ak}∞k=1, with probability greater than 0,
lim
n→∞ µˆX(
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}) > 0.
For any n ∈ N, let A¯(X1:n) =
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}. Now take any two distinct values
y0, y1 ∈ Y, and construct a set of target functions {f⋆κ : κ ∈ [0, 1)} as follows. For any
κ ∈ [0, 1) and i ∈ N, let κi = ⌊2iκ⌋ − 2⌊2i−1κ⌋: the ith bit of the binary representation of
κ. For each i ∈ N and each x ∈ Ai, define f⋆κ(x) = yκi . Note that for any κ ∈ [0, 1), f⋆κ is a
measurable function (as it is constant within each Ai, and the Ai sets are measurable).
For any t ∈ N, let it denote the value of i ∈ N for which Xt ∈ Ai. Now fix any self-
adaptive learning rule gn,m, and for brevity define a function f
κ
n,m : X → Y as fκn,m(·) =
gn,m(X1:m, f
⋆
κ(X1:n), ·). Then
sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
dκ
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
κ(Xm+1)
)
1A¯(X1:n)(Xm+1)
]
dκ.
By Fubini’s theorem, this is equal
E
[∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
κ(Xm+1)
)
1A¯(X1:n)(Xm+1)dκ
]
.
Since ℓ is bounded, Fatou’s lemma implies this is at least as large as
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
∫ 1
0
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
κ(Xm+1)
)
1A¯(X1:n)(Xm+1)dκ
]
,
and linearity of integration implies this equals
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
1A¯(X1:n)(Xm+1)
∫ 1
0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
κ(Xm+1)
)
dκ
]
. (9)
Note that, for any m, the value of fκn,m(Xm+1) is a function of X and the values κi1 , . . . , κin .
Therefore, for any m with Xm+1 ∈ A¯(X1:n), the value of fκn,m(Xm+1) is functionally inde-
pendent of κim+1 . Thus, letting K ∼ Uniform([0, 1)) be independent of X and gn,m, for any
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such m we have∫ 1
0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
κ(Xm+1)
)
dκ = E
[
ℓ
(
fKn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆
K(Xm+1)
) ∣∣∣X, gn,m]
= E
[
E
[
ℓ
(
gn,m(X1:m, {yKij }nj=1,Xm+1), yKm+1
) ∣∣∣X, gn,m,Ki1 , . . . ,Kin] ∣∣∣X, gn,m]
= E

 ∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2
ℓ
(
gn,m(X1:m, {yKij }nj=1,Xm+1), yb
) ∣∣∣X, gn,m

 .
By the triangle inequality, this is no smaller than E
[
1
2ℓ(y0, y1)
∣∣∣X, gn,m] = 12ℓ(y0, y1), so that
(9) is at least as large as
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
1A¯(X1:n)(Xm+1)
1
2
ℓ(y0, y1)
]
=
1
2
ℓ(y0, y1)E
[
lim sup
n→∞
µˆX
(⋃
{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)]
.
Since any nonnegative random variable with mean 0 necessarily equals 0 almost surely (e.g.,
Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000, Theorem 1.6.6), and since lim
n→∞ µˆX (
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}) >
0 with probability strictly greater than 0, and the left hand side is nonnegative, we have
that E
[
lim sup
n→∞
µˆX(
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅})
]
> 0. Furthermore, since ℓ is a metric, we also
have ℓ(y0, y1) > 0. Altogether we have that
sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
≥ 1
2
ℓ(y0, y1)E
[
lim sup
n→∞
µˆX
(⋃
{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)]
> 0.
In particular, this implies ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) such that E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
> 0. Since any ran-
dom variable equal 0 (a.s.) necessarily has expected value 0, and since lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
is nonnegative, we must have that, with probability greater than 0, lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n) >
0, so that gn,m is not strongly universally consistent. Since gn,m was an arbitrary self-
adaptive learning rule, we conclude that there does not exist a self-adaptive learning rule
that is strongly universally consistent under X: that is, X /∈ SUAL. Since this argument
holds for any X /∈ C1, the lemma follows.
Finally, to complete the proof of Theorem 7, we prove that Condition 1 is sufficient for
X to admit strong universal inductive learning. We prove this via a more general strategy:
namely, a kind of constrained maximum empirical risk minimization. Though the lemmas
below are in fact somewhat stronger than needed to prove Theorem 7, some of them are
useful later for establishing Theorem 5, and some should also be of independent interest.
We propose to study an inductive learning rule fˆn such that, for any n ∈ N, x1:n ∈ X n, and
y1:n ∈ Yn, the function fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, ·) is defined as
argminεn
f∈Fn
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(xt), yt), (10)
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where Fn is a well-chosen class of functions X → Y, mˆn is a well-chosen integer, and εn is an
arbitrary sequence in [0,∞) with εn → 0. For our purposes, fˆ0({}, {}, ·) can be defined as
an arbitrary measurable function X → Y. The class Fn and integer mˆn, and the guarantees
they provide, originate in the following several lemmas. In particular, the sets Fn will be
chosen as finite sets, and as such one can easily verify that the selection in the argminεn in
(10) can be chosen in a way that makes fˆn a measurable function.
Lemma 20 For any finite set G of bounded measurable functions X → R, for any process
X, there exists a (nonrandom) nondecreasing sequence {mn}∞n=1 in N with mn →∞ s.t.
lim
n→∞E
[
sup
n′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmn≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= 0.
Proof Fix any sequence x = {xt}∞t=1 in X and any bounded function g : X → R. By
definition,
µˆx(g) = lim
s→∞ limn→∞ maxs≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt).
In particular, for each s ∈ N, since max
s≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) is nondecreasing in n, and g is bounded,
lim
n→∞ maxs≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) exists and is finite. This implies that, for each s ∈ N, ∃ngs(x) ∈ N
s.t. ngs(x) ≥ s and every n ≥ ngs(x) has
max
s≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) ≤ sup
s≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) ≤ 2−s + max
s≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt). (11)
In particular, let us define ngs(x) to be the minimal value in N with this property. We
first argue that ngs(x) is nondecreasing in s. To see this, first note that the left inequality
in (11) is trivially satisfied for every s, n ∈ N with n ≥ s. Moreover, for any n, s ∈ N
with s ≥ 2 and n ≥ ngs(x), either sup
s−1≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) is achieved at m = s − 1, in which
case it is clearly less than 2−(s−1) + max
s−1≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt), or else sup
s−1≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) =
sup
s≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt), in which case (since n ≥ ngs(x)) it is at most 2−s + max
s≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) ≤
2−(s−1) + max
s−1≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt). Furthermore, we have n
g
s(x) ≥ s ≥ s − 1. Altogether, we
have ngs−1(x) ≤ ngs(x), so that ngs(x) is indeed nondecreasing in s.
For each n ∈ N with n ≥ ng1(x), let sgn(x) = max{s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : n ≥ ngs(x)}; for
completeness, let sgn(x) = 0 for n < n
g
1(x). Then, for any finite set G of bounded functions
X → R, define sGn(x) = min
g∈G
sgn(x) = max
{
s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : n ≥ max
g∈G
ngs(x)
}
∪ {0}. Since
ngs(x) is nondecreasing in s, for any n, n′ ∈ N with n′ ≥ n, for 1 ≤ s ≤ sGn(x), every g ∈ G
has n′ ≥ ngs(x), so that (11) is satisfied for every g ∈ G, which implies
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣ sups≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)− max
s≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−s.
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Therefore, for any sequence sn →∞ such that ∃n0 ∈ N with 1 ≤ sn ≤ sGn(x) for all n ≥ n0,
we have
lim
n→∞ supn′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣ supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) − max
sn≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ limn→∞ 2−sn = 0.
Furthermore, since each s ∈ N and g ∈ G have ngs(x) < ∞, and G is a finite set, we have
sGn(x)→∞, so that such sequences sn do indeed exist. Furthermore, for any such sequence
sn, for every g ∈ G,
lim
n→∞ supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) = µˆx(g),
and since G has finite cardinality, this implies
lim
n→∞maxg∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆx(g) − supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ = maxg∈G limn→∞
∣∣∣∣∣µˆx(g) − supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Altogether, the triangle inequality implies
lim
n→∞ supn′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆx(g) − maxsn≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
n→∞ supn′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣ supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt) − max
sn≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
+ lim
n→∞maxg∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆx(g) − supsn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0. (12)
Next, suppose the bounded functions in the set G are measurable. Note that this implies
that, for any g ∈ G, the set of sequences x satisfying (11) for a given s, n ∈ N is a measurable
subset of X∞, so that for each s, n′ ∈ N the set of sequences x with ngs(x) = n′ is also a
measurable set, so that ngs is a measurable function. Since the value of s
g
n is obtained
from the values ngs via operations that preserve measurability, we also have that s
g
n is a
measurable function. Since the minimum of a finite set of measurable functions is also
measurable, we also have that sGn is a measurable function.
Now fix any process X, and for any n ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1) let
sGn(δ) = max
{
s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} : P(sGn(X) ≥ s) ≥ 1− δ
}
.
Since sGn(x) is nondecreasing for each sequence x, we must also have that sGn(δ) is nonde-
creasing in n. Furthermore, since each x ∈ X∞ has sGn(x)→∞, by continuity of probability
measures (e.g., Schervish, 1995, Theorem A.19), ∀s ∈ N, lim
n→∞P(s
G
n(X) < s) = 0. We there-
fore have sGn(δ)→∞ for any δ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, letting
sn = max
({
s ∈ N : sGn(2−s) ≥ s
} ∪ {0})
for each n ∈ N, we have that sn is nondecreasing, and sn →∞. Furthermore, by definition,
we have P(sGn(X) ≥ sn) ≥ 1 − 2−sn . Let n1 = 1, and let n2, n3, . . . denote the increasing
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subsequence of all values n ∈ N \ {1} for which sn > sn−1; since sn → ∞ while each n
has sn < ∞, there are indeed an infinite number of such nk values. Note that, since sn is
nondecreasing, and hence these snk are each distinct values in N ∪ {0}, we have
∞∑
k=1
P(sGnk(X) < snk) ≤
∞∑
k=1
2−snk ≤
∞∑
i=0
2−i = 2 <∞.
Therefore, the Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies that, with probability one, for all sufficiently
large k, sGnk(X) ≥ snk . Furthermore, since sGn(X) is nondecreasing in n, and sn = snk for all
n ∈ {nk, . . . , nk+1 − 1} (due to sn nondecreasing), if sGnk(X) ≥ snk for a given k ∈ N, then
sGn(X) ≥ sn for every n ∈ {nk, . . . , nk+1− 1}. Thus, we may conclude that, with probability
one, for all sufficiently large n ∈ N, sGn(X) ≥ sn ≥ 1. Therefore, (12) implies
lim
n→∞ supn′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxsn≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (a.s.). (13)
Finally, since the functions in G are bounded and G has finite cardinality,{
sup
n′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxsn≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
}∞
n=1
is a uniformly bounded sequence of random variables, so that combining (13) with the
dominated convergence theorem implies
lim
n→∞E
[
sup
n′≥n
max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxsn≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= 0.
The result now follows by taking mn = sn for all n ∈ N.
Lemma 21 Suppose {Gi}∞i=1 is a sequence of nonempty finite sets of bounded measur-
able functions X → R, with G1 ⊆ G2 ⊆ · · · , and {γi}∞i=1 is a sequence in (0,∞) with
γ1 ≥ max
g∈G1
(
sup
x∈X
g(x)− inf
x∈X
g(x)
)
. Then for any process X, there exist (nonrandom) nonde-
creasing sequences {mi}∞i=1 and {in}∞n=1 in N with mi →∞ and in →∞ such that ∀n ∈ N,
E
[
max
g∈Gin
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmin≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ γin .
Proof For each i ∈ N, let {mi,n}∞n=1 denote a nondecreasing sequence in N with limn→∞mi,n =
∞ and
lim
n→∞E
[
sup
n′≥n
max
g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmi,n≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= 0. (14)
Such a sequence is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 20. Now for each n ∈ N, define
jn=max
{
i∈{1, . . . , n} : ∀i′≤ i, sup
n′′≥n
E
[
sup
n′≥n′′
max
g∈Gi′
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmi′,n′′≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤γi′
}
.
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First note that the set on the right hand side is nonempty, since every n′′ ∈ N has
E
[
sup
n′≥n′′
max
g∈G1
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxm1,n′′≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ max
g∈G1
(
sup
x∈X
g(x) − inf
x∈X
g(x)
)
≤ γ1.
Thus, jn is well-defined for every n ∈ N. In particular, by this definition, we have ∀n ∈ N,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , jn},
E
[
sup
n′≥n
max
g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmi,n≤m≤n′ 1m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ γi. (15)
Furthermore, since
sup
n′′≥n
E
[
sup
n′≥n′′
max
g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmi,n′′≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
is nonincreasing in n for every i ∈ N, we have that jn is nondecreasing. Also note that, for
any i ∈ N, since γi > 0, (14) implies that ∃n′i ∈ N such that, ∀n ≥ n′i,
sup
n′′≥n
E
[
sup
n′≥n′′
max
g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmi,n′′≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ γi.
Therefore jn ≥ i for every n ≥ max
{
i, max
1≤i′≤i
n′i′
}
. Since this is true of every i ∈ N, we have
that jn →∞.
Next, let n1 = 1, and for each i ∈ N \ {1}, inductively define
ni = min
{
n ∈ N : jn ≥ i, min
1≤j≤i
mj,n > mi−1,ni−1
}
.
Note that, given the value ni−1 ∈ N, the value ni is well-defined since jn → ∞ and
lim
n→∞ min1≤j≤i
mj,n = min
1≤j≤i
lim
n→∞mj,n = ∞. Thus, by induction, ni is a well-defined value
in N for all i ∈ N. For each i ∈ N, define mi = mi,ni . In particular, by definition of ni,
for all i ∈ N we have mi+1 ≥ min
1≤j≤i+1
mj,ni+1 > mi,ni = mi, so that mi is increasing, with
mi → ∞. Finally, for each n ∈ N, define in = max {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ni ≤ n}. Since n1 = 1,
{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ni ≤ n} 6= ∅ for all n ∈ N, so that in is a well-defined value in N for all
n ∈ N. Also, any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ni ≤ n also has ni ≤ n+1, so that in is nondecreasing
in n. Furthermore, since ni <∞ for every i ∈ N, we have in →∞. Also note that, ∀n ∈ N,
n ≥ nin . Thus, for every n ∈ N,
E
[
max
g∈Gin
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g) − maxmin≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤E
[
sup
n′≥nin
max
g∈Gin
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(g)− maxmin,nin≤m≤n′
1
m
m∑
t=1
g(Xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
.
By definition of nin , we have jnin ≥ in (this is immediate from the ni definition if in ≥ 2,
and is also trivially true for in = 1 since j1 ≥ 1), so that (15) implies the rightmost expres-
sion above is at most γin , which completes the proof.
The following lemma represents the first use of Condition 1 in the proof of sufficiency
of Condition 1 for strong universal inductive learning.
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Lemma 22 There exists a countable set T1 ⊆ B such that, ∀X ∈ C1, ∀A ∈ B,
inf
G∈T1
E[µˆX(G△A)] = 0.
Proof By assumption, B is generated by a separable metrizable topology T , and since every
separable metrizable topological space is second countable (see Srivastava, 1998, Proposition
2.1.9), we have that there exists a countable set T0 ⊆ T such that, ∀A ∈ T , ∃A ⊆ T0
s.t. A =
⋃A. Now from this, there is an immediate proof of the lemma if we were
to take T1 as the algebra generated by T0 (which is a countable set) via the monotone
class theorem (Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000, Theorem 1.3.9), using Condition 1 to argue
that the sets A satisfying the claim in the lemma form a monotone class. However, here
we will instead establish the lemma with a smaller choice of the set T1, which thereby
simplifies the problem of implementing the resulting learning rule. Specifically, we take
T1 = {
⋃A : A ⊆ T0, |A| <∞}: all finite unions of sets in T0. Note that, given an indexing
of T0 by N, each A ∈ T1 can be indexed by a finite subset of N (the indices of elements of
the corresponding A), of which there are countably many, so that T1 is countable. Now fix
any X ∈ C1 and let
Λ =
{
A ∈ B : inf
G∈T1
E[µˆX(G△A)] = 0
}
.
We will prove that Λ = B by establishing that T ⊆ Λ and that Λ is a σ-algebra.
First consider any A ∈ T . As mentioned above, ∃{Bi}∞i=1 in T0 such that A =
∞⋃
i=1
Bi.
But then letting Ak =
k⋃
i=1
Bi for each k ∈ N, we have Ak△A = A \Ak ↓ ∅, and Ak ∈ T1 for
each k ∈ N. Therefore, inf
G∈T1
E [µˆX(G△A)] ≤ lim
k→∞
E [µˆX(Ak △A)], and the right hand side
equals 0 by Condition 1. Together with nonnegativity of inf
G∈T1
E [µˆX(G△A)] (Lemma 9),
this implies A ∈ Λ. Since this holds for any A ∈ T , we have T ⊆ Λ.
Next, we argue that Λ is a σ-algebra. We begin by showing it is closed under com-
plements. Toward this end, consider any A ∈ Λ, and for any k ∈ N denote by Gk an
element of T1 with E [µˆX(Gk △A)] < 1/k (guaranteed to exist by the definition of Λ).
Since Gk ∈ T1 ⊆ T , it follows that X \ Gk is a closed set. Therefore, since (X ,T ) is
metrizable, ∃{Bki}∞i=1 in T such that X \ Gk =
∞⋂
i=1
Bki (Kechris, 1995, Proposition 3.7).
Denoting Ckj =
j⋂
i=1
Bki for each j ∈ N, we have that Ckj △ (X \ Gk) = Ckj \ (X \ Gk) ↓ ∅
as j → ∞, and Ckj ∈ T for each j ∈ N. In particular, by Condition 1, ∃jk ∈ N
such that E[µˆX(Ckjk △ (X \Gk))] < 1/k. Also, since Ckjk ∈ T , and we proved above
that T ⊆ Λ, ∃Dk ∈ T1 such that E [µˆX(Dk △ Ckjk)] < 1/k. Together with the facts
that Dk △ (X \ A) ⊆ (Dk △ Ckjk) ∪ (Ckjk △ (X \ Gk)) ∪ ((X \ Gk) △ (X \ A)) and
(X \Gk)△ (X \A) = Gk △A, we have that
E[µˆX(Dk △ (X \A))] ≤ E[µˆX(Dk △ Ckjk)]+E[µˆX(Ckjk △ (X \Gk))]+E[µˆX(Gk △A)] < 3/k,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 11. Since Dk ∈ T1, and this argument holds for
any k ∈ N, we have
inf
G∈T1
E[µˆX(G△ (X \ A))] ≤ inf
k∈N
3/k = 0.
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Together with nonnegativity of the left hand side (Lemma 9), this implies X \A ∈ Λ. Thus,
Λ is closed under complements.
Next, we argue that Λ is closed under countable unions. Let {Ai}∞i=1 be a sequence in
Λ, denote A =
∞⋃
i=1
Ai, and fix any ε > 0. Denoting Bk =
k⋃
i=1
Ai for each k ∈ N, we have
Bk△A = A\Bk ↓ ∅. Therefore, Condition 1 implies ∃kε ∈ N such that E[µˆX(Bkε △A)] < ε.
Next, for each i ∈ N, let Gi be an element of T1 with E[µˆX(Gi △Ai)] < ε/kε (guaranteed to
exist, since Ai ∈ Λ). Denote by Ckε =
kε⋃
i=1
Gi. Noting that it follows immediately from its
definition that T1 is closed under finite unions, we have that Ckε ∈ T1. Then noting that
Ckε △A ⊆ (Bkε △A) ∪ (Ckε △Bkε) ⊆ (Bkε △A) ∪
kε⋃
i=1
(Gi △Ai),
altogether we have that
inf
G∈T1
E[µˆX(G△A)]≤E[µˆX(Ckε△A)]≤E[µˆX(Bkε△A)]+
kε∑
i=1
E[µˆX(Gi△Ai)]<ε+
kε∑
i=1
ε
kε
= 2ε,
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 11. Since this argument holds for any ε > 0,
taking the limit as ε→ 0 reveals that inf
G∈T1
E[µˆX(G△A)] ≤ 0. Together with nonnegativity
of the left hand side (Lemma 9), this implies A ∈ Λ. Thus, Λ is closed under countable
unions.
Finally, recalling that T is a topology, by definition we have X ∈ T , and since T ⊆ Λ,
this implies X ∈ Λ. Altogether, we have established that Λ is a σ-algebra. Therefore,
since B is the σ-algebra generated by T , and T ⊆ Λ, it immediately follows that B ⊆ Λ
(which also implies Λ = B). Since this argument holds for any choice of X ∈ C1, the lemma
immediately follows.
For example, in the special case of X = Rp (p ∈ N) with the Euclidean topology, the
above proof implies it suffices to take the set T1 as the finite unions of rational-centered
rational-radius open balls. Now, continuing with the general case, the next lemma extends
Lemma 22 from set approximation to function approximation, again using Condition 1.
Lemma 23 There exists a sequence {Fi}∞i=1 of nonempty finite sets of measurable functions
X → Y with F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ · · · such that, for every X ∈ C1, for every measurable f : X → Y,
lim
i→∞
min
fi∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(fi(·), f(·)))] = 0.
Proof We will first prove that there exists a countable set F˜ of measurable functions
X → Y such that, for every X ∈ C1, ∀ε > 0, for every measurable f : X → Y, ∃f˜ ∈ F˜ s.t.
E
[
µˆX(ℓ(f˜(·), f(·)))
]
< 3ε. Let T1 be as in Lemma 22, and let Y˜ ⊆ Y be a countable set
with sup
y∈Y
inf
y˜∈Y˜
ℓ(y, y˜) = 0; this must exist, by the assumption that (Y, ℓ) is separable. Fix
some arbitrary value y0 ∈ Y, and let A0 = X . For any k ∈ N, values y1, . . . , yk ∈ Y, and
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sets A1, . . . , Ak ∈ B, for any x ∈ X , define f˜(x; {yi}ki=1, {Ai}ki=1) = ymax{j∈{0,...,k}:x∈Aj}; one
can easily verify that f˜(·; {yi}ki=1, {Ai}ki=1) is a measurable function (indeed, it is a simple
function). Define
F˜ =
{
f˜(·; {yi}ki=1, {Ai}ki=1) : k ∈ N,∀i ≤ k, yi ∈ Y˜, Ai ∈ T1
}
,
and note that, given an indexing of Y˜ and T1 by N, we can index F˜ by finite tuples of
integers (the indices of the corresponding yi and Ai values), of which there are countably
many, so that F˜ is countable.
Enumerate the elements of Y˜ as y˜1, y˜2, . . . (for simplicity of notation, we suppose this
sequence is infinite; otherwise, we can simply repeat the elements to get an infinite sequence).
For each ε > 0, let Bε,1 = {y ∈ Y : ℓ(y, y˜1) ≤ ε}, and for each integer i ≥ 2, inductively
define Bε,i = {y ∈ Y : ℓ(y, y˜i) ≤ ε} \
i−1⋃
j=1
Bε,j. Note that the sets Bε,i are measurable and
disjoint over i ∈ N, and that
∞⋃
i=1
Bε,i = Y.
Now fix any X ∈ C1, any measurable f : X → Y, and any ε > 0. For each i ∈ N,
define Cε,i = f
−1(Bε,i), which is an element of B by measurability of f and Bε,i. Note
that
∞⋃
i=1
Cε,i = f
−1
( ∞⋃
i=1
Bε,i
)
= f−1(Y) = X , and furthermore that (since the Bε,i sets are
disjoint) the sets Cε,i are disjoint over i ∈ N. It follows that lim
k→∞
∞⋃
i=k
Cε,i = ∅, with
∞⋃
i=k
Cε,i
nonincreasing in k, so that Condition 1 entails lim
k→∞
E
[
µˆX
( ∞⋃
i=k
Cε,i
)]
= 0. In particular,
this implies ∃kε ∈ N such that E
[
µˆX
(
∞⋃
i=kε+1
Cε,i
)]
< ε/ℓ¯.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , kε}, let Aε,i ∈ T1 be a set with E[µˆX(Aε,i△ Cε,i)] < ε/(kεℓ¯), which
exists by the defining property of T1 from Lemma 22. Finally, let
f˜ε(·) = f˜
(
·; {y˜i}kεi=1, {Aε,i}kεi=1
)
,
and note that f˜ε ∈ F˜ . Furthermore, for any x ∈ X =
∞⋃
i=1
Cε,i,
ℓ(f(x), f˜ε(x)) ≤ ℓ¯1⋃∞
i=kε+1
Cε,i(x) +
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(f(x), f˜ε(x))1Cε,i(x)
≤ ℓ¯1⋃∞
i=kε+1
Cε,i(x) +
kε∑
i=1
(
ℓ(f(x), y˜i)1Cε,i(x) + ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))1Cε,i(x)
)
≤ ℓ¯1⋃∞
i=kε+1
Cε,i(x) + ε+
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))1Cε,i(x). (16)
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Denote [kε] = {1, . . . , kε}. Since ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x)) = 0 if x ∈ Aε,i \
⋃
j∈[kε]\{i}
Aε,j,
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))1Cε,i(x) ≤
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))1(Cε,i\Aε,i)∪(Cε,i∩
⋃
j∈[kε]\{i}
Aε,j)(x)
≤
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))

1Cε,i\Aε,i(x) + ∑
j∈[kε]\{i}
1Cε,i∩Aε,j (x)

 .
Since Cε,i ∩ Cε,j = ∅ for j 6= i, Cε,i ∩Aε,j = Cε,i ∩ (Aε,j \ Cε,j), so that the above equals
kε∑
i=1
ℓ(y˜i, f˜ε(x))

1Cε,i\Aε,i(x) + ∑
j∈[kε]\{i}
1Cε,i∩(Aε,j\Cε,j)(x)


≤ ℓ¯
kε∑
i=1

1Cε,i\Aε,i(x) + ∑
j∈[kε]\{i}
1Cε,i∩(Aε,j\Cε,j )(x)

 . (17)
Since
kε∑
i=1
∑
j∈[kε]\{i}
1Cε,i∩(Aε,j\Cε,j)(x) =
kε∑
j=1
∑
i∈[kε]\{j}
1Cε,i∩(Aε,j\Cε,j)(x)
≤
kε∑
j=1
∞∑
i=1
1Cε,i∩(Aε,j\Cε,j )(x) =
kε∑
j=1
1Aε,j\Cε,j (x),
the expression on the right hand side in (17) is at most
ℓ¯

 kε∑
i=1
1Cε,i\Aε,i(x) +
kε∑
j=1
1Aε,j\Cε,j (x)

 = ℓ¯ kε∑
i=1
1Cε,i△Aε,i(x).
Plugging this into (16) yields that
ℓ(f(x), f˜ε(x)) ≤ ε+ ℓ¯1⋃∞
i=kε+1
Cε,i(x) + ℓ¯
kε∑
i=1
1Cε,i△Aε,i(x).
Therefore, by linearity of the expectation, together with monotonicity, homogeneity, and
finite subadditivity of µˆX (Lemma 8),
E
[
µˆX
(
ℓ
(
f˜ε(·), f(·)
))]
≤ ε+ ℓ¯E

µˆX

 ∞⋃
i=kε+1
Cε,i



+ ℓ¯ kε∑
i=1
E[µˆX(Cε,i△Aε,i)] < 3ε.
To complete the proof, we enumerate the elements of F˜ = {g˜1, g˜2, . . .} and define Fi =
{g˜1, . . . , g˜i} for each i ∈ N. Fix any measurable f : X → Y, and for each k ∈ N, let ik
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denote the index i ∈ N with g˜i = f˜(1/k), for f˜(1/k) ∈ F˜ defined as above for this f . Then for
any i ≥ ik,
min
fi∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(fi(·), f(·)))] ≤ E
[
µˆX
(
ℓ
(
f˜(1/k)(·), f(·)
))]
<
3
k
,
so that
lim
i→∞
min
fi∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(fi(·), f(·)))] ≤ lim
i→∞
min
k:ik≤i
3
k
= 0.
The result now follows from nonnegativity of the left hand side (by nonnegativity of ℓ, and
monotonicity of the expectation and µˆX from Lemma 8).
Additionally, we have the following property for the f -approximating sequences of sets
Fi implied by Lemma 23.
Lemma 24 Fix any process X on X , any measurable function f : X → Y, any non-
decreasing sequence {ui}∞i=1 in N with ui → ∞, and any sequence {Fi}∞i=1 of finite sets of
measurable functions X → Y with F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ · · · such that lim
i→∞
min
g∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(g(·), f(·)))] = 0.
There exists a (nonrandom) sequence {fi}∞i=1, with fi ∈ Fi for each i ∈ N, and a (nonran-
dom) sequence {αi}∞i=1 in (0,∞) with αi → 0, such that, on an event K of probability one,
∃ι0 ∈ N such that ∀i ≥ ι0,
sup
ui≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(fi(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ αi.
Proof Let {gi}∞i=1 be a sequence with gi ∈ Fi for each i ∈ N, s.t. lim
i→∞
E[µˆX(ℓ(gi(·), f(·)))] =
0. Then ∀k ∈ N, ∃jk ∈ N such that E[µˆX(ℓ(gjk(·), f(·)))] < 4−k ℓ¯. Let us fix any sequence
{jk}∞k=1 in N such that jk has this property for every k. For completeness, also define j0 = 1.
Furthermore, since ui →∞, the dominated convergence theorem implies that ∀j ∈ N,
lim
i→∞
E
[
sup
ui≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gj(Xt), f(Xt))
]
= E
[
lim
i→∞
sup
ui≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gj(Xt), f(Xt))
]
= E
[
lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gj(Xt), f(Xt))
]
= E[µˆX(ℓ(gj(·), f(·)))] .
In particular, this implies that ∀k ∈ N, ∃ik ∈ N such that
E
[
sup
uik≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gjk(Xt), f(Xt))
]
≤ E[µˆX(ℓ(gjk(·), f(·)))] + 4−k ℓ¯ < 2 · 4−k ℓ¯. (18)
Also note that, since the leftmost expression in (18) is nonincreasing in ik, we may choose
ik > ik−1 if k ≥ 2 (or ik > 1 for k = 1). Thus, letting i0 = 1, there exists a strictly
increasing sequence {ik}∞k=0 in N such that ik has the property (18) for every k ∈ N. We
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may then note that, by Markov’s inequality,
∞∑
k=0
P
(
sup
uik≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gjk(Xt), f(Xt)) > 2
(1/2)−k
√
ℓ¯
)
≤
∞∑
k=0
1
2(1/2)−k
√
ℓ¯
E
[
sup
uik≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gjk(Xt), f(Xt))
]
≤
∞∑
k=0
1
2(1/2)−k
√
ℓ¯
2 · 4−k ℓ¯ =
∞∑
k=0
2(1/2)−k
√
ℓ¯ = 23/2
√
ℓ¯ <∞.
Therefore, by the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, there exists an event K of probability one, on
which ∃κ0 ∈ N such that, ∀k ≥ κ0,
sup
uik≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gjk(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ 2(1/2)−k
√
ℓ¯. (19)
Now, ∀i ∈ N, define
ki = max {k ∈ N ∪ {0} : max{ik, jk} ≤ i} ,
and let αi = 2
(1/2)−ki
√
ℓ¯. To see that the value ki is well-defined for every i ∈ N, note that
max{i0, j0} = 1 ≤ i, so that the set on the right hand side is nonempty, and furthermore,
since {ik}∞k=0 is strictly increasing, every k ≥ i has max{ik, jk} > i, so that the set is finite,
and hence has a maximal element. Also, since ik and jk are finite for every k, we have that
lim
i→∞
ki = ∞. In particular, this implies that, on the event K, ∃ι0 ∈ N such that ∀i ≥ ι0,
ki ≥ κ0, so that (19) implies
sup
uiki
≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gjki (Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ αi. (20)
Now define fi = gjki for every i ∈ N. Note that, since jki ≤ i (by definition of ki) andF1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ · · · , we have Fjki ⊆ Fi. In particular, since fi = gjki ∈ Fjki (by definition),
this implies fi ∈ Fi for every i ∈ N. Also note that, since iki ≤ i (by definition of ki), and
{ut}∞t=1 is a nondecreasing sequence, uiki ≤ ui for every i ∈ N. Together with (20), these
facts imply that, on the event K, ∀i ≥ ι0,
sup
ui≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(fi(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ sup
uiki
≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(fi(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ αi.
With these results in hand, we are finally ready for the proof of sufficiency of Condition 1
for strong universal inductive learning.
Lemma 25 C1 ⊆ SUIL.
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Proof Suppose X ∈ C1. Lemma 23 implies that there exists a sequence {Gi}∞i=1 of finite
sets of measurable functions with G1 ⊆ G2 ⊆ · · · such that, for every measurable function
f⋆ : X → Y, lim
i→∞
min
gi∈Gi
E[µˆX(ℓ(gi(·), f⋆(·)))] = 0. Furthermore, applying Lemma 21 to
the sequence of sets {ℓ(f(·), g(·)) : f, g ∈ Gi}, with γi = 41−iℓ¯, we find that there exist
(nonrandom) nondecreasing sequences {mi}∞i=1 and {in}∞n=1 in N withmi →∞ and in →∞
such that ∀n ∈ N,
E
[
max
f,g∈Gin
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(ℓ(f(·), g(·))) − maxmin≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ γin . (21)
Let I = {in : n ∈ N}, and for each i ∈ I, denote ni = min{n ∈ N : in = i}. Markov’s
inequality and (21) imply
∑
i∈I
P
(
max
f,g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(ℓ(f(·), g(·))) − maxmi≤m≤ni 1m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣ > √γi
)
≤
∑
i∈I
1√
γi
E
[
max
f,g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣∣µˆX(ℓ(f(·), g(·))) − maxmi≤m≤ni 1m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤
∑
i∈I
√
γi ≤
∞∑
i=1
21−i
√
ℓ¯ = 2
√
ℓ¯ <∞.
Therefore, the Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies that there exists an event K ′ of probability
one, on which ∃ι0 ∈ N such that ∀i ∈ I with i ≥ ι0,
max
f,g∈Gi
(
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), g(·))) − max
mi≤m≤ni
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
≤ √γi. (22)
Additionally, note that ∀n ∈ N, n ≥ nin , so that ∀f, g ∈ Gin ,
max
min≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt)) ≥ max
min≤m≤nin
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt)). (23)
Furthermore, since in →∞, on the event K ′, ∃ν1 ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ ν1, we have in ≥ ι0,
so that (22) and (23) imply
max
f,g∈Gin
(
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), g(·))) − max
min≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
≤ √γin . (24)
Now consider using the inductive learning rule fˆn defined in (10), with Fn = Gin and
mˆn = min for each n ∈ N, and {εn}∞n=1 an arbitrary sequence in [0,∞) with εn → 0. Fix
any measurable function f⋆ : X → Y. Note that, since lim
n→∞ in = limi→∞
mi = ∞, we have
lim
n→∞ mˆn =∞. Furthermore, since in is nondecreasing with limn→∞ in =∞, the above guaran-
tees for the sequence {Gi}∞i=1 imply F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ · · · and limn→∞ ming∈Fn E[µˆX(ℓ(g(·), f
⋆(·)))] = 0.
Therefore, Lemma 24 implies that there exists a (nonrandom) sequence {f⋆n}∞n=1 with
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f⋆n ∈ Fn for each n ∈ N, a (nonrandom) sequence {αn}∞n=1 in (0,∞) with αn → 0, and an
event K of probability one, on which ∃ν0 ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ ν0,
sup
mˆn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆n(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ αn. (25)
For brevity, denote gˆn(·) = fˆn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), ·) for every n ∈ N. Note that, by the
definition of fˆn from (10) and the fact that f
⋆
n ∈ Fn, ∀n ∈ N,
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ εn + max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆n(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)).
Thus, on the event K, ∀n ∈ N with n ≥ ν0, (25) implies
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ εn + αn. (26)
On the other hand, suppose the eventK∩K ′ occurs, fix any n ∈ N with n ≥ max{ν0, ν1},
and fix any f ∈ Fn satisfying
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), f⋆(·))) > 3αn +√γin + εn, (27)
if such a function f exists in Fn. The triangle inequality implies
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))
≥ max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
(ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
n(Xt))− ℓ(f⋆n(Xt), f⋆(Xt)))
≥ max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
n(Xt)) − sup
mˆn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆n(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)).
Since the event K holds and n ≥ ν0, (25) implies this last expression is no smaller than
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
n(Xt))− αn.
Furthermore, since both f and f⋆n are elements of Fn, and since the event K ′ holds and
n ≥ ν1, the inequality (24) (together with the definitions of Fn = Gin and mˆn = min)
implies the above is at least as large as
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), f⋆n(·)))−
√
γin − αn. (28)
By the triangle inequality, ℓ(f(·), f⋆n(·)) + ℓ(f⋆n(·), f⋆(·)) ≥ ℓ(f(·), f⋆(·)). Combined with
subadditivity and monotonicity of µˆX (Lemma 8), this implies
µˆX(ℓ(f(·),f⋆n(·)))+ µˆX(ℓ(f⋆n(·),f⋆(·))) ≥ µˆX(ℓ(f(·),f⋆n(·))+ℓ(f⋆n(·),f⋆(·))) ≥ µˆX(ℓ(f(·),f⋆(·))).
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Subtracting µˆX(ℓ(f
⋆
n(·), f⋆(·))) from these expressions implies that (28) is no smaller than
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), f⋆(·))) − µˆX(ℓ(f⋆n(·), f⋆(·))) −
√
γin − αn
≥ µˆX(ℓ(f(·), f⋆(·))) − sup
mˆn≤m<∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆n(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))−√γin − αn.
Since the event K holds and n ≥ ν0, (25) implies this is at least as large as
µˆX(ℓ(f(·), f⋆(·))) −√γin − 2αn.
Since f was chosen to satisfy (27), this is strictly greater than 3αn+
√
γin+εn−√γin−2αn =
εn + αn. Altogether, we have that
max
mˆn≤m≤n
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) > εn + αn.
Together with (26), this implies that gˆn 6= f . Since this is true of any f ∈ Fn satisfying (27)
(if any such f exists in Fn), and since gˆn ∈ Fn, it follows that gˆn is a function f ∈ Fn not
satisfying (27). Altogether, we have that on the event K∩K ′, ∀n ∈ N with n ≥ max{ν0, ν1},
µˆX(ℓ(gˆn(·), f⋆(·))) ≤ 3αn +√γin + εn.
In particular, recall that in →∞ and γi → 0, so that lim
n→∞
√
γin = 0. Thus, since limn→∞αn =
lim
n→∞ εn = 0 (by their definitions), and since max{ν0, ν1} < ∞, we have that on the event
K ∩K ′,
lim
n→∞ LˆX(fˆn, f
⋆;n) = lim
n→∞ µˆX(ℓ(gˆn(·), f
⋆(·))) ≤ lim
n→∞ 3αn +
√
γin + εn = 0.
Since the event K ∩ K ′ has probability one (by the union bound), and LˆX is nonneg-
ative, this establishes that LˆX(fˆn, f⋆;n) → 0 (a.s.). Since this argument applies to any
measurable f⋆ : X → Y, this establishes that fˆn is strongly universally consistent under X,
so that X ∈ SUIL. Since this argument applies to any X ∈ C1, this completes the proof that
C1 ⊆ SUIL.
Combining Lemmas 18, 19, and 25 completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Interestingly, we may note that the only reliance of the above proof of Lemma 25 on
the assumption X ∈ C1 is in the existence of the sequence {Gi}∞i=1 via Lemma 23: that
is, we have in fact established that any X for which there exists a sequence {Gi}∞i=1 with
these properties admits strong universal inductive learning, so that the existence of such a
sequence implies X ∈ SUIL. Together with Theorem 7 (implying C1 = SUIL) and Lemma 23
(implying X ∈ C1 suffices for such a sequence {Gi}∞i=1 to exist), this establishes that C1 is
in fact equivalent to the set of processes for which such a sequence exists (and hence so
are SUIL and SUAL, via Theorem 7). Thus, we have yet another useful equivalent way of
expressing Condition 1. This is stated formally in the following corollary.
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Corollary 26 A process X satisfies Condition 1 if and only if there exists a sequence
{Fi}∞i=1 of nonempty finite sets of measurable functions X → Y such that, for every mea-
surable f : X → Y, lim
i→∞
min
fi∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(fi(·), f(·)))] = 0.
Indeed, we may further observe that, since Condition 1 does not involve Y or ℓ, applying
the above equivalence to the special case of Y = {0, 1} and ℓ(y, y′) = 1[y 6= y′] admits
another simple equivalent condition. Specifically, in that special case, one can easily verify
that there exists a sequence {Fi}∞i=1 as described in Corollary 26 if and only if there exists
a countable set T2 ⊆ B with ∀A ∈ B, inf
G∈T2
E[µˆX(G△A)] = 0, as guaranteed by the set T1
from Lemma 22. Thus, for any process X, the existence of such a set T2 is also provably
equivalent to Condition 1.
5. Optimistically Universal Learning
This section presents the proofs of two results on optimistically universal learning: Theo-
rems 5 and 6 stated in Section 1.2. For the first of these, we propose a new general self-
adaptive learning rule, and prove that it is optimistically universal: that is, it is strongly
universally consistent under every process admitting strong universal self-adaptive learn-
ing. For the second of these theorems, we prove that there is no optimistically universal
inductive learning rule. Together, these results imply that the additional capability of self-
adaptive learning rules to adjust their predictor based on the unlabeled test data is crucial
for optimistically universal learning.
5.1 Existence of Optimistically Universal Self-Adaptive Learning Rules
We now present the construction of an optimistically universal self-adaptive learning rule.
Fix a sequence {Fi}∞i=1 of nonempty finite sets of measurable functions X → Y with F1 ⊆
F2 ⊆ · · · such that ∀X ∈ C1, for every measurable f :X→Y, lim
i→∞
min
fi∈Fi
E[µˆX(ℓ(fi(·), f(·)))] =
0. Recall that such a sequence {Fi}∞i=1 is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 23. Let {ui}∞i=1
be an arbitrary nondecreasing sequence in N with ui → ∞ and u1 = 1, and let {γi}∞i=1 be
an arbitrary sequence in (0,∞) with γ1 ≥ ℓ¯ and γi → 0. Let {xi}∞i=1 be any sequence in X
and let {yi}∞i=1 be any sequence in Y. For each n,m ∈ N with m ≥ n, let
iˆn,m(x1:m) = max
{
i ∈ N : ui ≤ n and
max
f,g∈Fi
(
max
ui≤s≤m
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(xt), g(xt))− max
ui≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(xt), g(xt))
)
≤ γi
}
.
This is a well-defined positive integer, since our constraints on u1 and γ1 guarantee that the
set of i values on the right hand side is nonempty, while the fact that ui →∞ implies this
set of i values is finite (and hence has a maximum element). Let {εn}∞n=1 be an arbitrary
sequence in [0,∞) such that εn → 0. Finally, for every n,m ∈ N with m ≥ n, define the
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function fˆn,m(x1:m, y1:n, ·) as
argminεn
f∈F
iˆn,m(x1:m)
max
u
iˆn,m(x1:m)
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(xt), yt). (29)
Since the sets Fi are finite, one can easily verify that the selection in the argminεn above
can be chosen in a way that makes fˆn,m a measurable function. For completeness, for every
m ∈ N ∪ {0}, also define fˆ0,m(x1:m, {}, ·) as an arbitrary element of F1 (chosen identically
for every m and x1:m), which is then also a measurable function. Thus, the function fˆn,m
defines a self-adaptive learning rule. We have the following theorem for this fˆn,m.
Theorem 27 The self-adaptive learning rule fˆn,m is optimistically universal.
Proof The proof proceeds along similar lines to that of Lemma 25, except using the data-
dependent values iˆn,m(X1:m) in place of the distribution-dependent sequence in from the
proof of Lemma 25. Fix any X ∈ C1 and any measurable f⋆ : X → Y.
Note that, for any given i ∈ N and f, g ∈ Fi, max
ui≤s≤m
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt)) is nondecreas-
ing in m, so that ∀n ∈ N, iˆn,m(X1:m) is nonincreasing in m. Since iˆn,m(X1:m) is always
positive, this implies iˆn,m(X1:m) converges as m→∞; in particular, since iˆn,m(X1:m) ∈ N,
this implies ∀n ∈ N, ∃m∗n ∈ N withm∗n ≥ n such that ∀m ≥ m∗n, iˆn,m(X1:m) = iˆn,m∗n(X1:m∗n).
For brevity, let us define iˆn = iˆn,m∗n(X1:m∗n). By definition of iˆn,m(X1:m), we have that every
m ≥ m∗n satisfies
max
f,g∈F
iˆn
(
max
u
iˆn
≤s≤m
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))− max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
≤ γiˆn .
Taking the limiting case as m→ ∞, together with monotonicity of the max function, this
implies
max
f,g∈F
iˆn
(
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))− max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
≤ γiˆn . (30)
Furthermore, for each i ∈ N, since Fi is finite, continuity of the max function implies
lim sup
n→∞
max
f,g∈Fi
(
max
ui≤s≤m∗n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))− max
ui≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
max
f,g∈Fi
(
max
ui≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))− max
ui≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
= max
f,g∈Fi
(
max
ui≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))− lim
n→∞ maxui≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), g(Xt))
)
= 0 < γi.
Together with finiteness of every ui, this implies
lim
n→∞ iˆn =∞. (31)
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Next note that, by our choices of the sequences {Fi}∞i=1 and {ui}∞i=1, Lemma 24 implies
that there exists a (nonrandom) sequence {f⋆i }∞i=1, with f⋆i ∈ Fi for each i ∈ N, a (nonran-
dom) sequence {αi}∞i=1 in (0,∞) with αi → 0, and an event K of probability one, on which
∃ι0 ∈ N such that ∀i ≥ ι0,
sup
ui≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆i (Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ αi.
In particular, since lim
n→∞ iˆn = ∞ by (31), this implies that, on the event K, ∃ν0 ∈ N such
that ∀n ≥ ν0, we have iˆn ≥ ι0, so that the above implies
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆
iˆn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ αiˆn . (32)
For brevity, for every n,m ∈ N with m ≥ n, define gˆn,m(·) = fˆn,m(X1:m, f⋆(X1:n), ·).
Since every m ≥ m∗n has iˆn,m(X1:m) = iˆn,m∗n(X1:m∗n), the definition of fˆn,m implies that any
m ≥ m∗n also has gˆn,m = gˆn,m∗n (recalling the remark following the definition of argminε,
regarding consistency among multiple evaluations). Denote gˆn = gˆn,m∗n . Combining the
definition of fˆn,m∗n with (32) we have that, on the event K, ∀n ∈ N with n ≥ ν0,
max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆
iˆn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) + εn
≤ sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆
iˆn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) + εn ≤ αiˆn + εn. (33)
Now suppose the event K occurs, fix any n ∈ N with n ≥ ν0, and fix any f ∈ Fiˆn
satisfying
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) > 3αiˆn + γiˆn + εn, (34)
if such a function f exists in Fiˆn . The triangle inequality implies
max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))
≥ max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
(
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt))− ℓ(f⋆iˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))
)
≥ max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt)) − sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆
iˆn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)).
Since the event K holds and n ≥ ν0, (32) implies the expression on this last line is at least
as large as
max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt))− αiˆn .
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Since both f and f⋆
iˆn
are elements of Fiˆn , (30) implies that the above expression is at least
as large as
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt))− γiˆn − αiˆn . (35)
By the triangle inequality, ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt)) ≥ ℓ(f(Xt), f⋆(Xt)) − ℓ(f⋆iˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) for
every t. Together with monotonicity of the supremum function, this implies
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆
iˆn
(Xt))
≥ sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
(
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))− ℓ(f⋆iˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))
)
≥ sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) − sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f⋆
iˆn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)). (36)
Since the event K holds and n ≥ ν0, (32) implies the second term in (36) is at most αiˆn ,
while (34) implies the first term is strictly greater than 3αiˆn + γiˆn + εn. Together, we have
that (36) is strictly greater than 2αiˆn+γiˆn+εn. Thus, (35) is strictly greater than αiˆn+εn.
Altogether, on the event K, for any n ∈ N with n ≥ ν0, any f ∈ Fiˆn satisfying (34) has
max
u
iˆn
≤s≤n
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(f(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) > αiˆn + εn,
which together with (33) implies gˆn 6= f . Since this is true of any f ∈ Fiˆn satisfying (34)
(if any such f exists in Fiˆn), and since gˆn ∈ Fiˆn , it must be that gˆn is a function in Fiˆn not
satisfying (34). In summary, we have established that, on the event K, every n ∈ N with
n ≥ ν0 has
sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ 3αiˆn + γiˆn + εn. (37)
Now note that, for every n ∈ N, since gˆn,m = gˆn for every m ≥ m∗n, we have
LˆX
(
fˆn,·, f⋆;n
)
= lim sup
s→∞
1
s+ 1
n+s∑
m=n
ℓ(gˆn,m(Xm+1), f
⋆(Xm+1))
≤ lim sup
s→∞
1
s+ 1
(m∗n − 1)ℓ¯+
1
s+ 1
n+s∑
m=m∗n
ℓ(gˆn(Xm+1), f
⋆(Xm+1))
≤ lim sup
s→∞
n+ s+ 1
s+ 1
1
n+ s+ 1
n+s+1∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt))
= lim sup
s→∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) ≤ sup
u
iˆn
≤s<∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
ℓ(gˆn(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)) .
Combined with (37), this implies that, on the event K, every n ∈ N with n ≥ ν0 satisfies
LˆX
(
fˆn,·, f⋆;n
)
≤ 3αiˆn + γiˆn + εn.
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Recalling that lim
i→∞
αi = lim
i→∞
γi = lim
n→∞ εn = 0 by their definitions, and that limn→∞ iˆn = ∞
by (31), we have that on the event K,
lim
n→∞ LˆX
(
fˆn,·, f⋆;n
)
≤ lim
n→∞ 3αiˆn + γiˆn + εn = 0.
Recalling that the event K has probability one, and LˆX is nonnegative, this establishes
that LˆX
(
fˆn,·, f⋆;n
)
→ 0 (a.s.). Since this argument applies to any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
this establishes that fˆn,m is strongly universally consistent under X. Furthermore, since this
argument applies to any X ∈ C1, and Theorem 7 implies SUAL = C1, this completes the
proof that fˆn,m is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ SUAL: i.e., that fˆn,m is
optimistically universal.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 27 is that there exist optimistically universal
self-adaptive learning rules, so that this also completes the proof of Theorem 5 stated in
Section 1.2.
5.2 Nonexistence of Optimistically Universal Inductive Learning Rules
Given the positive result above on optimistically universal self-adaptive learning, it is nat-
ural to wonder whether the same is true of inductive learning. However, it turns out this
is not the case. In fact, we find below that there do not even exist inductive learning rules
that are strongly universally consistent under every X with convergent relative frequencies,
which form a proper subset of SUIL (recall the discussion in Section 3). We begin with the
following result (restated from Section 1.2). For technical reasons, throughout Section 5.2
we assume that (X ,T ) is a Polish space; for instance, Rp satisfies this for any p ∈ N, under
the usual Euclidean topology.
Theorem 6 (restated) There does not exist an optimistically universal inductive learning
rule, if X is uncountable.
Before presenting the proof, we first have a technical lemma regarding a basic fact about
nonatomic probability measures.
Lemma 28 For any nonatomic probability measure π0 on X , there exists a sequence
{Rk}∞k=1 in B such that, ∀k ∈ N, π0(Rk) = 1/2, and ∀A ∈ B, lim
k→∞
π0(A∩Rk) = (1/2)π0(A).
Proof Denote by λ the Lebesgue measure on R. First, note that since (X ,T ) is a Polish
space, (X ,B) is a standard Borel space (in the sense of Srivastava, 1998). In particular,
since π0 is nonatomic, this implies that there exists a Borel isomorphism ψ : X → [0, 1]
such that, for every Borel subset B of [0, 1], π0(ψ
−1(B)) = λ(B) (see e.g., Srivastava, 1998,
Theorem 3.4.23).
For each k ∈ N and each i ∈ Z, define Ck,i =
[
(i− 1)2−k, i2−k), let Bk = ⋃
i∈Z
Ck,2i,
and define Rk = ψ
−1(Bk ∩ [0, 1]). Note that each Bk ∩ [0, 1] is a Borel subset of [0, 1],
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so that measurability of ψ implies Rk ∈ B; furthermore, π0(Rk) = π0(ψ−1(Bk ∩ [0, 1])) =
λ(Bk ∩ [0, 1]) = 1/2, as required.
Now fix any set A ∈ B, and let B ⊆ [0, 1] be the Borel subset of [0, 1] with A = ψ−1(B)
(which exists by the bimeasurability property of ψ). Since λ is a regular measure (e.g.,
Cohn, 1980, Proposition 1.4.1), for any ε > 0, there exists an open set Uε with B ⊆ Uε ⊆ R
such that λ(Uε \ B) < ε. As any open subset of R is a union of countably many pairwise-
disjoint open intervals (e.g., Kolmogorov and Fomin, 1975, Section 6, Theorem 6), we let
(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . be a sequence of disjoint open intervals (ai ∈ [−∞,∞), bi ∈ (−∞,∞])
with Uε =
∞⋃
i=1
(ai, bi); for notational simplicity, we suppose this sequence is infinite, which can
always be achieved by adding an infinite number of empty intervals (ai, bi) with ai = bi ∈ R.
Since Uε \
j⋃
i=1
(ai, bi) ↓ ∅ as j → ∞, and since λ(Uε) = λ(Uε \ B) + λ(B) < ε + 1 < ∞,
continuity of finite measures implies lim
j→∞
λ
(
Uε \
j⋃
i=1
(ai, bi)
)
= 0 (e.g., Schervish, 1995,
Theorem A.19). In particular, for any δ > 0, ∃jδ ∈ N such that λ
(
Uε \
jδ⋃
i=1
(ai, bi)
)
< δ/2.
Now let kδ =
⌈
log2
(
4jδ
δ
)⌉
. Since λ(Uε) < ∞, it must be that every ai > −∞ and every
bi <∞. Furthermore, letting a¯i = min{t2−kδ : ai < t2−kδ , t ∈ Z} and b¯i = max{t2−kδ : bi >
t2−kδ , t ∈ Z}, we have that
λ
(
(ai, bi) \
⋃
{Ckδ,t : Ckδ,t ⊆ (ai, bi), t ∈ Z}
)
≤ |a¯i − ai|+ |bi − b¯i| ≤ 2 · 2−kδ ≤ δ
2jδ
.
Thus,
λ
(
Uε \
⋃
{Ckδ,t : Ckδ,t ⊆ Uε, t ∈ Z}
)
≤ λ
(
Uε \
jδ⋃
i=1
(ai, bi)
)
+ λ
(
jδ⋃
i=1
(ai, bi) \
⋃
{Ckδ,t : Ckδ,t ⊆ Uε, t ∈ Z}
)
< δ/2 +
jδ∑
i=1
λ
(
(ai, bi) \
⋃
{Ckδ,t : Ckδ,t ⊆ Uε, t ∈ Z}
)
≤ δ/2 +
jδ∑
i=1
λ
(
(ai, bi) \
⋃
{Ckδ,t : Ckδ,t ⊆ (ai, bi), t ∈ Z}
)
≤ δ/2 +
jδ∑
i=1
δ
2jδ
= δ. (38)
Now note that, for every k > kδ and i ∈ Z, each j ∈ Z has either Ck,j ⊆ Ckδ,i or
Ck,j ∩ Ckδ,i = ∅, and moreover each j has Ck,2j ⊆ Ckδ,i if and only if Ck,2j−1 ⊆ Ckδ,i (the
smallest j with Ck,j ⊆ Ckδ,i has (j − 1)2−k = (i− 1)2−kε , which implies j is an odd number
because k > kε; similarly, the largest j with Ck,j ⊆ Ckδ,i has j2−k = i2−kε and is therefore
even), so that
λ(Bk ∩ Ckδ,i) = λ
(⋃
{Ck,2j : Ck,2j ⊆ Ckδ,i, j ∈ Z}
)
= (1/2)λ(Ckδ ,i),
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and hence (by disjointness of the Ckδ,i sets)
λ
(
Bk ∩
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
=
∑
i∈Z:Ckδ,i⊆Uε
λ(Bk ∩ Ckδ,i)
=
∑
i∈Z:Ckδ,i⊆Uε
(1/2)λ(Ckδ ,i) = (1/2)λ
(⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
.
Therefore ∀k > kδ,
λ(Uε ∩Bk)
= λ
(
Bk ∩
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
+ λ
(
Bk ∩ Uε \
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
= (1/2)λ
(⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
+ λ
(
Bk ∩ Uε \
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
)
.
(39)
The first term in (39) equals (1/2) (λ(Uε)− λ(Uε \
⋃ {Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z})), which by
(38) is greater than (1/2)λ(Uε) − δ/2. Furthermore, the second term in (39) is no smaller
than 0, and no greater than λ(Uε \
⋃ {Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}). Thus,
(1/2)λ(Uε)− δ/2 < λ(Uε ∩Bk)
≤ (1/2)
(
λ(Uε)−λ
(
Uε\
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i⊆Uε, i∈Z}
))
+ λ
(
Uε\
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i⊆Uε, i∈Z}
)
= (1/2)
(
λ(Uε) + λ
(
Uε \
⋃
{Ckδ,i : Ckδ,i ⊆ Uε, i ∈ Z}
))
< (1/2)λ(Uε) + δ/2,
where this last inequality is by (38).
Since this holds for every k > kδ, and kδ is finite for every δ ∈ (0, 1), we have ∀δ ∈ (0, 1),
(1/2)λ(Uε)− δ/2 ≤ lim inf
k→∞
λ(Uε ∩Bk) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
λ(Uε ∩Bk) ≤ (1/2)λ(Uε) + δ/2,
and taking the limit as δ → 0 implies
lim
k→∞
λ(Uε ∩Bk) = (1/2)λ(Uε).
This further implies that
lim sup
k→∞
λ(B ∩Bk) ≤ lim
k→∞
λ(Uε ∩Bk) = (1/2)λ(Uε) < (1/2)λ(B) + ε/2,
and
lim inf
k→∞
λ(B ∩Bk) ≥ lim
k→∞
λ(Uε ∩Bk)− λ(Uε \B) = (1/2)λ(Uε)− λ(Uε \B)
= (1/2)λ(B) − (1/2)λ(Uε \B) > (1/2)λ(B) − ε/2.
Since these inequalities hold for every ε > 0, taking the limit as ε→ 0 reveals that
lim
k→∞
λ(B ∩Bk) = (1/2)λ(B).
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Furthermore, since ψ−1(B) ∩ ψ−1(Bk ∩ [0, 1]) = ψ−1(B ∩ Bk ∩ [0, 1]) = ψ−1(B ∩ Bk) for
every k ∈ N, this implies that
lim
k→∞
π0(A ∩Rk) = lim
k→∞
π0(ψ
−1(B) ∩ ψ−1(Bk ∩ [0, 1])) = lim
k→∞
π0(ψ
−1(B ∩Bk))
= lim
k→∞
λ(B ∩Bk) = (1/2)λ(B) = (1/2)π0(ψ−1(B)) = (1/2)π0(A).
Since this argument holds ∀A ∈ B, this completes the proof.
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 6. The proof is partly inspired by that of
a related (but somewhat different) result of Nobel (1999), based on a technique of Adams
and Nobel (1998). Specifically, Nobel (1999) proves that there is no universally consistent
learning rule for all joint processes (X,Y) that are stationary and ergodic. In contrast, we
are interested in learning under a fixed target function f⋆, and as such the construction of
Nobel (1999) needs to be modified for our purposes. However, the proof below does preserve
the essential elements of the cutting and stacking argument of Adams and Nobel (1998),
though generalized to suit our abstract setting. While the processes X we construct do not
have the property of stationarity from the original proof of Nobel (1999), they do satisfy
ergodicity (indeed, they are product processes) and are contained in CRF.
Proof of Theorem 6 Fix any inductive learning rule fn. We begin by constructing the
process X. Since X is uncountable, and (X ,T ) is a Polish space, there exists a nonatomic
probability measure π0 on X (with respect to B) (see Parthasarathy, 1967, Chapter 2,
Theorem 8.1). Furthermore, fixing any such nonatomic π0, Lemma 28 implies there exists
a sequence {Rk}∞k=1 in B such that, ∀k ∈ N, π0(Rk) = 1/2, and ∀A ∈ B, lim
k→∞
π0(A∩Rk) =
(1/2)π0(A). Also define R0 = ∅. Define random variables Uk,j (for all k, j ∈ N), Vk,j (for
all k, j ∈ N), and Wj (for all j ∈ N), all mutually independent (and independent from
{fn}n∈N), with distributions specified as follows. For each k, j ∈ N, Uk,j has distribution
π0(·|X \ Rk), while Vk,j has distribution π0(·|Rk). For each j ∈ N, Wj has distribution π0.
Denote U = {Uk,j}k,j∈N, V = {Vk,j}k,j∈N, W = {Wj}j∈N.
Fix any y0, y1 ∈ Y with ℓ(y0, y1) > 0. For any array v = {vk,j}k,j∈N, and any K ∈ N,
denote v<K = {vk,j}k,j∈N,k<K, and denote vK = {vK,j}j∈N. Then, for any arrays u =
{uk,j}k,j∈N and v = {vk,j}k,j∈N in X , any sequence w = {wj}j∈N in X , and any K ∈ N,
define
f⋆K(x;u<K ,v<K ,w) =
{
y0, if x ∈ (v<K ∪RK) \ (w ∪ u<K)
y1, otherwise
and
f⋆0 (x;v) =
{
y0, if x ∈ v
y1, otherwise
,
where, for notational simplicity, in these definitions we treat v<K , w, u<K , v as the sets
of the distinct values in the respective arrays.
Now, for any u, v, w as above, inductively define values X
(k)
i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) as
follows. Let n0 = 0. For this inductive definition, suppose that for some k ∈ N the
value nk−1 ∈ N and the values {X(k−1)i (u<k−1,uk−1,v<k−1,vk−1,w) : i ∈ N, i ≤ nk−1}
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are already defined (taking this to be trivially satisfied in the case k = 1, wherein this is
an empty sequence). For each i ∈ N with i ≤ nk−1, define X˜(k)i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) and
X
(k)
i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) both equal to X
(k−1)
i (u<k−1,uk,v<k−1,vk−1,w). Then, for each
i ∈ N, define X˜(k)nk−1+k(i−1)+1(u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) = vk,nk−1+k(i−1)+1, and for each j ∈ N
with 2 ≤ j ≤ k, define X˜(k)nk−1+k(i−1)+j(u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) = uk,nk−1+k(i−1)+j . To simplify
notation, for each i ∈ N, abbreviate Xˆ(k)i = X˜(k)i (U<k,Uk,V<k,Vk,W). If ∃n ∈ N with
n > nk−1 such that
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
fn
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:n, f
⋆
k
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:n;U<k,V<k,W
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
)
< 2−k,
(40)
then fix some such value of n, and ∀i ∈ {nk−1+1, . . . , n} define X(k)i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) =
X˜
(k)
i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w). Furthermore, for each i ∈ N with n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2, define
X
(k)
i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w)=wi. Finally, define nk=n
2. Otherwise, if no such n satisfies (40),
then ∀i ∈ N with i > nk−1, define X(k)i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w) = X˜(k)i (u<k,uk,v<k,vk,w), in
which case the inductive definition is complete (upon reaching the smallest value of k for
which no such n exists). Note that, since we do not condition on any variables in (40), the
values nk are not random.
Now we consider two cases. First, suppose there is a maximum value k∗ of k ∈ N
for which nk−1 is defined. In this case, ∄n ∈ N with n > nk∗−1 satisfying (40) with
k = k∗, and furthermore X(k
∗)
i (u<k∗ ,uk∗ ,v<k∗ ,vk∗ ,w) = X˜
(k∗)
i (u<k∗ ,uk∗ ,v<k∗ ,vk∗ ,w) for
every i ∈ N, and every u, v, and w. Next note that, by the law of total probability
and basic limit theorems for probabilities (see e.g., Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000), denoting
Qk∗ = (U<k∗ ,V<k∗ ,W) for brevity,
E
[
P
(
lim sup
n→∞
{
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
fn
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n , f
⋆
k∗
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n ;Qk∗
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
} ∣∣∣Qk∗
)]
= P
(
lim sup
n→∞
{
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
fn
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n , f
⋆
k∗
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n ;Qk∗
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
})
≥ lim sup
n→∞
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
fn
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n , f
⋆
k∗
(
Xˆ
(k∗)
1:n ;Qk∗
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
)
.
The negation of (40) implies this last expression is at least 2−k∗ (noting that the nega-
tion of (40) holds for every n > nk∗−1 in the present case). In particular, since the
Uk,j,Vk′,j′, and Wj′′ variables are all independent, this implies ∃u,v,w such that, taking
Xi = X
(k∗)
i (u<k∗ ,Uk∗ ,v<k∗ ,Vk∗ ,w) for every i ∈ N, and f⋆(·) = f⋆k∗(·;u<k∗ ,v<k∗ ,w), we
have
P
(
lim sup
n→∞
{π0({x : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2}) ≥ 3/4}
)
≥ 2−k∗ .
Define the event
E′ =
{
lim sup
n→∞
π0({x ∈ Rk∗ : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2}) ≥ 1/4
}
.
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Since π0(Rk∗) = 1/2, we have that
lim sup
n→∞
{π0({x : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2}) ≥ 3/4}
⊆ lim sup
n→∞
{π0({x ∈ Rk∗ : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2}) ≥ 1/4} ⊆ E′,
so that E′ has probability at least 2−k∗ . Also let E denote the event that ∀k, j ∈ N,
Vk,j /∈ {wj′ : j′ ∈ N} ∪ {uk′,j′ : k′, j′ ∈ N}; note that, since π0 is nonatomic, and hence so is
each π0(·|Rk) (since π0(Rk) > 0), E has probability one.
Denote ti = nk∗−1 + k∗(i − 1) + 1 for each i ∈ N, and let Ik∗ = {ti : i ∈ N}. Note that,
since every Vk∗,j ∈ Rk∗ and every t ∈ Ik∗ has Xt = Vk∗,t (by definition), on the event E,
every t ∈ Ik∗ has f⋆(Xt) = y0 (by definition of f⋆). Therefore, on the event E, every n ∈ N
with n > nk∗−1 has
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) ≥ lim sup
m→∞
1
m
n+m∑
t=n+1
1Ik∗ (t)ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt) , f
⋆(Xt))
= lim sup
m→∞
1
m
n+m∑
t=n+1
1Ik∗ (t)ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt) , y0) .
Since k∗
n+m∑
t=n+1
1Ik∗ (t) > m− k∗, letting in = max{i ∈ N : ti ≤ n}, this last line is at least as
large as
lim sup
q→∞
1
k∗q + k∗
q∑
s=1
ℓ
(
fn
(
X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xtin+s
)
, y0
)
= lim sup
q→∞
1
k∗q
q∑
s=1
ℓ
(
fn
(
X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xtin+s
)
, y0
)
≥ lim sup
q→∞
1
k∗q
q∑
s=1
1[ℓ(y0,y1)/2,∞)
(
ℓ
(
fn
(
X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xtin+s
)
, y0
)) ℓ(y0, y1)
2
.
Furthermore, the subsequence {Xtin+s}∞s=1 is a sequence of independent random variables
with distribution π0(·|Rk∗) (namely, a subsequence of Vk∗), also independent from the rest
of the sequence {Xt : t /∈ {tin+s : s ∈ N}} and fn. This implies that
{
1[ℓ(y0,y1)/2,∞)
(
ℓ
(
fn
(
X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xtin+s
)
, y0
))}∞
s=1
is a sequence of conditionally i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables (given X1:n and fn). Thus,
∀n ∈ N with n > nk∗−1, by the strong law of large numbers (applied under the conditional
distribution given X1:n and fn) and the law of total probability, there is an event E
′′
n of
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probability one such that, on E ∩E′′n,
lim sup
q→∞
1
k∗q
q∑
s=1
1[ℓ(y0,y1)/2,∞)
(
ℓ
(
fn
(
X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xtin+s
)
, y0
)) ℓ(y0, y1)
2
=
ℓ(y0, y1)
2k∗
π0
({
x : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)
2
} ∣∣∣Rk∗
)
=
ℓ(y0, y1)
k∗
π0
({
x ∈ Rk∗ : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)
2
})
.
Combining this with the above, we have that on the event E ∩E′ ∩ ⋂
n>nk∗−1
E′′n,
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)
k∗
lim sup
n→∞
π0
({
x ∈ Rk∗ : ℓ(fn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) , y0) ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)
2
})
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)
4k∗
.
Since ℓ(y0,y1)4k∗ > 0, and since E ∩ E′ ∩
⋂
n>nk∗−1
E′′n has probability at least 2−k
∗
> 0 (by the
union bound), and since f⋆ is clearly a measurable function, this implies that fn is not
strongly universally consistent under the process X defined here.
To complete this first case, we argue that X ∈ SUIL; in fact, we will show the stronger
result that X ∈ CRF. Note that for every t > nk∗−1, either t ∈ Ik∗ , in which case Xt = Vk∗,t,
or else Xt = Uk∗,t. Thus, for any n > nk∗−1 and A ∈ B,
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1A(Xt) =
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
(
1Ik∗ (t)1A(Vk∗,t) + 1N\Ik∗ (t)1A(Uk∗,t)
)
.
Thus, since 0 ≤ 1n
nk∗−1∑
t=1
1A(Xt) ≤ nk∗−1n implies limn→∞
1
n
nk∗−1∑
t=1
1A(Xt) = 0, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
1A(Xt) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1Ik∗ (t)1A(Vk∗,t) + limn→∞
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1N\Ik∗ (t)1A(Uk∗,t).
For any n ∈ N with n > nk∗−1, denoting by qn =
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1Ik∗ (t), we have n − nk∗−1 ≤
k∗qn < n− nk∗−1 + k∗. Therefore
lim
n→∞
k∗qn
n
= 1, (41)
so that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1Ik∗ (t)1A(Vk∗,t) = limn→∞
k∗qn
n
1
k∗qn
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1Ik∗ (t)1A(Vk∗,t)
=
1
k∗
lim
n→∞
1
qn
qn∑
i=1
1A(Vk∗,ti) =
1
k∗
lim
s→∞
1
s
s∑
i=1
1A(Vk∗,ti).
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Since the variables {Vk∗,ti}∞i=1 are independent π0(·|Rk∗)-distributed random variables, the
strong law of large numbers implies that with probability one, the rightmost expression
above equals (1/k∗)π0(A|Rk∗). Likewise, for any n ∈ N with n > nk∗−1, denoting by
q′n =
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1N\Ik∗ (t) and noting that q
′
n = n− nk∗−1 − qn, (41) implies
lim
n→∞
q′n
n
= lim
n→∞
k∗(n− nk∗−1 − qn)
k∗n
=
k∗ − 1
k∗
.
Therefore, if k∗ > 1, denoting by t′1, t
′
2, . . . the enumeration of the elements of {t ∈ N \ Ik∗ :
t > nk∗−1} in increasing order, we have that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1N\Ik∗ (t)1A(Uk∗,t) = limn→∞
q′n
n
1
q′n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1N\Ik∗ (t)1A(Uk∗,t)
=
k∗ − 1
k∗
lim
n→∞
1
q′n
q′n∑
i=1
1A(Uk∗,t′i) =
k∗ − 1
k∗
lim
s→∞
1
s
s∑
i=1
1A(Uk∗,t′i).
Since the variables {Uk∗,t′i}∞i=1 are independent π0(·|X \Rk∗)-distributed random variables,
the strong law of large numbers implies that on an event of probability one, the rightmost
expression above equals k
∗−1
k∗ π0(A|X \Rk∗), so that on this event,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=nk∗−1+1
1N\Ik∗ (t)1A(Uk∗,t) =
k∗ − 1
k∗
π0(A|X \Rk∗).
Although this argument was specific to k∗ > 1, the above equality is trivially also satisfied
if k∗ = 1, so that the conclusion holds for any k∗ ∈ N.
By the union bound, both of the above events occur simultaneously with probability
one, so that altogether we have that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
1A(Xt) =
1
k∗
π0(A|Rk∗) + k
∗ − 1
k∗
π0(A|X \Rk∗) (a.s.). (42)
In particular, this also establishes that the limit of the expression on the left hand side exists
almost surely. Since this conclusion holds for any choice of A ∈ B, we have that X ∈ CRF.
Thus, since Theorem 17 of Section 3 establishes that CRF ⊆ C1, we have that X ∈ C1, and
since Theorem 7 establishes that SUIL = C1, this implies X ∈ SUIL. Therefore, in this first
case, we conclude that the inductive learning rule fn is not optimistically universal.
Next, let us examine the second case, wherein nk is defined for every k ∈ N ∪ {0}, so
that {nk}∞k=0 is an infinite increasing sequence of nonnegative integers. In this case, for
every k ∈ N, (40) and the definition of nk imply that, denoting by Qk = (U<k,V<k,W),
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
, f⋆k
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
;Qk
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
)
< 2−k.
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By the monotone convergence theorem and linearity of expectations, combined with the
law of total probability, this implies
E
[ ∞∑
k=1
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
, f⋆k
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
;Qk
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
∣∣∣V)
]
=
∞∑
k=1
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
, f⋆k
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
;Qk
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
)
< 1.
In particular, this implies that with probability one,
∞∑
k=1
P
(
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
, f⋆k
(
Xˆ
(k)
1:
√
nk
;Qk
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 3/4
∣∣∣V) <∞.
Since U, W, and {fn}n∈N are independent from V, and since every k, j ∈ N has Vk,j
with distribution π0(·|Rk) and hence Vk,j ∈ Rk, this implies ∃v with vk,j ∈ Rk for every
k, j ∈ N, such that, defining Xi = X(k)i (U<k,Uk,v<k,vk,W) for every k ∈ N and i ∈
{nk−1 + 1, . . . , nk},
∞∑
k=1
P
(
π0
({
x :ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
k
(
X1:√nk ;U<k,v<k,W
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥3/4
)
<∞.
The Borel-Cantelli Lemma then implies that there exists an event H ′ of probability one, on
which ∃k0 ∈ N such that, ∀k ∈ N with k > k0,
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
k
(
X1:√nk ;U<k,v<k,W
)
, x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
< 3/4.
Next, let H denote the event that {Wj : j ∈ N} ∩ {vk,j : k, j ∈ N} = ∅ and {Uk,j : k, j ∈
N}∩{vk,j : k, j ∈ N} = ∅. Note that, since π0 is nonatomic, and so is π0(·|X \Rk) for every
k ∈ N, H has probability one. Furthermore, for every k ∈ N, by definition of f⋆k , ∀j ∈ N,
f⋆k (Wj;U<k,v<k,W) = y1, and ∀k′, j ∈ N with k′ < k, f⋆k (Uk′,j;U<k,v<k,W) = y1. Also,
for every j ∈ N, the distribution of Uk,j is π0(·|X \ Rk), and therefore we have Uk,j /∈ Rk;
together with the definition of f⋆k , this implies f
⋆
k (Uk,j;U<k,v<k,W) = y1 on the event
H. The definition of f⋆k further implies that, on H, for every k
′, k, j ∈ N with k′ < k,
f⋆k (vk′,j;U<k,v<k,W) = y0. Also, since vk,j ∈ Rk for every k, j ∈ N, on the event H,
every k, j ∈ N has f⋆k (vk,j;U<k,v<k,W) = y0. Furthermore, by definition of f⋆0 , every
k, j ∈ N has f⋆0 (vk,j;v) = y0, and on the event H, every j ∈ N has f⋆0 (Wj ;v) = y1, and
∀k, j ∈ N, f⋆0 (Uk,j;v) = y1. Altogether we have that, on the event H, every k′, k, j ∈ N
with k′ ≤ k has f⋆k (vk′,j;U<k,v<k,W) = f⋆0 (vk′,j;v), f⋆k (Uk′,j;U<k,v<k,W) = f⋆0 (Uk′,j;v),
and f⋆k (Wj ;U<k,v<k,W) = f
⋆
0 (Wj ;v). In particular, note that for any k ∈ N, every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,√nk} has Xi ∈ {vk′,i : k′ ≤ k} ∪ {Uk′,i : k′ ≤ k} ∪ {Wi}, so that, on the event
H, f⋆k (Xi;U<k,v<k,W) = f
⋆
0 (Xi;v). Thus, taking f
⋆(·) = f⋆0 (·;v), on the event H ∩H ′,
∀k ∈ N with k > k0,
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆(X1:√nk), x
)
, y0
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
< 3/4.
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Any y ∈ Y with ℓ(y, y1) < ℓ(y0, y1)/2 necessarily has ℓ(y, y0) > ℓ(y, y0) + ℓ(y, y1) −
ℓ(y0, y1)/2 ≥ ℓ(y0, y1)− ℓ(y0, y1)/2 = ℓ(y0, y1)/2, where the second inequality is due to the
triangle inequality for ℓ. Therefore, on H ∩H ′, ∀k ∈ N with k > k0,
π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆(X1:√nk), x
)
, y1
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
= 1− π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆(X1:√nk), x
)
, y1
)
< ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
≥ 1− π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆(X1:√nk), x
)
, y0
)
> ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
> 1/4. (43)
Now fix any k, k′ ∈ N with k′ ≥ k and k′ > 1 (which implies nk′ > √nk′), and note that
every t ∈ {√nk′ + 1, . . . , nk′} has Xt = Wt; on H, this implies f⋆(Xt) = y1. Thus, on the
event H,
1
nk′ −√nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, f⋆(Xt)
)
=
1
nk′ −√nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, y1
)
≥ 1
nk′ −√nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
1[ℓ(y0,y1)/2,∞)
(
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, y1
)) ℓ(y0, y1)
2
.
Furthermore, the fact that {Xt}nk′t=√nk′+1 = {Wt}
nk′
t=
√
nk′+1
also implies that {Xt}nk′t=√nk′+1 are
independent π0-distributed random variables, also independent from X1:√nk (since k ≤ k′)
and f√nk . Therefore, Hoeffding’s inequality (applied under the conditional distribution
given X1:√nk and f√nk) and the law of total probability imply that, on an event H
′′
k,k′ of
probability at least 1− 1
(k′)3
,
1
nk′ −√nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
1[ℓ(y0,y1)/2,∞)
(
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, y1
))
≥ π0
({
x : ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
, x
)
, y1
)
≥ ℓ(y0, y1)/2
})
−
√
(3/2) ln(k′)
nk′ −√nk′ .
Combining with (43) we have that, on the event H ∩H ′∩ ⋂
k′∈N\{1}
⋂
k≤k′
H ′′k,k′, every k, k
′ ∈ N
with k′ ≥ k > k0 satisfy
1
nk′ −√nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, f⋆(Xt)
)
>
ℓ(y0, y1)
2
(
1
4
−
√
(3/2) ln(k′)
nk′ −√nk′
)
.
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Since nk is strictly increasing in k, we have that on H ∩H ′ ∩
⋂
k′∈N\{1}
⋂
k≤k′
H ′′k,k′,
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) ≥ lim sup
k→∞
LˆX
(
f√nk , f
⋆;
√
nk
)
= lim sup
k→∞
lim sup
m→∞
1
m
m∑
t=1
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, f⋆(Xt)
)
≥ lim sup
k→∞
lim sup
k′→∞
1
nk′
nk′∑
t=
√
nk′+1
ℓ
(
f√nk
(
X1:√nk , f
⋆
(
X1:√nk
)
,Xt
)
, f⋆(Xt)
)
≥ lim sup
k→∞
lim sup
k′→∞
nk′ −√nk′
nk′
ℓ(y0, y1)
2
(
1
4
−
√
(3/2) ln(k′)
nk′ −√nk′
)
. (44)
Since nk′ is strictly increasing in k
′, we have that for any k′ ≥ 4, 0 ≤ (3/2) ln(k′)nk′−√nk′ ≤
3 ln(nk′)
nk′
,
which converges to 0 as k′ → ∞. Furthermore, nk′−
√
nk′
nk′
= 1 − 1√nk′ , which converges to 1
as k′ → ∞. Therefore, the expression in (44) equals ℓ(y0, y1)/8. By the union bound, the
event H ∩H ′ ∩ ⋂
k′∈N\{1}
⋂
k≤k′
H ′′k,k′ has probability at least
1−
∑
k′∈N\{1}
∑
k≤k′
1
(k′)3
= 1−
∑
k′∈N\{1}
1
(k′)2
= 2− π
2
6
> 0,
so that there is a nonzero probability that lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(fn, f⋆;n) > 0. In particular, since
f⋆ is clearly a measurable function, this implies that the inductive learning rule fn is not
strongly universally consistent under X.
It remains to show that the process X defined above for this second case is an element
of SUIL; again, we will in fact establish the stronger fact that X ∈ CRF. For this, for each
k ∈ N, let Jk = {nk−1 + (i − 1)k + 1 : i ∈ N, nk−1 + (i − 1)k + 1 ≤ √nk}. For any n ∈ N,
denote kn = max{k ∈ N : nk−1 < n}; this is well-defined, since n0 = 0 (so that this set of
k values is nonempty), and nk is strictly increasing (so that this set of k values is finite,
and hence has a maximum value). Note that, since nk is finite for every k, it follows that
kn →∞. Fix any A ∈ B. By the construction of the process above, we have that, ∀n ∈ N,
1
n
n∑
t=1
1A(Xt) =
1
n
kn∑
k=1



min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
(
1Jk(t)1A(vk,t) + 1N\Jk(t)1A(Uk,t)
)+min{nk,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
1A(Wt)

.
(45)
By Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers, with probability one we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1



min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
(
1Jk(t) (1A(vk,t)−1A(vk,t)) + 1N\Jk(t) (1A(Uk,t)−π0(A|X \Rk))
)
+
min{nk,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
(1A(Wt)− π0(A))

 = 0.
(46)
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We therefore focus on establishing convergence of
1
n
kn∑
k=1



min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
(
1Jk(t)1A(vk,t) + 1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk)
)+ min{nk ,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)

 . (47)
Note that, for any k, n ∈ N with n > nk−1,
|Jk ∩ {nk−1 + 1, . . . ,min{√nk, n}}| =
⌈
min
{√
nk, n
}− nk−1
k
⌉
≤ n
k
+ 1,
and that max(Jk−1) ≤ √nk−1 for any k > 1. Thus,
0 ≤ 1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{√nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t)1A(vk,t) ≤
1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{√nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t)
≤
√
nkn−1
n
+
1
n
(
n
kn
+ 1
)
=
√
nkn−1
n
+
1
kn
+
1
n
. (48)
By definition of kn, this rightmost expression at most
1√
n
+ 1kn +
1
n , which has limit 0 as
n→∞ since kn →∞. Thus,
lim
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{√nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t)1A(vk,t) = 0. (49)
By the definition of the Rk sequence, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), ∃kε ∈ N such that, ∀k ≥ kε,
|π0(A∩Rk)−(1/2)π0(A)| < ε/2. For any k ≥ kε, we have π0(A|X \Rk) = 2π0(A∩(X\Rk)) =
2(π0(A) − π0(A ∩ Rk)) ∈ (2(π0(A) − (1/2)π0(A) − ε/2), 2(π0(A) − (1/2)π0(A) + ε/2)) =
(π0(A)− ε, π0(A) + ε). Thus, for any n ∈ N with kn ≥ kε, we have that
1
n
kn∑
k=1

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)


≥ −ε+ 1
n
kn∑
k=kε
min{nk ,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A) ≥ −ε+
1
n
kn∑
k=kε
min{nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
(π0(A)− 1Jk(t))
≥ −ε−

 1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t)

+

 1
n
kn∑
k=kε
min{nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
π0(A)


= −ε−

 1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{√nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t)

+ (1− nkε−1
n
)
π0(A)
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and
1
n
kn∑
k=1

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk ,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)


≤ nkε−1
n
+
1
n
kn∑
k=kε

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)


≤ nkε−1
n
+
1
n
kn∑
k=kε
min{nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
(π0(A) + ε) ≤ nkε−1
n
+ π0(A) + ε.
As mentioned above, the rightmost expression in (48) has limit 0. Therefore, the inequalities
in (48) also imply that lim
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1
min{√nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1Jk(t) = 0. Furthermore, for any fixed ε ∈ (0, 1),
lim
n→∞
nkε−1
n = 0. Thus, we have that
π0(A)− ε ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)


≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk ,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)

 ≤ π0(A) + ε.
Taking the limit as ε→ 0 reveals that
lim
n→∞
1
n
kn∑
k=1

min{
√
nk,n}∑
t=nk−1+1
1N\Jk(t)π0(A|X \Rk) +
min{nk ,n}∑
t=
√
nk+1
π0(A)

 = π0(A),
which also establishes that the limit exists. Combined with (49), (46), and (45), we have
1
n
n∑
t=1
1A(Xt)→ π0(A) (a.s.). (50)
In particular, this implies that the limit of the left hand side exists almost surely. Since
this holds for any choice of A ∈ B, we have that X ∈ CRF. Since Theorem 17 of Section 3
establishes that CRF ⊆ C1, this also implies X ∈ C1, and since Theorem 7 establishes that
SUIL = C1, this further implies X ∈ SUIL. Thus, in this second case as well, we con-
clude that the inductive learning rule fn is not optimistically universal. Since any inductive
learning rule fn satisfies one of these two cases, this completes the proof that no inductive
learning rule is optimistically universal.
Combining this result with a simple technique for learning in countable spaces, we
immediately have the following corollary.
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Corollary 29 There exists an optimistically universal inductive learning rule if and only
if X is countable.
Proof The “only if” part of the claim follows immediately from Theorem 6. For the
“if” part, consider a simple inductive learning rule fˆn, defined as follows. For any n ∈ N,
x1:n ∈ X n, y1:n ∈ Yn, and x ∈ X , if x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then letting i(x;x1:n) = min{i ∈
{1, . . . , n} : xi = x}, we define fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, x) = yi(x;x1:n). The value fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, x) can be
defined arbitrarily when x /∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. In other words, this method simply memorizes
the observed data points (xi, yi), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and if the test point x is among the observed
xi points, it simply reports the corresponding memorized yi value.
Suppose X is countable, and enumerate its elements X = {z1, z2, . . .} (or in the case of
finite |X |, X = {z1, z2, . . . , z|X |}). For each k ∈ N with k ≤ |X |, let Ak = {zk}; if |X | <∞,
let Ak = ∅ for all k ∈ N with k > |X |. Fix any X ∈ C1. By Lemma 13,
lim
i→∞
µˆX

⋃
k≥i
Ak

 = 0 (a.s.).
Combined with Lemma 14, this implies
lim
n→∞ µˆX
(⋃
{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= 0 (a.s.).
From the definition of fˆn, for each n ∈ N, any f⋆ : X → Y, and each zi ∈ X , if
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n), zi) 6= f⋆(zi), then necessarily zi /∈ {X1, . . . ,Xn}. Therefore,⋃
{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅} = X \ {X1, . . . ,Xn} ⊇ {zi : fˆn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), zi) 6= f⋆(zi)}.
Combining this with Lemma 8 (for homogeneity and monotonicity of µˆX), we have that for
any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
lim
n→∞ LˆX(fˆn, f
⋆;n) ≤ lim
n→∞ µˆX
(
1{x:fˆn(X1:n,f⋆(X1:n),x)6=f⋆(x)}(·)ℓ¯
)
= ℓ¯ lim
n→∞ µˆX
(
{x : fˆn(X1:n, f⋆(X1:n), x) 6= f⋆(x)}
)
≤ ℓ¯ lim
n→∞ µˆX
(⋃
{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}
)
= 0 (a.s.).
Thus, since LˆX is nonnegative, fˆn is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ C1.
Recalling that (by Theorem 7) SUIL = C1, this completes the proof.
It is worth noting here that the proof of Theorem 6 can be made somewhat simpler if
we only wish to directly establish the theorem statement. Specifically, the variables Vk,j
there can be replaced by i.i.d. π0 samples, while the Uk,j variables can all be set equal to
some fixed point x0 ∈ X ; in this case, the sets Rk are not needed (replaced by X \ {x0}),
and several of the definitions can be simplified (e.g., the f⋆k functions can all be replaced by
a fixed function f⋆1 , which simply outputs y0 except on wj and x0 points, where it outputs
y1). The general approach to the proof of inconsistency remains essentially unchanged. One
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can easily verify that the resulting process does satisfy Condition 1; however, it does not
necessarily have convergent relative frequencies (specifically, in the second case discussed in
the proof). The details of this simpler proof are left as an exercise for the interested reader.
We have chosen the more-involved proof presented above so that the inductive learning
rule is shown to not be universally consistent even under processes with convergent relative
frequencies. Indeed, the constructed processes are in fact product processes, and the limit
in (8) is a (non-random) probability measure, described by either (42) or (50). Formally,
we have established the following corollary.
Corollary 30 If X is uncountable, then there does not exist an inductive learning rule that
is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ CRF.
6. Online Learning
In this section, we discuss the online learning setting, establishing a number of results re-
lated to the following question (restated from Section 1.2) on the existence of optimistically
universal learning rules.
Open Problem 1 (restated) Does there exist an optimistically universal online learning
rule?
We approach this question and related issues in an analogous fashion to the above
discussion of self-adaptive and inductive learning. However, unlike the results on self-
adaptive and inductive learning, the results presented here are only partial, and leave open
a number of interesting core questions, including the above open problem.
After introducing some useful lemmas on online aggregation techniques in Section 6.1, we
begin the discussion of universally consistent online learning in Section 6.2 with the subject
of concisely characterizing the family of processes SUOL. We propose a concise condition
(Condition 2) for a process X, and prove that it is generally a necessary condition: i.e., it
is satisfied by any X that admits strong universal online learning. We also argue that it
is a sufficient condition in the case that X is countable or that X is deterministic, but we
leave open the question of whether this condition is a sufficient condition for X to admit
strong universal online learning in the general case (Open Problem 2). Following this, in
Section 6.3, we address the relation between admission of strong universal online learning
and admission of strong universal self-adaptive learning. We specifically establish that
the latter implies the former, but not vice versa (when X is infinite): that is, SUAL ⊂
SUOL with strict inclusion, which establishes a separation of SUOL from SUAL and SUIL.
Although lacking a general concise (provable) characterization of SUOL, we are at least
able to show, in Section 6.4, that the family SUOL is invariant to the choice of loss function
ℓ (as was true of SUIL and SUAL above, from their equivalence to C1 in Theorem 7), under
the additional restriction that ℓ is totally bounded. We also argue that SUOL is invariant
to the choice of ℓ among losses that are not totally bounded, but we leave open the question
of whether these two SUOL families are equal (Open Problem 3).
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6.1 Online Aggregation
Before getting into the new results of the present work on online learning, we first introduce
some supporting lemmas based on a well-known aggregation technique from the literature
on online learning with arbitrary sequences. The first lemma is a regret guarantee for a
weighted averaging prediction algorithm. The technique and analysis are taken from classic
works in the theory of online learning (Vovk, 1990, 1992; Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994;
Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, Haussler, Helmbold, Schapire, and Warmuth, 1997; Kivinen and
Warmuth, 1999; Singer and Feder, 1999; Gyo¨rfi and Lugosi, 2002). For completeness, we
include a brief proof: a version of this classic argument.
Lemma 31 For each n ∈ N, let {zn,i}∞i=1 be a sequence of values in [0, 1], and let {pi}∞i=1 be
a sequence in (0, 1) with
∞∑
i=1
pi = 1. Fix a finite constant b ∈ (0, 1). For each n, i ∈ N, define
Ln,i =
1
n
n∑
t=1
zt,i. Then for each i ∈ N, define w1,i = v1,i = pi, and for each n ∈ N \ {1},
define wn,i = pib
(n−1)L(n−1),i , and vn,i = wn,i/
∞∑
i=1
wn,i. Finally, for each n ∈ N, define
z¯n =
∞∑
i=1
vn,izn,i. Then for every n ∈ N,
1
n
n∑
t=1
z¯t ≤ inf
i∈N
(
ln(1/b)
1− b Ln,i +
1
(1− b)n ln
(
1
pi
))
.
Proof DenoteWn =
∞∑
i=1
wn,i for each n ∈ N. Then note that ∀n ∈ N,Wn+1 =
∞∑
i=1
wn,ib
zn,i =
Wn
∞∑
i=1
vn,ib
zn,i . Noting that bzn,i ≤ 1− (1− b)zn,i, we find that
Wn+1
Wn
≤
∞∑
i=1
vn,i(1− (1− b)zn,i) = 1− (1− b)z¯n.
SinceW1 = 1, by induction we haveWn+1 ≤
n∏
t=1
(1−(1−b)z¯t). Noting that ln(1−(1−b)z¯t) ≤
−(1 − b)z¯t, we have that ln(Wn+1) ≤
n∑
t=1
ln(1 − (1 − b)z¯t) ≤ −(1 − b)
n∑
t=1
z¯t. Therefore, for
any n ∈ N,
n∑
t=1
z¯t ≤ 1
1− b ln
(
1
Wn+1
)
=
1
1− b ln
(
1∑∞
i=1 pib
nLn,i
)
≤ 1
1− b ln
(
1
supi∈N pibnLn,i
)
= inf
i∈N
(
ln(1/b)
1− b nLn,i +
1
1− b ln
(
1
pi
))
.
Dividing the leftmost and rightmost expressions by n completes the proof.
For our purposes, we will need the following implication of this lemma.
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Lemma 32 For any sequence
{
hˆ
(i)
n
}∞
i=1
of online learning rules, there exists an online
learning rule fˆn such that, for any process X and any function f
⋆ : X → Y, if, with probabil-
ity one, there exists a sequence {in}∞n=1 in N with ln(in) = o(n) s.t. limn→∞ LˆX(hˆ
(in)· , f⋆;n) = 0,
then lim
n→∞ LˆX(fˆ·, f
⋆;n) = 0 (a.s.).
Proof Fix any sequences x = {xn}∞n=1 in X and y = {yn}∞n=1 in Y. For each n, i ∈ N,
define zˆn,i(x1:n, y1:n) = ℓ(hˆ
(i)
n−1(x1:(n−1), y1:(n−1), xn), yn)/ℓ¯ (which may be random, if hˆ
(i)
n−1
is a randomized learning rule). For each i ∈ N, let pi = 6π2i2 , and note that
∞∑
i=1
pi = 1. Fix
any b ∈ (0, 1), and for n, i ∈ N define vn,i as in Lemma 31, for these pi values, and for zn,i =
zˆn,i(x1:n, y1:n) ∈ [0, 1] for each n, i ∈ N. Finally, define z¯n(x1:n, y1:n) =
∞∑
i=1
vn,izˆn,i(x1:n, y1:n).
From this point, there are two possible routes toward defining the online learning rule
fˆn, depending on whether we involve randomization. In the simplest definition, when
predicting for xn+1, we could simply sample an index i (independently) according to the
distribution specified by {v(n+1),i}∞i=1, and take the hˆ(i)n learning rules’s prediction. It is
fairly straightforward to relate the expected performance of this method to the quantities
z¯t(x1:t, y1:t) and then apply Lemma 31 (see e.g., Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994), together
with concentration inequalities to argue that the bound from Lemma 31 almost surely
becomes valid in the limit of n→∞. However, instead of this approach, we will analyze a
method that avoids randomization. Specifically, let {εn}∞n=0 be any sequence in (0,∞) with
εn → 0, and for each n ∈ N ∪ {0}, define4
fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = argmin
εn
y∈Y
∞∑
i=1
v(n+1),iℓ
(
y, hˆ(i)n (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1)
)
.
We use this definition for any n and any such sequences x and y, so that this completes the
definition of fˆn. With this definition, for any t ∈ N ∪ {0} and sequences x and y, by the
triangle inequality and the fact that
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),i = 1, we have that
ℓ
(
fˆt(x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
= ℓ
(
fˆt(x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
) ∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),i
≤
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),iℓ
(
fˆt(x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1)
)
+
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),iℓ
(
hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
.
4. Here we suppose the argminεn
y∈Y
selection is implemented in a way that renders this function measurable.
This is clearly always possible in our context. For instance, it would suffice to consider an enumeration
of a countable dense subset of Y (which exists by the separability assumption) and then choose the first
y in this enumeration satisfying the εn excess criterion in the definition of argmin
εn
y∈Y
.
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Then the definition of fˆt guarantees this is at most
εt + inf
y∈Y
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),iℓ
(
y, hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1)
)
+
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),iℓ
(
hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
≤ εt + 2
∞∑
i=1
v(t+1),iℓ
(
hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
= εt + 2ℓ¯z¯t+1(x1:(t+1), y1:(t+1)),
so that
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
fˆt(x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
≤ 1
n
n−1∑
t=0
(
εt + 2ℓ¯z¯t+1(x1:(t+1), y1:(t+1))
)
.
Together with Lemma 31, we have that
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
fˆt(x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
)
(51)
≤
(
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
εt
)
+ 2 inf
i∈N
(
ln(1/b)
1− b
(
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
hˆ
(i)
t (x1:t, y1:t, xt+1), yt+1
))
+
ℓ¯
(1− b)n ln
(
1
pi
))
.
Now fix X and f⋆ such that, with probability one, there exists a sequence {in}∞n=1 in N
with ln(in) = o(n) such that lim
n→∞ LˆX(hˆ
(in)· , f⋆;n) = 0. Then, on the event that this occurs,
the inequality in (51) implies
LˆX(fˆ·, f⋆;n) ≤
(
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
εt
)
+ 2 inf
i∈N
(
ln(1/b)
1− b LˆX(hˆ
(i)
· , f⋆;n) +
ℓ¯
(1− b)n ln
(
1
pi
))
≤
(
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
εt
)
+ 2
(
ln(1/b)
1− b LˆX(hˆ
(in)· , f⋆;n) +
2ℓ¯
(1− b)n ln(in) +
ℓ¯
(1− b)n ln
(
π2
6
))
.
Since εt → 0 implies lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
εt = 0, and since lim
n→∞ LˆX(hˆ
(in)· , f⋆;n) = 0 and lim
n→∞
1
n ln(in)
= 0 in this context, and LˆX is nonnegative, it follows that lim
n→∞ LˆX(fˆ·, f
⋆;n) = 0 on this
event.
The next lemma provides a technical fact useful in the proofs of the theorems below.
Lemma 33 Suppose {βi,n}i,n∈N is an array of values in [0,∞) such that lim
i→∞
lim sup
n→∞
βi,n =
0, and that {jn}∞n=1 is a sequence in N with jn →∞. Then there exists a sequence {in}∞n=1
in N such that in ≤ jn for every n ∈ N, and lim
n→∞βin,n = 0.
Proof For each i ∈ N, let ni ∈ N be such that sup
n≥ni
βi,n ≤ 1i + lim sup
n→∞
βi,n; such an ni is
guaranteed to exist by the definition of the lim sup. For each n ∈ N with n < n1, define
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in = 1, and for each n ∈ N with n ≥ n1, define in = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , jn} : n ≥ ni}. By
definition, we clearly have in ≤ jn for every n ∈ N. Furthermore, by definition, we have
n ≥ nin for every n ≥ n1, so that βin,n ≤ 1in + lim sup
n′→∞
βin,n′ . Finally, since ni is finite for
each i ∈ N, and jn →∞, we have in →∞. Altogether, we have
lim sup
n→∞
βin,n ≤ lim sup
n→∞
(
1
in
+ lim sup
n′→∞
βin,n′
)
≤ lim sup
i→∞
(
1
i
+ lim sup
n→∞
βi,n
)
= 0.
Since lim inf
n→∞ βin,n ≥ 0 by nonnegativity of the βi,n values, the result follows.
6.2 Toward Concisely Characterizing SUOL
We begin the discussion of universally consistent online learning with the subject of con-
cisely characterizing the family of processes SUOL. Specifically, we consider the following
candidate for such a characterization. Though we succeed in establishing its necessity,
determining whether it is also sufficient will be left as an open problem.
Condition 2 For every sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of disjoint elements of B,
|{k ∈ N : X1:T ∩Ak 6= ∅}| = o(T ) (a.s.).
Denote by C2 the set of all processes X satisfying Condition 2. With the aim of con-
cisely characterizing the family of processes SUOL, we consider now the specific question
of whether SUOL = C2. Formally, we make partial progress toward resolving the following
question, which remains open at this writing.
Open Problem 2 Is SUOL = C2?
In this subsection, we show that in general, SUOL ⊆ C2, and that equality holds when
X is countable. Equality also holds for the intersections of these sets with the family of
deterministic processes.
We begin with the first of these claims. First, as was true of C1, we can also state
Condition 2 in an alternative equivalent form, which makes the necessity of Condition 2 for
learning more immediately clear.
Lemma 34 A process X satisfies Condition 2 if and only if, for every sequence {Ai}∞i=1 of
disjoint elements of B with
∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X , denoting by i(x) the unique index i ∈ N with x ∈ Ai
(for each x ∈ X ),
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]
= 0 (a.s.).
Proof First note that, for any sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of disjoint sets in B, defining B1 =
X \
∞⋃
k=1
Ak and Bk = Ak−1 for integers k ≥ 2, we have that {Bk}∞k=1 is a sequence of disjoint
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sets in B with
∞⋃
k=1
Bk = X , and |{k : X1:T ∩ Ak 6= ∅}| ≤ |{k : X1:T ∩ Bk 6= ∅}|, so that if
|{k : X1:T ∩Bk 6= ∅}| = o(T ) (a.s.), then |{k : X1:T ∩Ak 6= ∅}| = o(T ) (a.s.) as well. Thus,
the set of processes X satisfying Condition 2 remains unchanged if we restrict the disjoint
sequences {Ak}∞k=1 to those satisfying
∞⋃
k=1
Ak = X .
Now fix any process X and any sequence {Ai}∞i=1 of disjoint elements of B with
∞⋃
i=1
Ai =
X , and let i(x) be as in the lemma statement. Then note that, for any T ∈ N,
|{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩Ai 6= ∅}| = 1
[
X1:(T−1) ∩Ai(XT ) = ∅
]
+
∣∣{i ∈ N : X1:(T−1) ∩Ai 6= ∅}∣∣ .
By induction (taking T = 1 in the above equality for the base case), this implies that
∀T ∈ N,
|{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩Ai 6= ∅}| =
T∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]
.
In particular, this implies that
T∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]
= o(T ) (a.s.) if and only if
|{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩Ai 6= ∅}| = o(T ) (a.s.). Since this equivalence holds for any choice of dis-
joint sequence {Ai}∞i=1 in B with
∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X , the lemma follows.
With this lemma in hand, we can now prove the following theorem, which establishes
that Condition 2 is necessary for a process to admit strong universal online learning.
Theorem 35 SUOL ⊆ C2.
Proof This proof follows essentially the same outline as that of Lemma 19. We prove the
result in the contrapositive. Suppose X /∈ C2. By Lemma 34, there exists a disjoint sequence
{Ai}∞i=1 in B with
∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X such that, letting i(x) denote the unique i ∈ N with x ∈ Ai
(for each x ∈ X ), we have, with probability strictly greater than 0,
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]
> 0.
Furthermore, since the left hand side is always nonnegative, this also implies (see e.g., Ash
and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000, Theorem 1.6.6)
E
[
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]]
> 0. (52)
Now take any two distinct values y0, y1 ∈ Y, and (as we did in the proof of Lemma 19)
for each κ ∈ [0, 1), i ∈ N, and x ∈ Ai, denoting κi = ⌊2iκ⌋ − 2⌊2i−1κ⌋ ∈ {0, 1}, define
f⋆κ(x) = yκi. Also denote it = i(Xt) for every t ∈ N, and for any n ∈ N ∪ {0}, let
A¯(X1:n) =
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}.
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Now fix any online learning rule gn, and for brevity define f
κ
n (·) = gn(X1:n, f⋆κ(X1:n), ·)
for each n ∈ N. Then
sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(g·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(g·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
dκ
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ (fκt (Xt+1), f
⋆
κ(Xt+1)) 1A¯(X1:t)(Xt+1)
]
dκ.
By Fubini’s theorem, this is equal
E
[∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ(fκt (Xt+1), f
⋆
κ(Xt+1))1A¯(X1:t)(Xt+1)dκ
]
.
Since ℓ is bounded, Fatou’s lemma implies this is at least as large as
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
∫ 1
0
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ(fκt (Xt+1), f
⋆
κ(Xt+1))1A¯(X1:t)(Xt+1)dκ
]
,
and linearity of integration implies this equals
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1A¯(X1:t)(Xt+1)
∫ 1
0
ℓ(fκt (Xt+1), f
⋆
κ(Xt+1)) dκ
]
. (53)
For any t ∈ N∪{0}, the value of fκt (Xt+1) is a function of X and κi1 , . . . , κit . Therefore,
for any t ∈ N∪ {0} with Xt+1 ∈ A¯(X1:t), the value of fκt (Xt+1) is functionally independent
of κit+1 . Thus, for any t ∈ N ∪ {0}, letting K ∼ Uniform([0, 1)) be independent of X and
gt, if Xt+1 ∈ A¯(X1:t), we have∫ 1
0
ℓ(fκt (Xt+1), f
⋆
κ(Xt+1)) dκ = E
[
ℓ
(
fKt (Xt+1), f
⋆
K(Xt+1)
) ∣∣∣X, gt]
= E
[
E
[
ℓ
(
gt(X1:t, {yKij }tj=1,Xt+1), yKt+1
) ∣∣∣X, gt,Ki1 , . . . ,Kit] ∣∣∣X, gt]
= E

 ∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2
ℓ
(
gt(X1:t, {yKij }tj=1,Xt+1), yb
) ∣∣∣X, gt

 .
By the triangle inequality, this is no smaller than E
[
1
2ℓ(y0, y1)
∣∣∣X, gt] = 12ℓ(y0, y1), so that
(53) is at least as large as
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1A¯(X1:t)(Xt+1)
1
2
ℓ(y0, y1)
]
=
1
2
ℓ(y0, y1)E
[
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
1
[
X1:(t−1) ∩Ai(Xt) = ∅
]]
> 0,
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where this last inequality is immediate from (52) and the fact that (since ℓ is a metric)
ℓ(y0, y1) > 0. Altogether, we have that
sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(g·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
> 0.
In particular, this implies ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) such that E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(g·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
> 0. Since any
random variable equal 0 (a.s.) necessarily has expected value 0, this further implies that
with probability strictly greater than 0, lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(g·, f⋆κ ;n) > 0. Thus, gn is not strongly
universally consistent. Since gn was an arbitrary online learning rule, we conclude that
there does not exist an online learning rule that is strongly universally consistent under X:
that is, X /∈ SUOL. Since this argument holds for any X /∈ C2, the theorem follows.
Although this work falls short of establishing equivalence between SUOL and C2 in
the general case (i.e., positively resolving Open Problem 2 in general), we do show this
equivalence in the special case of countable X , and indeed also positively resolve Open
Problem 1 for countable X in the process. Note that, in this special case, Condition 2
simplifies to the condition that the number of distinct points x ∈ X occurring in the
sequence X1:T is o(T ) almost surely. Specifically, we have the following result.
Theorem 36 If X is countable, then Condition 2 is necessary and sufficient for a process X
to admit strong universal online learning: that is, SUOL = C2. Moreover, if X is countable,
then there exists an optimistically universal online learning rule.
Proof Suppose X is countable. For the first claim, since we already know SUOL ⊆ C2
from Theorem 35, it suffices to show C2 ⊆ SUOL, for this special case. We will establish this
fact, while simultaneously establishing the second claim, by showing that there is an online
learning rule that is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ C2 (which thereby
also establishes that every such process is in SUOL). Toward this end, fix any y0 ∈ Y,
and define an online learning rule fn such that, for each n ∈ N ∪ {0}, ∀x1:(n+1) ∈ X n+1,
∀y1:n ∈ Yn, if xn+1 = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then fn(x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = yi for the
smallest i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with xn+1 = xi, and otherwise fn(x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = y0. The key
property of fn here is that it is memorization-based, in that any previously-observed point’s
response y will be faithfully reproduced if that point is encountered again later in the
sequence. The specific fact that it evaluates to y0 in the case of a previously-unseen point
is unimportant in this context, and this case can in fact be defined arbitrarily (subject to
the function fn being measurable) without affecting the result (and similarly for the choice
to break ties to favor smaller indices).
Now fix any X ∈ C2 and any measurable function f⋆ : X → Y. Note that any i, t ∈ N with
i ≤ t and Xt+1 = Xi has f⋆(Xt+1) = f⋆(Xi), so that ℓ(ft(X1:t, f⋆(X1:t),Xt+1), f⋆(Xt+1)) =
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ℓ(f⋆(Xi), f
⋆(Xt+1)) = 0. Therefore, we have
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(f·, f⋆;n) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ(ft(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1))
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ¯1[∄i ∈ {1, . . . , t} : Xt+1 = Xi] = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
ℓ¯1[X1:(t−1) ∩ {Xt} = ∅].
(54)
Since X is countable, we can enumerate its elements as z1, z2, . . . (or z1, . . . , z|X |, in the case
of finite |X |). Then let Ai = {zi} for each i ∈ N with i ≤ |X |, and if |X | < ∞ then let
Ai = ∅ for every i > |X |. Note that {Ai}∞i=1 is a sequence of disjoint elements of B with∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X . Furthermore, letting i(x) be defined as in Lemma 34, we have Ai(x) = {x} for
each x ∈ X . Therefore, since X ∈ C2, Lemma 34 implies that the rightmost expression in
(54) equals 0 almost surely. Since this argument holds for any choice of f⋆, we conclude
that fn is strongly universally consistent under X. Furthermore, since this holds for any
choice of X ∈ C2, the theorem follows.
The following corollary on deterministic processes is also implied, via a reduction to the
case of countable X .
Corollary 37 For any deterministic process X, Condition 2 is necessary and sufficient for
X to admit strong universal online learning: that is, X ∈ SUOL if and only if X ∈ C2.
Proof Sketch This result follows from essentially the same proof used for Theorem 36,
except using the distinct entries of the sequence X as the zi sequence there (and taking
the rest of the space, not occurring in the sequence, as a separate irrelevant Ai set in the
application of Lemma 34 there). Alternatively, it can also be established via a reduction
to the case of countable X . Specifically, fix any deterministic process X, and let XX denote
the set of distinct points x ∈ X appearing in the sequence X. Note that XX is countable,
and that (with a slight abuse of notation) X may be thought of as a sequence of XX-valued
random variables. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that X satisfies Condition 2
for the space XX if and only if it satisfies Condition 2 for the original space X (since only
the intersections of the sets Ai with XX are relevant for checking this condition). Thus,
since Theorem 36 holds for any countable space X , applying it to the space XX, we have
that X admits strong universal online learning if and only if X satisfies Condition 2.
6.3 Relation of Online Learning to Inductive and Self-Adaptive Learning
Next, we turn to addressing the relation between admission of strong universal online learn-
ing and admission of strong universal inductive or self-adaptive learning. Specifically, we
find that the latter implies the former, but not vice versa (if X is infinite), so that ad-
mission of strong universal online learning is a strictly more general condition. To show
this, since we have established in Theorem 7 that SUIL = SUAL, it suffices to argue that
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SUAL ⊆ SUOL, with strict inclusion if |X | = ∞: that is, SUOL \ SUAL 6= ∅. For this we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 38 SUAL ⊆ SUOL, and the inclusion is strict iff |X | =∞.
Proof We begin by showing SUAL ⊆ SUOL. In fact, we will establish a stronger claim:
that there exists a single online learning rule fˆn that is strongly universally consistent for
every X ∈ SUAL. Specifically, let gˆn,m be an optimistically universal self-adaptive learning
rule. The existence of such a rule was established in Theorem 5, and an explicit construction
is given in (29), as established by Theorem 27. Now fix any y0 ∈ Y, and for each i ∈ N
define an online learning rule hˆ
(i)
n as follows. For each n ∈ N ∪ {0}, for any sequences
x1:(n+1) ∈ X n+1 and y1:n ∈ Yn, if n < i, then define hˆ(i)n (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = y0, and if n ≥ i,
then define hˆ
(i)
n (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = gˆi,n(x1:n, y1:i, xn+1). It is easy to verify that measurability
hˆ
(i)
n follows from measurability of gˆi,n, so that this is a valid definition of an online learning
rule.
Given this definition of the sequence
{
hˆ
(i)
n
}∞
i=1
, denote by fˆn the online learning rule
guaranteed to exist by Lemma 32 (defined explicitly in the proof above), satisfying the
property described there relative to this sequence
{
hˆ
(i)
n
}∞
i=1
. Now fix any X ∈ SUAL and
any measurable f⋆ : X → Y, and for each i, n ∈ N, denote βˆi,n = LˆX(hˆ(i)· , f⋆;n). In
particular, note that since ℓ is always finite, it holds that ∀i ∈ N,
lim sup
n→∞
βˆi,n = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
hˆ
(i)
t (X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1)
)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=i
ℓ(gˆi,t(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:i),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1))
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n+ 1
i+n∑
t=i
ℓ(gˆi,t(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:i),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1)) = LˆX(gˆi,·, f⋆; i).
Since gˆn,m is strongly universally consistent under X, it follows that lim
i→∞
lim sup
n→∞
βˆi,n = 0
on some event E of probability one. In particular, on E, Lemma 33 implies that there
exists a sequence {in}∞i=1 in N with in ≤ n for every n, such that limn→∞ βˆin,n = 0. Therefore,
since ln(in) ≤ ln(n) = o(n), the property of fˆn guaranteed by Lemma 32 implies that
lim
n→∞ LˆX(fˆ·, f
⋆;n) = 0 almost surely. Since this argument holds for any choice of f⋆, we
conclude that fˆn is strongly universally consistent under X, and since this holds for any
choice of X ∈ SUAL, it follows that SUAL ⊆ SUOL.
SUOL and SUAL are trivially equal if |X | <∞, since then every process X is contained
in C1, and Theorem 7 implies SUAL = C1, while we have just established that SUOL ⊇
SUAL, so every process is contained in both SUAL and SUOL. Now consider the case
|X | =∞. To see that SUOL\SUAL 6= ∅ in this case, in light of Corollary 37, together with
Theorem 7, it suffices to construct a deterministic process in C2 \ C1. Toward this end, we
let {zi}∞i=1 be an arbitrary sequence of distinct elements of X , and define a deterministic
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process X as follows. For each t ∈ N, define it = ⌊log2(2t)⌋, and let Xt = zit . For any
sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of disjoint elements of B, and any T ∈ N,
|{k ∈ N : X1:T ∩Ak 6= ∅}| ≤ |{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩ {zi} 6= ∅}| = ⌊log2(2T )⌋ = o(T ).
Therefore, X ∈ C2. However, let {Ak}∞k=1 denote any sequence of disjoint subsets of
{zi : i ∈ N}, with |Ak| = ∞ for all k ∈ N (e.g., Ak = {zpmk : m ∈ N}, where pk is the
kth prime number). Then note that every i ∈ N has 1
2i−1
2i−1∑
t=1
1{zi}(Xt) =
2i−1
2i−1 >
1
2 . Thus,
since each |Ak| = ∞, we have µˆX(Ak) ≥ 12 for every k ∈ N. But this implies ∀i ∈ N,
µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Ak
)
≥ µˆX(Ai) ≥ 12 , so that limi→∞ µˆX
(⋃
k≥i
Ak
)
≥ 12 > 0. Together with Lemma 13,
this implies X /∈ C1.
The proof of Theorem 38 actually establishes two additional results. First, since the
online learning rule fˆn constructed in the proof has no dependence on the distribution of
the process X from SUAL, this proof also establishes the following corollary.
Corollary 39 There exists an online learning rule that is strongly universally consistent
under every X ∈ SUAL.
Note that this is a weaker claim than would be required for positive resolution of Open
Problem 1, since (as established by Theorem 38) the set of processes admitting strong
universal online learning is a strict superset of the set of processes admitting strong universal
self-adaptive learning (if X is infinite).
Second, since Theorem 35 establishes that SUOL ⊆ C2, and Theorem 7 establishes
that SUAL = C1, Theorem 38 clearly also establishes that C1 ⊆ C2 (a fact that one can
easily verify from their definitions as well). Furthermore, the above proof that the inclusion
SUAL ⊆ SUOL is strict if |X | = ∞ establishes this fact by constructing a deterministic
process X ∈ C2 \ C1 (which thereby verifies the claim due to Corollary 37 and Theorem 7).
Thus, it also establishes that the inclusion C1 ⊆ C2 is strict in the case |X | = ∞. Also, as
noted in the above proof, if |X | < ∞, then C1 contains every process. Since C1 ⊆ C2, this
clearly implies that if |X | < ∞, then C1 = C2. Thus, the above proof also establishes the
following result.
Corollary 40 C1 ⊆ C2, and the inclusion is strict iff |X | =∞.
6.4 Invariance of SUOL to the Choice of Loss Function
In this subsection, we are interested in the question of whether the family SUOL is invariant
to the choice of loss function (subject to the basic constraints from Section 1.1). Recall that
we established above that this property holds for the families SUIL and SUAL (as implied
by their equivalence to C1 from Theorem 7, regardless of the choice of (Y, ℓ)). Furthermore,
a positive resolution of Open Problem 2 would immediately imply this property for SUOL,
since Condition 2 has no dependence on (Y, ℓ). However, since Open Problem 2 remains
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open at this time, it is interesting to directly explore the question of invariance of SUOL to
the choice of (Y, ℓ). Specifically, we prove two relevant results. First, we show that SUOL is
invariant to the choice of (Y, ℓ), under the additional constraint that (Y, ℓ) is totally bounded :
that is, ∀ε > 0, ∃Yε ⊆ Y s.t. |Yε| < ∞ and sup
y∈Y
inf
yε∈Yε
ℓ(yε, y) ≤ ε. For instance, ℓ as the
absolute loss with Y any bounded subset of R would satisfy this. In particular, this means
that, in characterizing the family of processes SUOL for totally bounded losses, it suffices
to characterize this set for the simplest case of binary classification: (Y, ℓ) = ({0, 1}, ℓ01),
where for any Y we generally denote by ℓ01 : Y2 → [0,∞) the 0-1 loss on Y, defined by
ℓ01(y, y
′) = 1[y 6= y′] for all y, y′ ∈ Y. Second, we also find that the set SUOL is invariant
among (bounded, separable) losses that are not totally bounded (e.g., the 0-1 loss with
Y = N). We leave open the question of whether or not these two SUOL sets are equal
(Open Problem 3 below). We begin with the totally bounded case.
Theorem 41 The set SUOL is invariant to the specification of (Y, ℓ), subject to being
totally bounded with ℓ¯ > 0.
Proof To disambiguate notation in this proof, for any metric space (Y ′, ℓ′), we denote
by SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) the family SUOL as it would be defined if (Y, ℓ) were specified as (Y ′, ℓ′).
As above, we define the measurable subsets of Y ′ as the elements of the Borel σ-algebra
generated by the topology induced by ℓ′. Let ℓ01 be the 0-1 loss on {0, 1}, as defined above.
To establish the theorem, it suffices to verify the claim that SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) = SUOL({0,1},ℓ01)
for all totally bounded metric spaces (Y ′, ℓ′) with sup
y,y′∈Y ′
ℓ′(y, y′) > 0. Fix any such (Y ′, ℓ′).
The inclusion SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) ⊆ SUOL({0,1},ℓ01) is quite straightforward, as follows. For
any X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′), letting fˆn be an online learning rule that is strongly universally
consistent under X (for the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′)), we can define an online learning
rule fˆ 01n for the specification (Y, ℓ) = ({0, 1}, ℓ01) as follows. Let z0, z1 ∈ Y ′ be such that
ℓ′(z0, z1) > 0. For any n ∈ N∪{0}, and any sequences x1:(n+1) in X and y1:n in {0, 1}, define
a sequence y′1:n with y
′
i = zyi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and then define fˆ 01n (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) =
argmin
y∈{0,1}
ℓ′
(
fˆn(x1:n, y
′
1:n, xn+1), zy
)
(breaking ties in favor of y = 0). In particular, that fˆ 01n
is a measurable function X n×{0, 1}n×X → {0, 1} follows immediately from measurability
of fˆn. Then note that, for any measurable function f : X → {0, 1}, defining f ′ : X → Y ′ as
f ′(x) = zf(x) (which is clearly also measurable), we have ∀t ∈ N ∪ {0},
1
[
fˆ 01t (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1) 6= f(Xt+1)
]
≤ 1
[
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t,f
′(X1:t),Xt+1),f ′(Xt+1)
)
=max
y∈{0,1}
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t,f
′(X1:t),Xt+1),zy
)]
≤ 1

ℓ′(fˆt(X1:t,f ′(X1:t),Xt+1),f ′(Xt+1))≥∑
y∈{0,1}
1
2
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t,f
′(X1:t),Xt+1),zy
)
≤ 1
[
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
′(X1:t),Xt+1), f ′(Xt+1)
)
≥ 1
2
ℓ′(z0, z1)
]
≤ 2
ℓ′(z0, z1)
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
′(X1:t),Xt+1), f ′(Xt+1)
)
,
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where the second-to-last inequality is due to the triangle inequality. Therefore, under the
specification (Y, ℓ) = ({0, 1}, ℓ01), we have
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX
(
fˆ 01· , f ;n
)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1
[
fˆ 01t (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1) 6= f(Xt+1)
]
≤ 2
ℓ′(z0, z1)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ′
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
′(X1:t),Xt+1), f ′(Xt+1)
)
= 0 (a.s.),
where the last equality (to which the “almost surely” qualifier applies) is due to strong
universal consistency of fˆn (and the fact that z0, z1 were chosen to satisfy ℓ
′(z0, z1) > 0).
Since this argument holds for any choice of measurable f : X → {0, 1}, we conclude that
fˆ 01n is strongly universally consistent under X (for the specification (Y, ℓ) = ({0, 1}, ℓ01)), so
that X ∈ SUOL({0,1},ℓ01). Since this argument holds for any X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′), we conclude
that SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) ⊆ SUOL({0,1},ℓ01).
The proof of the converse inclusion is somewhat more involved. Specifically, fix any X ∈
SUOL({0,1},ℓ01), and let fˆ
01
n be an online learning rule that is strongly universally consistent
under X (for the specification (Y, ℓ) = ({0, 1}, ℓ01)). We then define an online learning rule
fˆ ′n for the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′) as follows. For each ε > 0, let Y ′ε ⊆ Y ′ be such
that |Y ′ε| <∞ and sup
y∈Y ′
inf
yε∈Y ′ε
ℓ′(yε, y) ≤ ε, as guaranteed to exist by total boundedness. For
each y ∈ Y ′, let gε(y) = argmin
yε∈Y ′ε
ℓ′(yε, y), breaking ties to favor smaller indices in some fixed
enumeration of Y ′ε. Then, for each y ∈ Y ′ and each yε ∈ Y ′ε, define h(yε)ε (y) = 1[gε(y) = yε].
One can easily verify that gε and h
(yε)
ε are measurable functions, and furthermore that for
every y ∈ Y ′, exactly one yε ∈ Y ′ε has h(yε)ε (y) = 1 while every y′ε ∈ Y ′ε\{yε} has h(y
′
ε)
ε (y) = 0.
For any n ∈ N ∪ {0}, and any sequences x1:(n+1) in X and y1:n in Y ′, define
fˆ (ε)n (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) = argmax
yε∈Y ′ε
fˆ 01n (x1:n, h
(yε)
ε (y1:n), xn+1),
breaking ties to favor yε with a smaller index in a fixed enumeration of Y ′ε. Again, one
can easily verify that fˆn is a measurable function X n × (Y ′)n × X → Y ′, which follows
immediately from measurability of fˆ 01n , the h
(yε)
ε functions, and the argmax. Thus, fˆ
(ε)
n
defines an online learning rule.
Now note that, for any measurable function f : X → Y ′, and each yε ∈ Y ′ε, the composed
function x 7→ h(yε)ε (f(x)) is a measurable function X → {0, 1}, and therefore (by strong
universal consistency of fˆ 01n ) with probability one,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ01
(
fˆ 01t (X1:t, h
(yε)
ε (f(X1:t)),Xt+1), h
(yε)
ε (f(Xt+1))
)
= 0.
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By the union bound, this holds simultaneously for all yε ∈ Y ′ε with probability one. We
therefore have that, under the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′),
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX
(
fˆ
(ε)
· , f ;n
)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
fˆ
(ε)
t (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1), f(Xt+1)
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
(
ℓ′(gε(f(Xt+1)), f(Xt+1)) + ℓ¯1
[
fˆ
(ε)
t (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1) 6= gε(f(Xt+1))
])
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0

ε+ ℓ¯ ∑
yε∈Y ′ε
ℓ01
(
fˆ 01t (X1:t, h
(yε)
ε (f(X1:t)),Xt+1), h
(yε)
ε (f(Xt+1))
)
≤ ε+ ℓ¯
∑
yε∈Y ′ε
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ01
(
fˆ 01t (X1:t, h
(yε)
ε (f(X1:t)),Xt+1), h
(yε)
ε (f(Xt+1))
)
= ε (a.s.),
where the inequality on this last line is due to finiteness of |Y ′ε|.
We now apply this argument to values ε ∈ {1/i : i ∈ N}. For any measurable f⋆ :
X → Y ′, for each i, n ∈ N, denote βf⋆i,n = LˆX
(
fˆ
(1/i)
· , f⋆;n
)
(under the specification (Y, ℓ) =
(Y ′, ℓ′)). By the above argument, together with a union bound, on an event of probability
one, we have
lim
i→∞
lim sup
n→∞
βf
⋆
i,n ≤ limi→∞ 1/i = 0.
Thus, since these βf
⋆
i,n are also nonnegative, Lemma 33 implies that, on this event, there
exists a sequence {in}∞n=1 in N, with in ≤ n for every n ∈ N, such that limn→∞ β
f⋆
in,n
= 0.
Therefore, applying Lemma 32 to the sequence
{
fˆ
(1/i)
n
}∞
i=1
of online learning rules, we
conclude that there exists an online learning rule fˆn such that, for this process X, for any
measurable f⋆ : X → Y ′, under the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′), lim
n→∞ LˆX
(
fˆ·, f⋆;n
)
= 0
almost surely: that is, fˆn is strongly universally consistent under X. In particular, this
implies X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′). Since this argument holds for any X ∈ SUOL({0,1},ℓ01), we con-
clude that SUOL({0,1},ℓ01) ⊆ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′). Combining this with the first part, we have that
SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) = SUOL({0,1},ℓ01), and since these arguments apply to any totally bounded
(Y ′, ℓ′) with sup
y,y′∈Y ′
ℓ′(y, y′) > 0, this completes the proof.
Next, we have the analogous result for losses that are not totally bounded.
Theorem 42 The set SUOL is invariant to the specification of (Y, ℓ), subject to being
separable with ℓ¯ <∞ but not totally bounded.
Proof This proof follows the same line as that of Theorem 41, but with a few important
differences. We continue the notational conventions introduced there, but in this context
we let ℓ01 denote the 0-1 loss on N: that is, ∀y, y′ ∈ N, ℓ01(y, y′) = 1[y 6= y′]. To establish
the theorem, it suffices to verify the claim that SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) = SUOL(N,ℓ01) for all separable
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metric spaces (Y ′, ℓ′) with sup
y,y′∈Y ′
ℓ′(y, y′) < ∞ that are not totally bounded. Fix any such
space (Y ′, ℓ′).
We again begin with the inclusion SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) ⊆ SUOL(N,ℓ01). For any X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′),
letting gˆn be an online learning rule that is strongly universally consistent under X (for the
specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′)), we can define an online learning rule gˆNn for the specification
(Y, ℓ) = (N, ℓ01) as follows. Since (Y ′, ℓ′) is not totally bounded, ∃ε > 0 such that any
Y ′ε ⊆ Y ′ with sup
y∈Y
inf
yε∈Y ′ε
ℓ′(yε, y) ≤ ε necessarily has |Y ′ε| =∞. In particular, this implies that
for any finite sequence z1, . . . , zk ∈ Y ′, k ∈ N, there exists zk+1 ∈ Y ′ with inf
i≤k
ℓ′(zi, zk+1) > ε.
Thus, starting from any initial z1 ∈ Y ′, we can inductively construct an infinite sequence
z1, z2, . . . ∈ Y ′ with inf
i,j∈N:i 6=j
ℓ′(zi, zj) ≥ ε > 0. For any n ∈ N ∪ {0}, and any sequences
x1:(n+1) in X and y1:n in N, define a sequence y′1:n with y′i = zyi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
then define gˆNn (x1:n, y1:n, xn+1) as the (unique) value y ∈ N with ℓ′(gˆn(x1:n, y′1:n, xn+1), zy) <
ε/2, if such a y ∈ N exists, and otherwise define it to be z1. One can easily check that gˆNn
is a measurable function, due to measurability of gˆn. Then for any measurable f : X → N,
defining f ′ : X → Y ′ as f ′(x) = zf(x) (which is clearly also measurable), we have (under
the specification (Y, ℓ) = (N, ℓ01))
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX
(
gˆN· , f ;n
)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1
[
gˆNt (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1) 6= f(Xt+1)
]
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
1
[
ℓ′
(
gˆt(X1:t, f
′(X1:t),Xt+1), f ′(Xt+1)
) ≥ ε/2]
≤ 2
ε
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ′
(
gˆt(X1:t, f
′(X1:t),Xt+1), f ′(Xt+1)
)
= 0 (a.s.),
where the last equality (to which the “almost surely” qualifier applies) is due to strong
universal consistency of gˆn (and the fact that ε > 0). Since this argument holds for any
choice of measurable f : X → N, we conclude that gˆNn is strongly universally consistent under
X (for the specification (Y, ℓ) = (N, ℓ01)), so that X ∈ SUOL(N,ℓ01). Since this argument
holds for any X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′), we conclude that SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) ⊆ SUOL(N,ℓ01).
For the converse inclusion, fix any X ∈ SUOL(N,ℓ01), and let fˆNn be any online learning
rule that is strongly universally consistent under X (for the specification (Y, ℓ) = (N, ℓ01)).
We then define an online learning rule fˆ ′n for the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′) as follows. Let
Y˜ ′ be a countable subset of Y ′ such that sup
y∈Y ′
inf
y˜∈Y˜ ′
ℓ′(y˜, y) = 0; such a set Y˜ ′ is guaranteed to
exist by separability of (Y ′, ℓ′) (and furthermore, is necessarily infinite, due to (Y ′, ℓ′) not
being totally bounded). Enumerate the elements of Y˜ ′ as y˜1, y˜2, . . ., and for each ε > 0 and
each y ∈ Y ′, define hε(y) = min{i ∈ N : ℓ′(y˜i, y) ≤ ε}. One can easily check that this is a
measurable function Y ′ → N.
For any n ∈ N∪{0}, and any x1:n ∈ X n, y1:n ∈ (Y ′)n, and x ∈ X , define fˆ (ε)n (x1:n, y1:n, x)
= y˜i for i = fˆ
N
n (x1:n, hε(y1:n), x). That fˆ
(ε)
n is a measurable function X n × (Y ′)n × X → Y ′
follows immediately from measurability of fˆNn and hε. Thus, fˆ
(ε)
n defines an online learning
rule. Now, for any measurable function f : X → Y ′, the composed function x 7→ hε(f(x))
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is a measurable function X → N, and therefore (by strong universal consistency of fˆNn )
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ01
(
fˆNt (X1:t, hε(f(X1:t)),Xt+1), hε(f(Xt+1))
)
= 0 (a.s.).
We therefore have that, under the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′),
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX
(
fˆ
(ε)
· , f ;n
)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
fˆ
(ε)
t (X1:t, f(X1:t),Xt+1), f(Xt+1)
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
(
ℓ′(y˜hε(f(Xt+1)), f(Xt+1))+ℓ¯1
[
fˆNt (X1:t, hε(f(X1:t)),Xt+1) 6=hε(f(Xt+1))
])
≤ ε+ ℓ¯ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ01
(
fˆNt (X1:t, hε(f(X1:t)),Xt+1), hε(f(Xt+1))
)
= ε (a.s.).
The rest of this proof follows identically to the analogous part of the proof of Theorem 41.
Briefly, for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y ′, for each i, n ∈ N, denoting βf⋆i,n = LˆX
(
fˆ
(1/i)
· , f⋆;n
)
(under the specification (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′)), by the union bound, on an event of probability
one, we have
lim
i→∞
lim sup
n→∞
βf
⋆
i,n ≤ limi→∞ 1/i = 0.
Therefore Lemma 33 (with jn = n) and Lemma 32 imply that there exists an online learning
rule fˆn such that, for this process X, for any measurable f
⋆ : X → Y ′, under the specifica-
tion (Y, ℓ) = (Y ′, ℓ′), lim
n→∞ LˆX
(
fˆ·, f⋆;n
)
= 0 almost surely. This implies X ∈ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′).
Since this argument holds for any X ∈ SUOL(N,ℓ01), we conclude SUOL(N,ℓ01) ⊆ SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′).
Combining this with the first part, we have SUOL(Y ′,ℓ′) = SUOL(N,ℓ01), and since these
arguments apply to any separable metric space (Y ′, ℓ′) with sup
y,y′∈Y ′
ℓ′(y, y′) <∞ that is not
totally bounded, this completes the proof.
Since the reductions used to construct the learning rules in the above two proofs do not
explicitly depend on the distribution of the process X, these proofs also establish another
interesting property: namely, invariance to the specification of (Y, ℓ) in the existence of opti-
mistically universal learning rules. Specifically, the proof of Theorem 41 can also be used to
establish that, for any given X space, there exists an optimistically universal online learning
rule when (Y, ℓ) is totally bounded if and only if there exists one for binary classification
under the 0-1 loss. Similarly, the proof of Theorem 42 can be used to establish that, when
(Y, ℓ) is not totally bounded, there exists an optimistically universal online learning rule if
and only if there exists one for multiclass classification with a countably infinite number of
classes under the 0-1 loss.
The question of whether the two SUOL sets from the above two theorems are equivalent
remains an interesting open problem.
Open Problem 3 Is the set SUOL invariant to the specification of (Y, ℓ), subject to being
separable with 0 < ℓ¯ <∞?
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In particular, in the notation of the above proofs, this problem is equivalent to the
question of whether SUOL({0,1},ℓ01) = SUOL(N,ℓ01): that is, whether the set of processes that
admit strong universal online learning is the same for binary classification as for multiclass
classification with a countably infinite number of possible classes.
7. No Consistent Test for Existence of a Universally Consistent Learner
It is also interesting to ask to what extent admission of universal consistency is actually an
assumption, rather than a testable hypothesis: that is, is there any way to detect whether or
not a given data sequence X admits strong universal learning (in any of the above senses)?
It turns out the answer is no.
In our present context, a hypothesis test is a sequence of (possibly random)5 measurable
functions tˆn : X n → {0, 1}, n ∈ N ∪ {0}. We say tˆn is consistent for a set of processes C if,
for every X ∈ C, tˆn(X1:n) P−→ 1, and for every X /∈ C, tˆn(X1:n) P−→ 0. We have the following
theorem.6
Theorem 43 If X is infinite, there is no consistent hypothesis test for SUIL, SUAL, or
SUOL.
Proof Suppose X is infinite and fix any hypothesis test tˆn. Let {wi}∞i=0 be any sequence
of distinct elements of X . We construct a process X inductively, as follows. Let n0 = 0.
For the purpose of this inductive definition, suppose, for some k ∈ N, that nk−1 is defined,
and that Xt is defined for every t ∈ N with t ≤ nk−1. Let X(k)t = Xt for every t ∈ N with
t ≤ nk−1. If (k+1)/2 ∈ N (i.e., k is odd), then let X(k)t = w0 for every t ∈ N with t > nk−1.
Otherwise, if k/2 ∈ N (i.e., k is even), then let X(k)t = wt for every t ∈ N with t > nk−1. If
∃n ∈ N with n > nk−1 such that
P
(
tˆn(X
(k)
1:n) = 1[(k + 1)/2 ∈ N]
)
> 1/2, (55)
then define nk = n for some such value of n, and define Xt = X
(k)
t for every t ∈ {nk−1 +
1, . . . , nk}. Otherwise, if no such n exists, define Xt = X(k)t for every t ∈ N with t > nk−1,
in which case the inductive definition is complete (upon reaching the smallest value of k for
which no such n exists).
The above inductive definition specifies a deterministic process X. Now consider two
cases. First, suppose there is a maximum value k∗ of k ∈ N for which nk−1 is defined.
In this case, there is no n > nk∗−1 satisfying (55) with k = k∗. Furthermore, by the
definition of X
(k∗)
t for every t ≤ nk∗−1, and by our choice of Xt for every t > nk∗−1, we have
X = {X(k∗)t }∞t=1. Together, these imply that ∀n ∈ N with n > nk∗−1,
P
(
tˆn(X1:n) = 1[(k
∗ + 1)/2 ∈ N]) ≤ 1/2. (56)
5. In the case of random tˆn, we will suppose tˆn is independent from X.
6. There is actually a fairly simple proof of this theorem if X is uncountable and (X , T ) is a Polish space.
In that case, we can simply use the fact that no test can distinguish between an i.i.d. process with a
given nonatomic marginal distribution vs a deterministic process chosen randomly among the sample
paths of the i.i.d. process. However, the proof we present here has the advantage of applying also to
countable X , and indeed it remains valid even if we restrict to deterministic processes.
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If (k∗ + 1)/2 ∈ N, then Xt = w0 for every t ∈ N with t > nk∗−1. In this case, for
any A ∈ B, µˆX(A) = 1A(w0). Thus, for any monotone sequence {Ai}∞i=1 of sets in B with
Ai ↓ ∅, lim
i→∞
E[µˆX(Ai)] = lim
i→∞
1Ai(w0) = 1 lim
i→∞
Ai(w0) = 1∅(w0) = 0. Therefore, X satisfies
Condition 1 (i.e., X ∈ C1). Since Theorem 7 implies SUIL = SUAL = C1, we also have
that X ∈ SUIL and X ∈ SUAL. Also, since Theorem 38 implies SUAL ⊂ SUOL, we have
X ∈ SUOL as well. However, (56) implies lim sup
n→∞
P(tˆn(X1:n) 6= 1) ≥ 1/2, so that tˆn(X1:n)
fails to converge in probability to 1, and hence tˆn is not consistent for any of SUIL, SUAL,
or SUOL.
On the other hand, if (k∗ + 1)/2 /∈ N, then Xt = wt for every t ∈ N with t > nk∗−1.
In this case, letting Ai = {wi} ∈ B for each i ∈ N, these Ai sets are disjoint, and for
any T ∈ N, |{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩ Ai 6= ∅}| ≥ T − nk∗−1 6= o(T ), so that X fails to satisfy
Condition 2: that is, X /∈ C2. Since Theorem 35 implies SUOL ⊆ C2, and Theorems 7 and
38 imply SUIL = SUAL ⊂ SUOL, we also have that X /∈ SUOL, X /∈ SUAL, and X /∈ SUIL.
However, (56) implies lim sup
n→∞
P(tˆn(X1:n) 6= 0) ≥ 1/2, so that tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in
probability to 0, and hence tˆn is not consistent for any of SUIL, SUAL, or SUOL.
For the remaining case, suppose nk is defined for all k ∈ N ∪ {0}, so that {nk}∞k=0 is an
infinite strictly-increasing sequence of nonnegative integers. For each k ∈ N, our choice of nk
guarantees that (55) is satisfied with n = nk. Furthermore, for every k ∈ N, our definition
of X
(k)
t for values t ≤ nk−1, and our choice of Xt for values t ∈ {nk−1 + 1, . . . , nk} imply
that X1:nk = X
(k)
1:nk
. Thus, every k ∈ N satisfies P(tˆnk(X1:nk) = 1[(k + 1)/2 ∈ N]) > 1/2. In
particular, this implies that
lim sup
n→∞
P(tˆn(X1:n) 6= 1) ≥ lim sup
j→∞
P(tˆn2j(X1:n2j ) = 0) ≥ 1/2,
while
lim sup
n→∞
P(tˆn(X1:n) 6= 0) ≥ lim sup
j→∞
P(tˆn2j+1(X1:n2j+1) = 1) ≥ 1/2.
Thus, tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in probability to any value: that is, it neither converges in
probability to 0 nor converges in probability to 1. Therefore, in this case as well, we find
that tˆn is not consistent for any of SUIL, SUAL, or SUOL.
Thus, regardless of which of these is the case, we have established that tˆn is not a con-
sistent test for SUIL, SUAL, or SUOL.
Recall that, if X is finite, every X admits strong universal inductive learning: any
sequence Ak ↓ ∅ has Ak = ∅ for all sufficiently large k, so that every X has lim
k→∞
E[µˆX(Ak)] =
µˆX(∅) = 0, and hence satisfies Condition 1, which implies X ∈ SUIL ∩ SUAL ∩ SUOL by
Theorems 7 and 38. Therefore, the constant function tˆn(·) = 1 is a consistent test for SUIL,
SUAL, and SUOL in this case. Thus, we may conclude the following corollary.
Corollary 44 There exist consistent hypothesis tests for each of SUIL, SUAL, and SUOL
if and only if X is finite.
Note that, since Theorem 7 implies SUIL = C1, this corollary also holds for consistent
tests of C1. It is also easy to see that the proof above can further extend this corollary to
consistent tests of C2 as well.
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8. Unbounded Losses
In this section, we depart from the above discussion by considering the case of unbounded
losses. Specifically, we retain the assumption that (Y, ℓ) is a separable metric space, but
now we replace the assumption that ℓ is bounded (i.e., ℓ¯ < ∞) with the complementary
assumption that ℓ¯ =∞. To be clear, we suppose ℓ(y1, y2) is finite for every y1, y2 ∈ Y, but
is unbounded, in that sup
y1,y2∈Y
ℓ(y1, y2) = ∞. All of the other restrictions from Section 1.1
(e.g., that (Y, ℓ) is a separable metric space) remain unchanged. In this setting, we find
that the condition necessary and sufficient for a process to admit universal learning becomes
significantly stronger. Indeed, it was already known that not even all i.i.d. processes admit
universal learning when ℓ¯ = ∞. However, we are nevertheless able to establish results on
the existence of optimistically universal learning rules and consistent tests. We again find
that the set of processes admitting strong universal learning is invariant to ℓ (subject to
ℓ¯ =∞), and specified by a simple condition. Specifically, consider the following condition.
Condition 3 Every monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B with Ak ↓ ∅ satisfies
|{k ∈ N : X ∩Ak 6= ∅}| <∞ (a.s.).
We denote by C3 the set of processes X satisfying Condition 3. It is straightforward to see
that Condition 3 is equivalent to the condition that, for every disjoint sequence {Bk}∞k=1 in
B, |{k ∈ N : X ∩Bk 6= ∅}| <∞ (a.s.). To see this, note that, given any monotone sequence
Ak ↓ ∅, the sequence Bk = Ak \ Ak+1 is disjoint. Conversely, given any disjoint sequence
{Bk}∞k=1, the sequence Ak =
∞⋃
k′=k
Bk′ is monotone with Ak ↓ ∅. In either case, we have that
|{k ∈ N : X ∩Ak 6= ∅}| = sup {k ∈ N : X ∩Ak 6= ∅} = sup {k ∈ N : X ∩Bk 6= ∅} ,
and the rightmost expression is clearly finite if and only if |{k ∈ N : X ∩Bk 6= ∅}| <∞.
It is straightforward to see that any process satisfying Condition 3 necessarily also
satisfies Condition 1: i.e., C3 ⊆ C1. Specifically, for any X ∈ C3, for any sequence {Ak}∞k=1
in B with Ak ↓ ∅, with probability one every sufficiently large k has X ∩ Ak = ∅, which
implies lim
k→∞
µˆX(Ak) = 0; thus, X ∈ C1 by Lemma 13.
Condition 3 will turn out to be the key condition for determining whether a given
process admits strong universal learning (in any of the three protocols: inductive, self-
adaptive, or online) when the loss is unbounded, analogous to the role of Condition 1 for
the case of bounded losses in inductive and self-adaptive learning. This is stated formally
in the following theorem.
Theorem 45 When ℓ¯ =∞, the following statements are equivalent for any process X.
• X satisfies Condition 3.
• X admits strong universal inductive learning.
• X admits strong universal self-adaptive learning.
• X admits strong universal online learning.
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Equivalently, when ℓ¯ =∞, SUOL = SUAL = SUIL = C3.
We present the proof of this result in Section 8.3 below. One remarkable consequence
of this result is that, unlike Theorem 7 for bounded losses, this theorem includes online
learning among the equivalences. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, in the case of
bounded losses, we found (in Theorem 38) that SUOL is typically not equivalent to SUAL
and SUIL, instead forming a strict superset of these. This therefore creates an interesting
distinction between bounded and unbounded losses regarding the relative strengths of these
settings. A second interesting contrast to the above analysis of bounded losses is that, in
the case of unbounded losses, Theorem 45 establishes a concise condition that is necessary
and sufficient for a process to admit strong universal online learning; this contrasts with the
analysis of online learning for bounded losses in Section 6, where we fell short of provably
establishing a concise characterization of the processes admitting strong universal online
learning (see Open Problem 2).
In addition to the above equivalence, we also find that in all three learning settings
studied here, for unbounded losses, there exist optimistically universal learning rules. We
have the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Section 8.3 below.
Theorem 46 When ℓ¯ = ∞, there exists an optimistically universal (inductive / self-
adaptive / online) learning rule.
Indeed, we find that effectively the same learning strategy, described in (66) below,
suffices for optimistically universal learning in all three of these settings.
8.1 A Question Concerning the Number of Distinct Values
It is worth noting that Condition 3 is quite restrictive. In fact, it is even violated by
many i.i.d. processes: namely, all those with the marginal distribution of Xt having infinite
support. Clearly any process X such that the number of distinct points Xt is (almost surely)
finite satisfies Condition 3. Indeed, for deterministic processes or for countable X , one can
easily show that this is equivalent to Condition 3. But in general, it is not presently known
whether there exist processes X satisfying Condition 3 for which the number of distinct Xt
values is infinite with nonzero probability. Thus we have the following open question.
Open Problem 4 For some uncountable X , does there exist X ∈ C3 such that, with
nonzero probability, |{x ∈ X : X ∩ {x} 6= ∅}| =∞?
Either answer to this question would be interesting. If no such processes X exist, then
the proof of Theorem 45 below could be dramatically simplified, since it would then be
completely trivial to construct a strongly universally consistent learning rule (in any of the
three settings) under X ∈ C3, simply using memorization (once n is sufficiently large, all
the distinct points will have been observed in the training sample). On the other hand, if
there do exist such processes, then it would indicate that C3 is in fact a fairly rich family
of processes, and that the learning problem is indeed nontrivial. It is straightforward to
show that, if such processes do exist for X = [0, 1] (with the standard topology), then
there would also exist processes of this type that are convergent (to a nondeterministic
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limit point) almost surely;7 thus, in attempting to answer Open Problem 4 (in the case of
X = [0, 1]), it suffices to focus on convergent processes.
8.2 An Equivalent Condition
Before getting into the discussion of consistency under processes in C3, we first note an
elegant equivalent formulation of the condition, which may help to illuminate its relevance
to the problem of learning with unbounded losses. Specifically, we have the following result.
Lemma 47 A process X satisfies Condition 3 if and only if every measurable function
f : X → R satisfies
sup
t∈N
f(Xt) <∞ (a.s.).
Proof First, suppose X ∈ C3, and fix any measurable f : X → R. For each k ∈ N, define
Ak = f
−1([k − 1,∞)). Since f(x) < ∞ for every x ∈ X , we have Ak ↓ ∅. Thus, by the
definition of C3, with probability one ∃k0 ∈ N such that X∩Ak0+1 = ∅; in other words, with
probability one, ∃k0 ∈ N such that every t ∈ N has f(Xt) < k0, so that sup
t∈N
f(Xt) ≤ k0 <∞.
For the other direction, suppose X is such that every measurable f : X → R satisfies
sup
t∈N
f(Xt) < ∞ (a.s.). Fix any monotone sequence {Ak}∞k=1 of sets in B with Ak ↓ ∅, and
define a function f : X → R such that, ∀x ∈ X , f(x) =
∞∑
k=1
1Ak(x) = |{k ∈ N : x ∈ Ak}|.
Note that, since Ak ↓ ∅, we indeed have f(x) ∈ R for every x ∈ X . Furthermore, f is
clearly measurable (being a limit of simple functions). Thus, sup
t∈N
f(Xt) < ∞ (a.s.). Also
note that monotonicity of the sequence {Ak}∞k=1 implies that ∀x ∈ X , f(x) = max({k ∈
N : x ∈ Ak} ∪ {0}). Thus, denoting kˆ = sup
t∈N
f(Xt), on the event (of probability one) that
kˆ <∞, every k ∈ N with k > kˆ has X∩Ak = ∅, so that |{k ∈ N : X∩Ak 6= ∅}| ≤ kˆ <∞ (in
fact, the first inequality holds with equality). Since this holds for any choice of monotone
sequence {Ak}∞k=1 in B with Ak ↓ ∅, we have that X ∈ C3.
8.3 Proofs of the Main Results for Unbounded Losses
This subsection presents the proofs of Theorems 45 and 46. As with Theorem 7, we prove
Theorem 45 via a sequence of lemmas, corresponding to the implications among the various
statements claimed to be equivalent. The first of these is analogous to Lemma 18, showing
that processes admitting strong universal inductive learning also admit strong universal
self-adaptive learning. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 18, and as such is omitted.
Lemma 48 When ℓ¯ =∞, SUIL ⊆ SUAL.
Next, we have a result analogous to Lemma 19, showing that any process admitting
strong universal self-adaptive or online learning necessarily satisfies Condition 3.
7. For instance, for {Ut}
∞
t=0 i.i.d. Uniform(0, 2/3), the process Xt = U0 + 2
−tUt is convergent to the
nondeterministic limit U0.
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Lemma 49 When ℓ¯ =∞, SUAL ∪ SUOL ⊆ C3.
Proof Fix any X that fails to satisfy Condition 3. Then there exists a monotone sequence
{Bk}∞k=1 in B with Bk ↓ ∅ such that, on a σ(X)-measurable event E of probability strictly
greater than zero,
|{k ∈ N : X ∩Bk 6= ∅}| =∞. (57)
Furthermore, monotonicity of B 7→ X ∩ B implies that, without loss of generality, we may
suppose B1 = X . Also, by monotonicity of {Bk}∞k=1, on the event E, (57) implies that
∀k ∈ N,X ∩Bk 6= ∅. (58)
Now for each i ∈ N, define Ai = Bi \Bi+1. Note that, due to monotonicity of the {Bk}∞k=1
sequence and the facts that Bk ↓ ∅ and B1 = X , {Ai}∞i=1 is a disjoint sequence of sets in B
with
∞⋃
i=1
Ai = X . Thus, for every t ∈ N, there exists a unique it ∈ N with Xt ∈ Ait . Also
note that every j ∈ N has Bj =
⋃
i≥j
Ai, again due to monotonicity of {Bk}∞k=1 and the fact
that Bk ↓ ∅.
For each j ∈ N, define a random variable
τj =
{
min{t ∈ N : Xt ∈ Bj} , if X ∩Bj 6= ∅
0, otherwise
.
Note that, on the event E, (58) implies that we have τj = min{t ∈ N : Xt ∈ Bj} for every
j ∈ N (and that this minimum exists and is well-defined). Let {Tj}∞j=1 be a nondecreasing
sequence of (nonrandom) values in N ∪ {0} such that, for each j ∈ N,
P(τj > Tj) < 2
−j .
Such a sequence must exist, since τj always has a finite value, so that lim
t→∞P(τj > t) = 0
(e.g., Schervish, 1995, Theorem A.19). Since
∞∑
j=1
P (τj > Tj) <
∞∑
j=1
2−j = 1 <∞, the Borel-
Cantelli Lemma implies that, on a σ(X)-measurable event E′ of probability one, ∃ι0 ∈ N
such that ∀j ∈ N with j ≥ ι0, τj ≤ Tj . For each i ∈ N, let yi,0, yi,1 ∈ Y be such that
ℓ(yi,0, yi,1) > Ti. For every κ ∈ [0, 1) and i ∈ N, denote κi = ⌊2iκ⌋ − 2⌊2i−1κ⌋: the ith
bit of the binary representation of κ. Then for each κ ∈ [0, 1), i ∈ N, and x ∈ Ai, define
f⋆κ(x) = yi,κi. Note that f
⋆
κ is clearly a measurable function for every κ ∈ [0, 1) (as it is
constant within each of the Ai sets, and X is the union of these sets),
So that we may treat both self-adaptive and online learning simultaneously, for any
n,m ∈ N ∪ {0}, let fn,m denote any measurable function Xm × Ym × X → Y. We will
see below that any online learning rule can be expressed as such a function by simply
disregarding the n index, while any self-adaptive learning rule can be expressed as such
a function by disregarding the Y-valued arguments beyond the first n (when m ≥ n).
Additionally, for every x ∈ X , n,m ∈ N ∪ {0}, and every κ ∈ [0, 1), for brevity we denote
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fκn,m(x) = fn,m(X1:m, {yij ,κij }mj=1, x). We generally have
sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)]
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)]
dκ. (59)
We therefore aim to establish that this last expression is strictly greater than 0.
Since ℓ is nonnegative, Tonelli’s theorem implies that the last expression in (59) equals
E
[∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
dκ
]
≥ E
[
1E∩E′
∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
dκ
]
. (60)
Since Bk ↓ ∅, for any t ∈ N there exists kt ∈ N with X1:t ∩Bkt = ∅, which (by monotonicity
of {Bj}∞j=1) implies that on the event E (so that (58) holds), every integer j ≥ kt has τj > t.
Thus, on E, τj →∞ as j →∞. Therefore, the expression in (60) is at least as large as
E

1E∩E′
∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
j→∞
1
τj
τj−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
dκ


≥ E
[
1E∩E′
∫ 1
0
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
j→∞
1
τj
(
ℓ
(
fκn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,κiτj
)
∧ τj
)
dκ
]
. (61)
In particular, since ∀n, j ∈ N with τj > 0, we have 1τj
(
ℓ
(
fκn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,κiτj
)
∧ τj
)
≤ 1,
Fatou’s lemma (applied twice) implies that (61) is at least as large as
E
[
1E∩E′ lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
j→∞
1
τj
∫ 1
0
(
ℓ
(
fκn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,κiτj
)
∧ τj
)
dκ
]
. (62)
Now note that on the event E, for every j ∈ N, minimality of τj implies that every t ∈ N
with t < τj has Xt /∈ Bj, and since Bj =
⋃
i≥j
Ai, this implies it < j. Furthermore, on E,
by definition of τj we have Xτj ∈ Bj =
⋃
i≥j
Ai, so that iτj ≥ j for every j ∈ N. Together
these facts imply that on E, every j ∈ N has iτj /∈ {i1, . . . , iτj−1}, so that fκn,τj−1(Xτj ) is
functionally independent of κiτj . Therefore, for K ∼ Uniform([0, 1)) independent of X and
fn,τj−1, it holds that fKn,τj−1(Xτj ) is conditionally independent of Kiτj given Ki1 , . . . ,Kiτj−1 ,
X, and fn,τj−1, on the event E. Furthermore, on this event, Kiτj is conditionally indepen-
dent of Ki1 , . . . ,Kiτj−1 given X, and fn,τj−1, and the conditional distribution of Kiτj is
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Bernoulli(1/2), given X and fn,τj−1, on this event. Therefore, on the event E,∫ 1
0
(
ℓ
(
fκn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,κiτj
)
∧ τj
)
dκ = E
[(
ℓ
(
fKn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,Kiτj
)
∧ τj
) ∣∣∣X, fn,τj−1]
= E
[
E
[(
ℓ
(
fn,τj−1
(
X1:(τj−1),{yis,Kis}
τj−1
s=1,Xτj
)
, yiτj,Kiτj
)
∧τj
)∣∣∣X,{Kis}τj−1s=1,fn,τj−1] ∣∣∣X,fn,τj−1]
= E

 ∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2
(
ℓ
(
fn,τj−1
(
X1:(τj−1), {yis,Kis}
τj−1
s=1 ,Xτj
)
, yiτj ,b
)
∧ τj
) ∣∣∣X, fn,τj−1

 . (63)
Since τj ≥ 0, one can easily verify that ℓ(·, ·) ∧ τj is a pseudo-metric. Thus, by the triangle
inequality,
∑
b∈{0,1}
(
ℓ
(
fn,τj−1
(
X1:(τj−1), {yis,Kis}
τj−1
s=1 ,Xτj
)
, yiτj ,b
)
∧ τj
)
≥ ℓ
(
yiτj ,0, yiτj ,1
)
∧ τj ≥ Tiτj ∧ τj. (64)
As established above, on the event E, every j ∈ N has iτj ≥ j. Since {Ti}∞i=1 is nondecreas-
ing, this implies that, on E, Tiτj ≥ Tj . Furthermore, on the event E′, every j ≥ ι0 has
Tj ≥ τj. Combining this with (63) and (64) yields that, on the event E ∩E′, ∀n, j ∈ N with
j ≥ ι0, ∫ 1
0
(
ℓ
(
fκn,τj−1(Xτj ), yiτj ,κiτj
)
∧ τj
)
dκ ≥ E
[
1
2
τj
∣∣∣X, fn,τj−1
]
=
1
2
τj,
where the rightmost equality follows from σ(X)-measurability of τj. Therefore, the expres-
sion in (62) is at least as large as
E
[
1E∩E′ lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
j→∞
1
τj
(
1
2
τj
)]
=
1
2
P
(
E ∩E′) ≥ 1
2
(
P(E)− P((E′)c)) = 1
2
P(E),
where the rightmost equality is due to the fact that P(E′) = 1. In particular, recall that
P(E) > 0, so that the above is strictly greater than zero.
Altogether, we have established that the last expression in (59) is strictly greater than
0. By the inequality in (59) this implies ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) such that
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)]
> 0,
which further implies (see e.g., Theorem 1.6.5 of Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000) that, with
probability strictly greater than zero,
lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
> 0.
This argument applies to any measurable functions fn,m : Xm × Ym × X → Y. In
particular, for any online learning rule hn, we can define a function fn,m(x1:m, y1:m, x) =
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hm(x1:m, y1:m, x) (for every n,m ∈ N ∪ {0} and x1:m ∈ Xm, y1:m ∈ Ym, x ∈ X ), in which
case any κ ∈ [0, 1) has
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(h·, f⋆κ ;n) = lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
.
Therefore, the above argument implies that ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) for which, with probability strictly
greater than 0, lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(h·, f⋆κ ;n) > 0, so that hn is not strongly universally consistent
under X. Since this argument applies to any online learning rule hn, this implies X /∈ SUOL,
and since the argument applies to any process X failing to satisfy Condition 3, we conclude
that SUOL ⊆ C3.
Similarly, for any self-adaptive learning rule gn,m, for every n,m ∈ N∪{0} with m ≥ n,
we can define a function fn,m(x1:m, y1:m, x) = gn,m(x1:m, y1:n, x) (for every x1:m ∈ Xm,
y1:m ∈ Ym, x ∈ X ). For n,m ∈ N∪{0} withm < n, we can simply define fn,m(x1:m, y1:m, x)
as an arbitrary fixed y ∈ Y (invariant to the arguments x1:m ∈ Xm, y1:m ∈ Ym, x ∈ X ).
Then for any κ ∈ [0, 1), we have
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n) = lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t+ 1
n+t∑
m=n
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
= lim sup
n→∞
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ℓ
(
fκn,m(Xm+1), yim+1,κim+1
)
.
Therefore, the above argument implies that ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) for which, with probability strictly
greater than 0, lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n) > 0, so that gn,m is not strongly universally consistent
under X. Since this argument applies to any self-adaptive learning rule gn,m, this implies
X /∈ SUAL, and since the argument applies to any process X failing to satisfy Condition 3,
we conclude that SUAL ⊆ C3, which completes the proof.
To argue sufficiency of C3 for strong universal inductive learning, we propose a new
type of learning rule, suitable for learning with unbounded losses under processes in C3.
Specifically, let ε0 = ∞, and for each k ∈ N, let εk = 2−k. Given a sequence {f˜i}∞i=1 of
measurable functions X → Y (described below), any sequence {in}∞n=1 in N with in → ∞,
and any n ∈ N, x1:n ∈ X n, and y1:n ∈ Yn, define iˆn,0(x1:n, y1:n) = 1, and for each k ∈ N,
inductively define
iˆn,k(x1:n, y1:n) = min
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , in} : max
1≤t≤n
ℓ
(
f˜i(xt), yt
)
≤ εk, and
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜i(x), f˜iˆn,k−1(x1:n,y1:n)(x)
)
≤ εk−1 + εk
}
, (65)
if it exists. For completeness, if the set on the right hand side of (65) is empty for a given
k ∈ N, let us define iˆn,k(x1:n, y1:n) = iˆn,k−1(x1:n, y1:n). Then, for any sequence {kn}∞n=1 in
N with kn →∞, for any n ∈ N, and any x1:n ∈ X n, y1:n ∈ Yn, and x ∈ X , define
fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, x) = f˜iˆn,kn (x1:n,y1:n)
(x). (66)
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This defines an inductive learning rule (it is straightforward to verify that fˆn is a measurable
function). We will see below that, for an appropriate choice of the sequence {f˜i}∞i=1, this
inductive learning rule is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ C3, even for
unbounded losses. To specify an appropriate sequence {f˜i}∞i=1, and to study the performance
of the resulting learning rule, we first prove modified versions of Lemmas 22 and 23, under
the restriction of X to C3.
Lemma 50 There exists a countable set T1 ⊆ B such that, ∀X ∈ C3, ∀A ∈ B, with proba-
bility one, ∃Aˆ ∈ T1 s.t. X ∩ Aˆ = X ∩A.
Proof This proof follows along similar lines to the proof of Lemma 22, and indeed the set
T1 will be the same as defined in that proof. Let T0 be as in the proof of Lemma 22. As in
the proof of Lemma 22, there is an immediate proof based on the monotone class theorem
(Ash and Dole´ans-Dade, 2000, Theorem 1.3.9), by taking T1 as the algebra generated by
T0 (which, one can show, is a countable set), and then showing that the collection of sets
A for which the claim holds forms a monotone class (straightforwardly using Condition 3
for this part). However, as was the case for Lemma 22, we will instead establish the claim
with a smaller set T1. Unlike Lemma 22, in this case this smaller T1 will not actually help
to simplify the learning rule itself (as we will end up using the algebra generated by T1
anyway); but establishing Lemma 50 with this smaller T1 may be of independent interest.
Specifically, as in the proof of Lemma 22, take T1 = {
⋃A : A ⊆ T0, |A| <∞}, which (as
discussed in that proof) is a countable set. Fix any X ∈ C3, and let
Λ =
{
A ∈ B : P
(
∃Aˆ ∈ T1 s.t. X ∩ Aˆ = X ∩A
)
= 1
}
.
For any A ∈ T , as mentioned in the proof of Lemma 22, ∃{Bi}∞i=1 in T0 such that
A =
∞⋃
i=1
Bi. Then letting Ak =
k⋃
i=1
Bi for each k ∈ N, we have Ak △ A = A \ Ak ↓ ∅
(monotonically), and Ak ∈ T1 for each k ∈ N. Therefore, by Condition 3, with probability
one, ∃k ∈ N such that X ∩ (Ak △ A) = ∅, which implies X ∩ Ak = X ∩ A. Thus, A ∈ Λ.
Since this holds for any A ∈ T , we have T ⊆ Λ.
Next, we argue that Λ is a σ-algebra, beginning with the property of being closed
under complements. First, consider any A ∈ T1. Since T1 ⊆ T , it follows that X \ A is a
closed set. Since (X ,T ) is metrizable, this implies ∃{Bi}∞i=1 in T such that X \A =
∞⋂
i=1
Bi
(Kechris, 1995, Proposition 3.7). Denoting Ck =
k⋂
i=1
Bi for each k ∈ N, we have that
Ck△ (X \A) = Ck \ (X \A) ↓ ∅ (monotonically), and Ck ∈ T for each k ∈ N. In particular,
by Condition 3, this implies that on an event E
(A)
0 of probability one, there exists k0 ∈ N
such that X ∩ (Ck0 △ (X \A)) = ∅, which implies X ∩Ck0 = X ∩ (X \A). Furthermore, for
each k ∈ N, since Ck ∈ T ⊆ Λ, there is an event E(A)k of probability one, on which ∃Aˆk ∈ T1
with X ∩ Aˆk = X ∩ Ck. Altogether, on the event
∞⋂
k=0
E
(A)
k (which has probability one, by
the union bound), X ∩ Aˆk0 = X ∩ (X \ A). Now denote E(T1) =
⋂
A∈T1
∞⋂
k=0
E
(A)
k , which has
probability one by the union bound (since T1 is countable).
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Next, consider any A ∈ Λ, and suppose the event E′ (of probability one) holds that
∃Aˆ ∈ T1 s.t. X ∩ Aˆ = X ∩ A, which also implies X ∩ (X \ Aˆ) = X ∩ (X \ A). Since Aˆ ∈ T1,
on the event E(T1) we have that ∃Aˆ′ ∈ T1 with X ∩ Aˆ′ = X ∩ (X \ Aˆ). Thus, on the event
E′∩E(T1), we have X∩ Aˆ′ = X∩ (X \A). Since E′∩E(T1) has probability one (by the union
bound), we have that X \A ∈ Λ. Since this argument holds for any A ∈ Λ, we have that Λ
is closed under complements.
Next, we show that Λ is closed under countable unions. Let {Ai}∞i=1 be a sequence
in Λ, and denote A =
∞⋃
i=1
Ai. Since each Ai ∈ Λ, by the union bound there is an event
E of probability one, on which there exists a sequence {Aˆi}∞i=1 in T1 such that ∀i ∈ N,
X∩Ai = X∩Aˆi. Furthermore, since A△
k⋃
i=1
Ai = A\
k⋃
i=1
Ai ↓ ∅ (monotonically), Condition 3
implies that, on an event E′′ of probability one, ∃k ∈ N such that X ∩
(
A△
k⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= ∅,
which implies X∩
k⋃
i=1
Ai = X∩A. Since, for any k ∈ N, X∩
k⋃
i=1
Ai is simply the subsequence
of X consisting of all entries appearing in any of the X∩Ai subsequences with i ≤ k, and (on
E) each X∩Ai = X∩ Aˆi, together we have that on the event E ∩E′′ (which has probability
one, by the union bound), ∃k ∈ N such that X∩
k⋃
i=1
Aˆi = X∩
k⋃
i=1
Ai = X∩A. Since it follows
immediately from its definition that the set T1 is closed under finite unions, we have that
k⋃
i=1
Aˆi ∈ T1. Therefore, A ∈ Λ. Since this holds for any choice of the sequence {Ai}∞i=1 in
Λ, we have that Λ is closed under countable unions.
Finally, recalling that T is a topology, we have X ∈ T , and since T ⊆ Λ, this implies
X ∈ Λ. Altogether, we have established that Λ is a σ-algebra. Therefore, since B is the
σ-algebra generated by T , and T ⊆ Λ, it immediately follows that B ⊆ Λ (which also
implies Λ = B). Since this argument holds for any choice of X ∈ C3, the lemma immediately
follows.
Lemma 51 There exists a sequence {f˜i}∞i=1 of measurable functions X → Y such that, for
every X ∈ C3, for every measurable f : X → Y, with probability one, ∀ε > 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∃j ∈ N
with
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
≤ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i(Xt), f(Xt)
)
+ ε
and sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f(Xt)
)
≤ ε.
Proof Let T1 be as in Lemma 50, and let y˜i and Bε,i be defined as in the proof of Lemma 23,
for each i ∈ N and ε > 0. Also fix an arbitrary value y˜0 ∈ Y. Let T2 denote the algebra
generated by T1. Since T1 is countable, one can easily verify that T2 is countable as well (see
e.g., Bogachev, 2007, page 5), and by definition, has T1 ⊆ T2. Furthermore, since T1 ⊆ B
and B is an algebra, minimality of the algebra T2 implies T2 ⊆ B (see e.g., Dudley, 2003,
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page 86). Now for each k0 ∈ N and disjoint sets A1, . . . , Ak0 ∈ B, let A0 = X \
k0⋃
k=1
Ak,
and for any x ∈ X , define f˜(x; {Ak}k0k=1) = y˜k for the unique value k ∈ {0, . . . , k0} with
x ∈ Ak. One can easily verify that f˜(·; {Ak}k0k=1) is a measurable function. Now define F˜ as
the set of all functions f˜(·; {Ak}k0k=1) with k0 ∈ N and A1, . . . , Ak0 disjoint elements of T2.
Note that, given an indexing of T2 by N, we can index F˜ by finite tuples of integers (the
indices of the corresponding Ai sets within T2), of which there are countably many, so that
F˜ is countable. We may therefore enumerate the elements of F˜ as f˜1, f˜2, . . .. For simplicity,
we will suppose this sequence is infinite (which can always be achieved by repetition, if
necessary).
Fix any X ∈ C3, any measurable f : X → Y, and any ε > 0. For each k ∈ N, define
Ck = f
−1(Bε,k). Since lim
k1→∞
∞⋃
k=k1
Ck = ∅ and X ∈ C3, on an event Eε,1 of probability
one, ∃k1 ∈ N s.t. X ∩
∞⋃
k=k1+1
Ck = ∅. Furthermore, by the union bound and the defining
property of T1 from Lemma 50, on an event Eε,2 of probability one, ∀k ∈ N, ∃A′k ∈ T1 with
X∩A′k = X∩Ck. Now note that for any k, k′ ∈ N, X∩ (A′k ∩A′k′) is simply the subsequence
of X consisting of entries Xt appearing in both subsequences X ∩ A′k and X ∩ A′k′ . Thus,
since the sets {Ck}∞k=1 are disjoint, and on the event Eε,2 every k ∈ N has X∩A′k = X∩Ck,
we have that on Eε,2 every k, k
′ ∈ N with k 6= k′ satisfy X∩ (A′k ∩A′k′) = X∩ (Ck ∩Ck′) = ∅,
so that any k ∈ N \ {1} has X ∩
k−1⋃
k′=1
(
A′k ∩A′k′
)
= ∅. Therefore, on the event Eε,2, defining
A1 = A
′
1, and Ak = A
′
k \
k−1⋃
k′=1
A′k′ = A
′
k \
k−1⋃
k′=1
(
A′k ∩A′k′
)
for every k ∈ N \ {1}, we have that
∀k ∈ N, X∩Ak = X∩A′k = X∩Ck. Note that the sets {Ak}∞k=1 are disjoint elements of T2.
Now fix any i ∈ N, and let k2 ∈ N and {A′′k}k2k=1 ∈ T k22 (disjoint) be such that f˜i(·) =
f˜
(
·; {A′′k}k2k=1
)
. For simplicity, denote k0 = max{k1, k2}, and (if k0 > k2) for any k ∈
{k2 + 1, . . . , k0} define A′′k = ∅; in particular, f˜i(·) = f˜
(
·; {A′′k}k0k=1
)
as well. Also define
A′′0 = X \
k0⋃
k=1
A′′k and A0 = X \
k0⋃
k=1
Ak. Now for each k ∈ {1, . . . , k0}, define
A˜k =
⋃{
Ak ∩A′′k′ : X ∩
(
Ak ∩A′′k′
) 6= ∅, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}}∪⋃{
Ak′ ∩A′′k : X ∩
(
Ak′ ∩A′′k
)
= ∅, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}
}
.
Note that A˜1, . . . , A˜k0 are elements of T2. Furthermore, disjointness of the sets {Ak}k0k=0, and
disjointness of the sets {A′′k}k0k=0, together imply that the sets {Ak ∩A′′k′ , k, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}}
are disjoint. From this and the definition of the A˜k sets, it easily follows that the sets
{A˜k}k0k=1 are disjoint. Thus, on the event Eε,1∩Eε,2, ∃j ∈ N such that f˜j(·) = f˜
(
·; {A˜k}k0k=1
)
.
Now suppose the event Eε,1 ∩ Eε,2 holds and that we have constructed this function f˜j
as above. Then for every k ∈ {1, . . . , k0}, since
X ∩
⋃{
Ak′ ∩A′′k : X ∩
(
Ak′ ∩A′′k
)
= ∅, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}
}
= ∅,
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we have
X ∩ A˜k = X ∩
⋃{
Ak ∩A′′k′ : X ∩
(
Ak ∩A′′k′
) 6= ∅, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}} ,
and since
X ∩
⋃{
Ak ∩A′′k′ : X ∩
(
Ak ∩A′′k′
)
= ∅, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}
}
= ∅,
this also implies
X ∩ A˜k = X ∩
⋃{
Ak ∩A′′k′ : k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0}
}
= X ∩
(
Ak ∩
k0⋃
k′=0
A′′k′
)
= X ∩Ak = X ∩Ck.
(67)
In particular, since k0 ≥ k1, this implies that every t ∈ N has Xt contained in exactly one
set A˜k with k ∈ {1, . . . , k0}. Therefore,
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f(Xt)
)
= sup
t∈N
k0∑
k=1
1A˜k
(Xt)ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f(Xt)
)
.
By the definition of f˜j, every Xt ∈ A˜k has f˜j(Xt) = y˜k, so that the above equals
sup
t∈N
k0∑
k=1
1A˜k
(Xt)ℓ(y˜k, f(Xt)) .
Furthermore, (67) implies 1A˜k(Xt) = 1Ck(Xt) for every t ∈ N. Therefore, the above expres-
sion equals
sup
t∈N
k0∑
k=1
1Ck(Xt)ℓ(y˜k, f(Xt)) .
By the definition of Ck, every Xt ∈ Ck has ℓ(y˜k, f(Xt)) ≤ ε, so that the above is at most
sup
t∈N
k0∑
k=1
1Ck(Xt)ε = ε.
Altogether, we have that
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f(Xt)
)
≤ ε.
Next, continuing to suppose Eε,1 ∩ Eε,2 holds and that f˜j is as above, fix any x ∈ X .
First, consider the case of x /∈
k0⋃
k=1
A˜k. By the definition of f˜j, we have f˜j(x) = y˜0. Also
note that every k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , k0} have Ak ∩A′′k′ ⊆ A˜k ∪ A˜k′ , so that x /∈ Ak ∩A′′k′ for every
such k, k′. Furthermore, since k0 ≥ k1 and X ∩Ak = X ∩ Ck for every k ∈ N, we have that
X∩A0 = ∅. It follows (from the definition of A˜k) that A0∩A′′k ⊆ A˜k for every k ∈ {1, . . . , k0},
so that x /∈ A0 ∩A′′k for every such k. Since
⋃
k,k′∈{0,...,k0}
Ak ∩ A′′k′ = X , the only remaining
possibility is that ∃k ∈ {0, . . . , k0} with x ∈ Ak ∩ A′′0 . In particular, since this implies
x ∈ A′′0 , the definition of f˜i implies f˜i(x) = y˜0, so that ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
= ℓ(y˜0, y˜0) = 0.
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Next, consider the remaining case, in which ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , k0} with x ∈ A˜k. Now there
are two subcases to consider. In the first subcase, ∃k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0} such that x ∈ Ak′ ∩A′′k
and X ∩ (Ak′ ∩A′′k) = ∅. In this case, since x ∈ A˜k, we have f˜j(x) = y˜k, and since x ∈ A′′k,
we have f˜i(x) = y˜k as well. Therefore, ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
= ℓ(y˜k, y˜k) = 0. In the second
(and only remaining) subcase, we have that ∃k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k0} such that x ∈ Ak ∩ A′′k′ and
X ∩ (Ak ∩A′′k′) 6= ∅. In this case, by the definitions of f˜i and f˜j, we have that f˜j(x) = y˜k
(due to x ∈ A˜k) and f˜i(x) = y˜k′ (due to x ∈ A′′k′). Also, since X ∩
(
Ak ∩A′′k′
) 6= ∅, we
have that ∃tk ∈ N with Xtk ∈ Ak ∩ A′′k′ ⊆ A˜k; in particular, this implies f˜i(Xtk) = y˜k′ .
Furthermore, (67) implies Xtk ∈ Ck, so that ℓ(f(Xtk), y˜k) ≤ ε. Together with the triangle
inequality, we have that
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
= ℓ(y˜k, y˜k′) ≤ ℓ(f(Xtk), y˜k) + ℓ(y˜k′, f(Xtk))
≤ ε+ ℓ
(
f˜i(Xtk ), f(Xtk)
)
≤ ε+ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i(Xt), f(Xt)
)
.
Since the above arguments together cover every x ∈ X , we have that, on Eε,1 ∩ Eε,2,
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
≤ ε+ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i(Xt), f(Xt)
)
.
The above results hold for any fixed ε > 0. Now letting εk = 2
−k for each k ∈ N,
we have that on the event
∞⋂
k=1
(Eεk,1 ∩Eεk,2), for any i ∈ N and any ε > 0, letting k =
⌈log2((1/ε) ∨ 2)⌉, we have that ∃j ∈ N with
sup
t∈N
ℓ(f˜j(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ εk ≤ ε,
and
sup
x∈X
ℓ(f˜j(x), f˜i(x)) ≤ εk + sup
t∈N
ℓ(f˜i(Xt), f(Xt)) ≤ ε+ sup
t∈N
ℓ(f˜i(Xt), f(Xt)).
Noting that the event
∞⋂
k=1
(Eεk,1 ∩Eεk,2) has probability one (by the union bound) com-
pletes the proof.
We are now ready to present a result analogous to Lemma 25, showing that any process
satisfying Condition 3 necessarily admits strong universal inductive learning. For clarity,
we make explicit the fact that this result holds for ℓ¯ = ∞, though it clearly also holds for
ℓ¯ <∞ (since C3 ⊆ C1).
Lemma 52 When ℓ¯ =∞, C3 ⊆ SUIL ∩ SUOL.
Proof We begin by showing that C3 ⊆ SUIL. Let fˆn be the inductive learning rule specified
by (66), where the sequence {f˜i}∞i=1 is chosen as in Lemma 51, and {in}∞n=1 and {kn}∞n=1
are arbitrary (nonrandom) sequences in N with in → ∞ and kn → ∞. We establish the
stated result by arguing that fˆn is strongly universally consistent for every X ∈ C3, which
thereby establishes that every X ∈ C3 admits strong universal inductive learning.
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Toward this end, fix any X ∈ C3 and any measurable function f⋆ : X → Y. To simplify
the notation, let us abbreviate iˆn,k = iˆn,k(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n)) for every n ∈ N and k ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Let E denote the event of probability one guaranteed by Lemma 51, for the process X and
the function f = f⋆: that is, on E, ∀ε > 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∃j ∈ N with
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i(x)
)
≤ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
+ ε (68)
and sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ ε. (69)
Let us suppose this event E occurs.
We now argue by induction that, ∀k ∈ N∪{0}, ∃i∗k, n∗k ∈ N such that, ∀n ≥ n∗k, iˆn,k = i∗k
and sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk. As a base case, the result is trivially satisfied for k = 0,
since taking i∗0 = 1, we have defined iˆn,0 = i∗0 for every n ∈ N, so that we may take n∗0 = 1;
moreover, ε0 =∞, so that we trivially have sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗0(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ ε0.
Now take as an inductive hypothesis that, for some k ∈ N, ∃i∗k−1, n∗k−1 ∈ N such that,
∀n ≥ n∗k−1, iˆn,k−1 = i∗k−1 and sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k−1
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk−1. Then define
i∗k = min
{
j ∈ N : sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk and sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
≤ εk−1 + εk
}
.
Note that, taking ε = εk and i = i
∗
k−1 in (68) and (69), and combining with the fact (from the
inductive hypothesis) that sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k−1
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk−1, we can conclude that the set of
values j on the right hand side of the definition of i∗k is nonempty, so that i
∗
k is a well-defined
element of N. In particular, by definition, we have sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk. Next note
that, by minimality of i∗k, for every j ∈ N with j < i∗k and sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
≤ εk−1+εk
(if any such j exists), we have sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
> εk, so that ∃tj,k ∈ N such that
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xtj,k ), f
⋆(Xtj,k )
)
> εk. Furthermore, since in → ∞, ∃n′k ∈ N such that min
n≥n′
k
in ≥ i∗k.
Now define
n∗k = max
({
tj,k : j ∈ {1, . . . , i∗k − 1}, sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
≤ εk−1 + εk
}
∪ {n′k, n∗k−1}
)
,
which (being a maximum of a finite subset of N) is a finite positive integer. In particular,
note that (since n∗k ≥ n∗k−1) for any n ≥ n∗k, the inductive hypothesis implies iˆn,k−1 = i∗k−1.
Additionally, for any n ≥ n∗k, every j ∈ N with j < i∗k and sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
≤
εk−1 + εk has max
1≤t≤n
ℓ
(
f˜j(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≥ ℓ
(
f˜j(Xtj,k), f
⋆(Xtj,k)
)
> εk. In particular, this
means that any such j is not included in the set on the right hand side of (65) (when
x1:n = X1:n and y1:n = f
⋆(X1:n)). Furthermore, for n ≥ n∗k, every j ∈ N with j < i∗k and
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sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜j(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
> εk−1 + εk is clearly also not included in the set on the right hand
side of (65) in this case (again, since iˆn,k−1 = i∗k−1). On the other hand, by definition we
have sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k
(x), f˜i∗
k−1
(x)
)
≤ εk−1 + εk, and
max
1≤t≤n
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜i∗
k
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk,
so that, since any n ≥ n∗k has in ≥ i∗k (due to n∗k ≥ n′k) and iˆn,k−1 = i∗k−1 (as argued above),
we have that i∗k is included in the set on the right hand side of (65) (again with x1:n = X1:n
and y1:n = f
⋆(X1:n)). Together with the definition of iˆn,k, these observations imply that,
for any n ≥ n∗k, iˆn,k = i∗k.
By the principle of induction, we have established the existence of a sequence {n∗k}∞k=0 in
N such that, ∀k ∈ N∪{0}, ∀n ∈ N with n ≥ n∗k, we have sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk. Now
for any n ∈ N, let k∗n = max {k ∈ {0, . . . , kn} : n ≥ n∗k} (recalling that we defined n∗0 = 1
above, so that k∗n always exists). Note that, by the above guarantee,
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k∗n
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ εk∗n . (70)
Furthermore, since kn →∞, and each n∗k is finite, we have that k∗n →∞.
Note that, by definition, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , kn}, we have sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k(x), f˜iˆn,k−1(x)
)
≤
εk−1 + εk (noting that this is true even when the set on the right hand side of (65) is
empty, by our choice to define iˆn,k = iˆn,k−1 in that case). Combining this with an inductive
application of the triangle inequality and subadditivity of the supremum, and noting that
k∗n ≤ kn (by definition), this implies
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,kn
(x), f˜iˆn,k∗n
(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈X
kn∑
k=k∗n+1
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k(x), f˜iˆn,k−1(x)
)
≤
kn∑
k=k∗n+1
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k(x), f˜iˆn,k−1(x)
)
≤
kn∑
k=k∗n+1
(εk−1 + εk) ≤
∞∑
k=k∗n+1
(εk−1 + εk) .
If k∗n = 0, this rightmost expression is ∞ = 3ε0; on the other hand, if k∗n ≥ 1, then by our
choice of εk = 2
−k for every k ∈ N, the rightmost expression above equals 3 · 2−k∗n = 3εk∗n .
Thus, either way, we have
sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,kn
(x), f˜iˆn,k∗n
(x)
)
≤ 3εk∗n . (71)
Therefore, by the triangle inequality, ∀n ∈ N,
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,kn
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ sup
t∈N
(
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k∗n
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
+ ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,kn
(Xt), f˜iˆn,k∗n
(Xt)
))
≤ sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,k∗n
(Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
+ sup
x∈X
ℓ
(
f˜iˆn,kn
(x), f˜iˆn,k∗n
(x)
)
≤ 4εk∗n ,
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where the last inequality is due to (70) and (71). Since k∗n → ∞ and εk → 0, and since
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n), ·) = f˜iˆn,kn (·) by its definition in (66), we may conclude that
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
→ 0.
Since all of the above claims hold on the event E, which has probability one, and since
the above argument holds for any choice of measurable function f⋆ : X → Y, we may
conclude that, for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
→ 0 (a.s.). (72)
This further implies that, for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
lim
n→∞ LˆX
(
fˆn, f
⋆;n
)
= lim
n→∞ lim supm→∞
1
m
n+m∑
t=n+1
ℓ
(
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
≤ lim
n→∞ supt∈N
ℓ
(
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
= 0 (a.s.).
Thus, the inductive learning rule fˆn is strongly universally consistent under X. In particular,
this implies that X admits strong universal inductive learning: that is, X ∈ SUIL.
The above argument can also be used to show that X ∈ SUOL. Specifically, consider
this same fˆn function defined above, but now interpreted as an online learning rule. We
then have, for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
lim
n→∞ LˆX
(
fˆ·, f⋆;n
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
ℓ
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1)
)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
sup
m∈N
ℓ
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xm), f
⋆(Xm)
)
. (73)
The convergence in (72) implies sup
m∈N
ℓ
(
fˆt(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:t),Xm), f
⋆(Xm)
)
→ 0 (a.s.) as t→∞.
Thus, since the arithmetic mean of the first n elements in any convergent sequence in R is
also convergent (as n→∞) with the same limit value, this immediately implies that the last
expression in (73) equals 0 almost surely. Since this holds for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
we have that fˆn is also a strongly universally consistent online learning rule under X. In
particular, this implies that X admits strong universal online learning: that is, X ∈ SUOL.
Finally, since the above arguments hold for any choice of X ∈ C3, we may conclude that
C3 ⊆ SUIL ∩ SUOL, which completes the proof.
Combining the above lemmas immediately provides the following proof of Theorem 45.
Proof of Theorem 45 Taking Lemmas 48, 49, and 52 together, we have that SUIL ∪
SUOL ⊆ SUAL ∪ SUOL ⊆ C3 ⊆ SUIL ∩ SUOL ⊆ SUAL ∩ SUOL. This further implies that
86
Learning Whenever Learning is Possible
SUAL△ SUOL = (SUAL ∪ SUOL) \ (SUAL ∩ SUOL) = ∅, and similarly SUIL△ SUOL =
(SUIL ∪ SUOL) \ (SUIL ∩ SUOL) = ∅, so that SUIL = SUOL = SUAL. Combining this
with Lemmas 49 and 52, we obtain SUOL = SUAL∪SUOL ⊆ C3 ⊆ SUIL∩SUOL = SUOL,
so that SUOL = C3. Hence SUIL = SUAL = SUOL = C3, which completes the proof.
Remark: Interestingly, the proof of Lemma 52 in fact establishes a much stronger kind of
convergence for fˆn under any X ∈ C3: for any measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
sup
t∈N
ℓ
(
fˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), f
⋆(Xt)
)
→ 0 (a.s.). (74)
Denoting by SUILsup the set of processes X that admit the existence of an inductive learn-
ing rule fˆn satisfying (74) for every measurable f
⋆ : X → Y, we have thus established that
C3 ⊆ SUILsup when ℓ¯ =∞. Furthermore, as shown in the proof of Lemma 52, this type of
convergence itself implies strong universal consistency of fˆn in the original sense of Defini-
tion 1, so that SUILsup ⊆ SUIL. Thus, since SUIL = C3 when ℓ¯ = ∞ (from Theorem 45,
just established), we have established that, when ℓ¯ =∞, SUILsup = SUIL: that is, the set
of processes X admitting this stronger type of universal consistency is in fact the same as
those admitting strong universal inductive learning in the usual sense of Definition 1. It is
clear that this is not the case when ℓ¯ < ∞ if X is infinite. Indeed, combining the proof of
Lemma 52 with a straightforward variation on the proof of Lemma 49, one can show that
even when ℓ¯ < ∞, Condition 3 remains a necessary and sufficient condition for a process
X to admit the existence of an inductive learning rule satisfying (74) for all measurable
functions f⋆ : X → Y: that is, SUILsup = C3. For these same reasons, the same is true of
the analogous guarantee for self-adaptive or online learning: that is, regardless of whether
ℓ¯ = ∞ or ℓ¯ < ∞, Condition 3 is necessary and sufficient for there to exist a self-adaptive
learning rule gˆn,m such that, for all measurable f
⋆ : X → Y,
sup
t∈N:t≥n
ℓ(gˆn,t(X1:t, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt+1), f
⋆(Xt+1))→ 0 (a.s.),
and Condition 3 is also necessary and sufficient for there to exist an online learning rule hˆn
such that, for all measurable f⋆ : X → Y,
ℓ
(
hˆn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xn+1), f
⋆(Xn+1)
)
→ 0 (a.s.).
We may also note that the proof of Lemma 52 specifically establishes that the inductive
learning rule fˆn specified in (66) (with {f˜i}∞i=1 from Lemma 51) is strongly universally
consistent for every X ∈ C3, and therefore by Theorem 45 (just established), for every X ∈
SUIL when ℓ¯ =∞. Since the definition of fˆn has no direct dependence on the distribution
of X, this implies fˆn is an optimistically universal inductive learning rule when ℓ¯ = ∞.
This is particularly interesting, as it contrasts with the fact, established in Theorem 6
above, that for bounded losses, no optimistically universal inductive learning rule exists (if
X is an uncountable Polish space). Furthermore, this also means we can easily define an
optimistically universal self-adaptive learning rule when ℓ¯ =∞, simply defining
gˆn,m(x1:m, y1:n, x) = fˆn(x1:n, y1:n, x) (75)
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for every n,m ∈ N ∪ {0} with m ≥ n, and every x1:m ∈ X n, y1:n ∈ Yn, and x ∈ X . In
particular, it is clear that LˆX(gˆn,·, f⋆;n) = LˆX(fˆn, f⋆;n) for this definition of gˆn,m. Thus,
since fˆn is strongly universally consistent under every X ∈ C3 by Lemma 52, it immediately
follows that gˆn,m also has this property, and the fact that it is an optimistically universal
self-adaptive learning rule (when ℓ¯ =∞) then follows from SUAL = C3 (from Theorem 45,
just established). The proof of Lemma 52 also establishes strong universal consistency of
fˆn under any X ∈ C3 when fˆn is interpreted as an online learning rule, so that (since
C3 = SUOL when ℓ¯ =∞, again by Theorem 45) fˆn is also an optimistically universal online
learning rule when ℓ¯ =∞. We summarize these findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 53 When ℓ¯ = ∞, with {f˜i}∞i=1 as in Lemma 51, the learning rule fˆn from (66)
is an optimistically universal inductive learning rule, and an optimistically universal online
learning rule. Moreover, defining gˆn,m as in (75), when ℓ¯ = ∞, gˆn,m is an optimistically
universal self-adaptive learning rule.
In particular, this implies that for unbounded losses, there exist optimistically universal
(inductive/self-adaptive/online) learning rules, so that Theorem 46 immediately follows.
8.4 No Consistent Test for Existence of a Universally Consistent Learner
As we did in Section 7 in the case of bounded losses, it is also natural to ask whether there
exist consistent hypothesis tests for whether or not a given data process X admits strong
universal learning, in this case when ℓ¯ =∞. As was true for bounded losses, we again find
that the answer is generally no. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 54 When ℓ¯ = ∞ and X is infinite, there is no consistent hypothesis test for
SUIL, SUAL, or SUOL.
Proof Suppose X is infinite. Since Theorem 45 implies SUIL = SUAL = SUOL = C3
when ℓ¯ =∞, it suffices to prove that there is no consistent hypothesis test for C3. Fix any
hypothesis test tˆn. Fix X to be that specific process constructed in the proof of Theorem 43,
relative to this hypothesis test tˆn. The proof of Theorem 43 (combined with Theorem 7)
establishes that, for this specific process X, if X ∈ C1, then tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in
probability to 1, and if X /∈ C1, then tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in probability to 0.
Recall that C3 ⊆ C1, so that if X /∈ C1, then X /∈ C3 as well. But, as mentioned above,
tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in probability to 0 in this case. Thus, in the case that this process
X /∈ C1, we have established that tˆn is not a consistent test for C3.
On the other hand, in the case that the constructed process X is in C1, there are two
subcases to consider. First, recalling the construction of X, if there exists a largest k ∈ N
for which nk−1 is defined, then for X to be in C1 we necessarily have (k + 1)/2 ∈ N (i.e.,
k is odd). In this case, every t > nk−1 has Xt = w0 = Xnk−1+1, so that for any sequence
{Ai}∞i=1 in B with Ai ↓ ∅,
|{i ∈ N : X ∩Ai 6= ∅}| =
∣∣{i ∈ N : X1:(nk−1+1) ∩Ai 6= ∅}∣∣ .
Since Ai ↓ ∅, ∃i0 ∈ N such that ∀i > i0, X1:(nk−1+1) ∩Ai = ∅. Therefore,
|{i ∈ N : X ∩Ai 6= ∅}| ≤ i0 <∞,
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so that X ∈ C3 as well. But, as mentioned above, in the case that this constructed process
X ∈ C1, tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in probability to 1, so that if X ∈ C1 and there is a largest
k ∈ N with nk−1 defined, this establishes that tˆn is not a consistent test for C3. Finally,
the only remaining case is where X ∈ C1 and nk−1 is defined for every k ∈ N. In this case,
as established in the proof of Theorem 43, tˆn(X1:n) fails to converge in probability at all
(i.e., neither converges in probability to 0 nor converges in probability to 1), which trivially
establishes that tˆn is not a consistent test for C3 in this case.
Since it is trivially true that every X is in C3 when X is finite (and hence also in SUIL,
SUAL, and SUOL when ℓ¯ =∞, by Theorem 45), we have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 55 When ℓ¯ =∞, there exist consistent hypothesis tests for each of SUIL, SUAL,
and SUOL if and only if X is finite.
9. Extensions
Here we briefly mention two simple extensions of the above theory: namely, extension be-
yond metric losses ℓ, and extension of the results to also hold for weak universal consistency.
9.1 More-General Loss Functions
For simplicity, we have chosen to restrict the loss function ℓ to be a metric in the above re-
sults. However, as mentioned in Section 1.1, most of the theory developed above extends to a
much broader family of loss functions, including all functions ℓ : Y2 → [0,∞) that are merely
dominated by a separable metric ℓo, in the sense that ∀y, y′ ∈ Y, ℓ(y, y′) ≤ φ(ℓo(y, y′)) for
some continuous nondecreasing function φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with φ(0) = 0 and lim
x→∞φ(x) =
∞, and that also satisfy a non-triviality condition: sup
y0,y1∈Y
inf
y∈Y
max{ℓ(y, y0), ℓ(y, y1)} > 0.
The measurable sets By are then defined as the Borel σ-algebra generated by the topology
induced by ℓo, and we also require that ℓ be a measurable function with respect to this.
For instance, this extension admits such common settings as ℓ the squared loss for Y as R
or [−1, 1], taking ℓo(y, y′) = |y − y′| and φ(x) = x2.
Here we briefly elaborate on the (minor) changes to the above theory yielding this
generalization. For any z ∈ [0,∞), denote φ−1(z) = inf{x ∈ [0,∞) : φ(x) ≥ z}; this always
exists since the conditions on φ guarantee that its range is [0,∞), and moreover by continuity
of φ we have φ(φ−1(z)) = z. Still defining ℓ¯ = sup
y,y′∈Y
ℓ(y, y′), in the case of bounded losses
(ℓ¯ <∞), note that we can suppose ℓo is also bounded without loss of generality, and in fact
that it is bounded by φ−1(ℓ¯), since the metric (y, y′) 7→ ℓo(y, y′) ∧ φ−1(ℓ¯) still satisfies the
requirement ℓ(y, y′) ≤ φ(ℓo(y, y′) ∧ φ−1(ℓ¯)). Then we can simply replace ℓ with ℓo in the
learning rules proposed in (10) and (29), and the resulting performance guarantees in terms
of the loss ℓo then imply universal consistency under ℓ under the same conditions. To see
this, note that for any yˆ, y⋆ ∈ Y, for any ε > 0, we have
ℓ(yˆ, y⋆) ≤ φ(ℓo(yˆ, y⋆)) ≤ ε+ ℓ¯1
[
ℓo(yˆ, y
⋆) > φ−1(ε)
] ≤ ε+ ℓ¯
φ−1(ε)
ℓo(yˆ, y
⋆) ,
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noting that φ−1(ε) > 0. Plugging this inequality into the three LˆX definitions, and noting
that it holds for all ε > 0, it easily follows that, in any of the three learning settings discussed
above, strong universal consistency under the loss ℓo implies strong universal consistency
under the loss ℓ.
Furthermore, in the results where it is needed to argue inconsistency of a given learning
rule (Lemma 19, Theorems 6 and 35), the only property of ℓ used in those arguments
is the stated non-triviality condition; more specifically, this condition is represented there
by the fact that, for ℓ a metric, any distinct y0, y1 ∈ Y have inf
y∈Y
1
2 (ℓ(y, y0) + ℓ(y, y1)) ≥
ℓ(y0, y1)/2 > 0, but the arguments would hold just as well for these more-general losses ℓ by
replacing ℓ(y0, y1)/2 with inf
y∈Y
max{ℓ(y, y0), ℓ(y, y1)}/2 and choosing y0, y1 ∈ Y specifically
to make this latter quantity nonzero.
These generalizations can be applied to all of the results involving a loss function in
Sections 1 through 6.3. Section 6.4 is the only place (involving bounded losses) where
somewhat-nontrivial modifications are necessary to extend the results to these more-general
losses, simply due to needing an appropriate generalization of the notion of “total bound-
edness” for the arguments to remain valid.
The results on unbounded losses in Section 8 can also be generalized. In this case, the
same trick of using ℓo in place of ℓ in the definition of the learning rule (66) again works for
establishing universal consistency with ℓ under X ∈ C3 in Lemma 52, but in this case it fol-
lows from the stronger guarantee (74) for ℓo (together with continuity and monotonicity of φ,
and φ(0) = 0) rather than from directly relating LˆX for the losses ℓo and ℓ: that is, the learn-
ing rule defined in terms of ℓo satisfies the convergence in (74) for the loss ℓo under X ∈ C3,
and the properties of φ imply that it remains true for φ(ℓo(·, ·)), and hence also for the loss
ℓ. However, the complementary result in Lemma 49 requires an additional restriction to ℓ
for the argument there to generalize: namely, that sup
y0,y1∈Y
inf
y∈Y
max{ℓ(y, y0), ℓ(y, y1)} = ∞,
a property satisfied by most unbounded losses studied in the literature anyway. Using
this to replace the values ℓ(yi,0, yi,1) appearing in the proof of Lemma 49 with values
inf
y∈Y
max{ℓ(y, yi,0), ℓ(y, yi,1)} (both in the definition of yi,0, yi,1, and in (64)), the result is
then extended to these more-general loss functions. Together, these modifications allow us
to extend all of the results in Section 8 to these more-general loss functions ℓ.
9.2 Weak Universal Consistency
It is straightforward to extend the above results on inductive and self-adaptive learning
(Sections 4 and 5) to weak universal consistency as well, where the definition of weakly
universally consistent learning is as above except replacing the almost sure convergence
of LˆX to 0 with convergence in probability. The proof of necessity of Condition 1 for
inductive learning and self-adaptive learning (from Lemmas 18 and 19) can easily be
modified to show necessity of Condition 1 for weak universal consistency by inductive
or self-adaptive learning rules as well. Specifically, the proof of Lemma 19 in this case
would follow the same argument, but starting from sup
κ∈[0,1)
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
in-
stead of sup
κ∈[0,1)
E
[
lim sup
n→∞
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n)
]
. After relaxing sup
κ∈[0,1)
to an integral over κ ∈
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[0, 1) (as in the present proof) and applying Fatou’s lemma to exchange the integral op-
erator with the lim sup
n→∞
, the proof proceeds identically as before, and the final conclu-
sion follows by noting that if lim
n→∞ µˆX(
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅}) > 0 with nonzero proba-
bility, then (by the monotone convergence theorem) lim
n→∞E[µˆX(
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅})] =
E
[
lim
n→∞ µˆX(
⋃{Ai : X1:n ∩Ai = ∅})] > 0. For brevity, we leave the details of the proof as
an exercise for the interested reader. Since strong universal consistency implies weak uni-
versal consistency, the sufficiency of Condition 1 for universal consistency of inductive or
self-adaptive learning (from Lemmas 25 and 18), as well as the result on optimistically
universal self-adaptive learning (Lemma 27), continue to hold for the weak universal con-
sistency criterion in place of strong universal consistency. In particular, this means that
the set of processes admitting weak universal inductive or self-adaptive learning is equal to
SUIL or SUAL, both of which are equal C1 by Theorem 7. Additionally, it follows from
statements made in the proof of Theorem 6 that Theorem 6 remains valid for weak universal
consistency as well. Again, the details are left as an exercise for the interested reader.
Interestingly, the extension to weak consistency in the online learning setting (with ℓ¯ <
∞) is substantially more involved, and indeed the set of processes that admit weak universal
online learning is in fact a strict superset of SUOL (if X is infinite). That it is a superset
easily follows from the fact that almost sure convergence implies convergence in probability,
so the interesting detail here is that there exist processes X that admit weak universal
online learning but not strong universal online learning. To see this, consider the following
construction of a process X. Let {zi}∞i=0 be distinct elements of X (supposing X is infinite),
and let {Bk}∞k=1 be independent random variables with Bk ∼ Bernoulli(1/k). Then for each
k ∈ N and each t ∈ {2k−1, . . . , 2k − 1}, if Bk = 1, then set Xt = zt, and if Bk = 0, then set
Xt = z0. Since
∞∑
k=1
1/k =∞, the second Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that, with probability
one, there exists an infinite strictly-increasing sequence {ki}∞i=1 in N with Bki = 1 for every
i ∈ N. On this event, every k ∈ {ki : i ∈ N} has |{j ∈ N : X1:(2k−1) ∩ {zj} 6= ∅}| ≥ 2k−1,
so that |{j ∈ N : X1:T ∩ {zj} 6= ∅}| 6= o(T ) (a.s.). Thus, X /∈ C2, and hence by Theorem 35,
X /∈ SUOL. However, if we take fn as the simple memorization-based online learning rule
(from the proof of Theorem 36), then for any n ∈ N and measurable f⋆ : X → Y, we have
E
[
LˆX(f·, f⋆;n)
]
≤ ℓ¯nE [|{j ∈ N ∪ {0} : X1:n ∩ {zj} 6= ∅}|] ≤ ℓ¯n
(
1 +
⌊log2(2n)⌋∑
k=1
2k−1(1/k)
)
≤
ℓ¯
n
(
1 +
⌊log2(4n)⌋∫
1
2x−1(1/x)dx
)
. Since
t∫
1
2x−1(1/x)dx = o
(
t∫
1
2xdx
)
as t→∞ (by L’Hoˆpital’s
rule and the fundamental theorem of calculus), and
t∫
1
2xdx = 1ln(2)2
t, we conclude that
E
[
LˆX(f·, f⋆;n)
]
= o(1), which implies LˆX(f·, f⋆;n) P−→ 0 by Markov’s inequality. Thus, X
admits weak universal online learning.
Following arguments analogous to the proof of Theorem 35, one can show that a neces-
sary condition for a process X to admit weak universal online learning is that every disjoint
sequence {Ai}∞i=1 in B satisfies E[|{i ∈ N : X1:T ∩ Ai 6= ∅}|] = o(T ). This represents a
sort of weak form of Condition 2. Furthermore, following similar arguments to the proof of
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Theorem 36, one can show that in the special case of countable X , this condition is both
necessary and sufficient for X to admit weak universal online learning. However, as was the
case for Condition 2 and strong universal consistency (Open Problem 2), in the general case
(allowing uncountable X ) it remains an open problem to determine whether this weaker
form of Condition 2 is equivalent to the condition that X admits weak universal online learn-
ing. Likewise, it also remains an open problem to determine whether there generally exist
optimistically universal online learning rules under this weak consistency criterion instead
of the strong consistency criterion.
In the case of unbounded losses, one can show that Theorems 45 and 46 extend to
weak universal consistency without modification. Since almost sure convergence implies
convergence in probability, Theorem 45 immediately implies sufficiency of Condition 3 for
a process to admit weak universal learning (in all three settings). Furthermore, the same
construction used in the proof of Lemma 49 can be used to show that Condition 3 is also
necessary for weak universal learning (again in all three settings) when ℓ¯ =∞. Specifically,
for any X /∈ C3, in the notation defined in the proof of Lemma 49, we would have that for
any online learning rule hn, every j ∈ N has P
(
LˆX(h·, f⋆K ;Tj) > 12
)
≥ 12P(0 < τj ≤ Tj) ≥
1
2(P(E)− 2−j), which is bounded away from 0 for all sufficiently large j. Since one can also
show that Tj →∞, it follows that ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) such that lim sup
n→∞
P
(
LˆX(h·, f⋆κ ;n) > 12
)
> 0, so
that hn is not weakly universally consistent under X. Similarly, for any self-adaptive learning
rule gn,m, we would have that for any n ∈ N, P
(
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆K ;n) ≥ 12
)
≥ P(E∩E′) > 0, which
implies ∃κ ∈ [0, 1) such that lim sup
n→∞
P
(
LˆX(gn,·, f⋆κ ;n) ≥ 12
)
> 0, so that gn,m is not weakly
universally consistent under X. The same argument holds for any inductive learning rule
fn as well. The details of these arguments are left as an exercise for the interested reader.
Together with Theorems 45 and 46 and the fact that almost sure convergence implies
convergence in probability, this also implies that there exists an optimistically universal
learning rule (in all three settings) under this weak consistency criterion as well.
10. Open Problems
For convenience, we conclude the paper by briefly gathering in summary form the main
open problems posed in the sections above, along with additional general directions for
future study. The statements involving ℓ regard the case ℓ¯ <∞.
• Open Problem 1: Does there exist an optimistically universal online learning rule?
• Open Problem 2: Is SUOL = C2?
• Open Problem 3: Is the set SUOL invariant to the specification of (Y, ℓ), subject to
being separable with 0 < ℓ¯ <∞?
• Open Problem 4: For some uncountable X , do there exist processes X ∈ C3 such that,
with nonzero probability, the number of distinct x ∈ X appearing in X is infinite?
One additional general direction for future study is to introduce the possibility of
stochastic Yt values given Xt, rather than simply supposing Yt = f
⋆(Xt) as above. Such an
92
Learning Whenever Learning is Possible
extension would necessarily re-introduce some degree of arbitrariness in the assumptions.
One simple starting place would be to suppose Yt is conditionally independent of {Yt′}t′ 6=t
given Xt, and that E[ℓ(f
⋆(Xt), Yt)|Xt] = min
y∈Y
E[ℓ(y, Yt)|Xt], and then we would be interested
in the average loss achieved by a learning rule fn relative to f
⋆: that is (in the case of induc-
tive learning, for instance), lim sup
m→∞
1
m
n+m∑
t=n+1
(ℓ(fn(X1:n, f
⋆(X1:n),Xt), Yt)− ℓ(f⋆(Xt), Yt)).
The question is then whether the conditions for achieving universal consistency in this excess
loss remain the same as for the theory developed above, or generally what the conditions
would be, and whether optimistically universal learning rules exist (under this conditional
independence assumption). However, it is conceivable that other assumptions may be im-
portant for such a theory, such as (as an extreme example) supposing that the conditional
distribution of Yt given Xt is invariant to t; this would still be a strict generalization of the
theory developed in the present work.
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